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3The twentieth century saw an acceleration in the process of 
urbanisation, of a speed and pace of change that outstripped the 
genteel and planned expansion of Paris, Barcelona, Berlin and even 
London in the previous century. This process has accelerated even 
further since 2000, completely transforming the physiognomy of 
some cities in response to profound changes in global economic  
and social trends. 
Rio de Janeiro stands out today as a city that is embracing change  
and undergoing profound transformation. As such, it provides 
the ideal setting for an informed debate on the impacts of city 
transformations across the globe. This is why the Urban Age, an 
international investigation of cities jointly organised by the London 
School of Economics and Deutsche Bank’s Alfred Herrhausen Society, 
has chosen to hold its twelfth conference in this unique Brazilian city 
that is both investing and reflecting on the long-term impacts of such 
intense urban change. 
Over 70 speakers from 40 cities and 20 countries will be joining  
local urban experts, policymakers, investors, NGOs and academics 
to discuss these issues, with a view to improving our understanding 
of how to design, manage and live in more equitable urban 
environments.
Ricky Burdett  
Director, the Urban Age  
and LSE Cities  
London School of Economics
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6At the close of the 2012 Urban Age 
conference in London, the urbanist and 
social theorist Richard Sennett argued 
that the tendency to build large-scale new 
cities and neighbourhoods is depriving 
us of the social and creative energies of 
traditional urban form – often referred to 
as cityness. He returns to this theme in this 
newspaper for the Urban Age conference 
in Rio de Janeiro by framing the debate on 
cities as a contrast between efficiency and 
sociability. This duality is at the heart of 
the investigation of the interrelationships 
between the social and the physical in 
cities, which since 2005 have shaped the 
explorations of the Urban Age programme 
at LSE Cities.
For the Rio Urban Age conference we 
have focussed on the impact of radical 
transformations in cities that have 
reshaped – at times drastically – the 
spatial, social and economic landscape of 
urban centres across the globe. We have 
used the opportunity of Rio’s intense 
pace and scale of change to reflect on 
the social and creative energies of urban 
form at different scales and levels, in an 
attempt to understand how they affect 
patterns of everyday urban life, in positive 
and negative ways. We are interested in 
finding out whether the streets, blocks and 
infrastructure networks being built today 
are guiding us to more equitable, efficient 
and more civic lives, or are working against 
the grain of that elusive quality of cityness, 
fostering divisiveness and inequality in the 
rush to build and compete. 
This publication is designed to 
contribute to the debate with texts and 
research by over twenty leading urban 
commentators, academics, policymakers 
and practitioners investigating the 
recent transformations of cities like Rio, 
London, Barcelona, Mumbai, Bogotá, 
Hamburg and Cape Town. It contains 
new research carried out by LSE Cities, 
comparing the social, economic and spatial 
characteristics of Rio de Janeiro with 
other global cities, and provides detailed 
analysis of the changing physiognomy of 
cities and projects in selected urban areas. 
The objective of the newspaper and the 
conference it supports is to ask a number of 
key questions. What are the drivers of these 
physical transformations and the global 
political economies that are emerging 
behind these building programmes? 
What long-term dependencies are such 
transformations putting before us and 
how flexible are these forms to social 
and economic change? How are citizens 
demanding different infrastructures and 
questioning the traditional role of markets 
and the State in delivering big projects?
These same questions were being asked 
over 150 years ago when London’s Victorian 
reformers saw fit to improve the health 
of their citizens by constructing a major 
sewerage system under their city. What 
they found was a London subdivided into 
small territorial interests, unable to take the 
necessary metropolitan decisions that such 
a land-thirsty city transformation required. 
In delivering the project, the Victorians 
created a new metropolitan authority, the 
predecessor to London’s first government, 
the London County Council, founded in 
1889. Put in simple terms, the project had 
the ability to concentrate power away from 
the vestries and later normalise this new-
found power into governing Londoners in 
the name of greater utility. 
Critics like David Harvey and Deyan 
Sudjic have commented on how these large-
scale technical interventions barely conceal 
a social programme – from Haussman’s 
Paris to Robert Moses’s New York. 
More recently, Carlos Vainer and other 
commentators have identified similarities 
with some of the developments taking place 
in Rio. To implement ‘big’ plans of large 
ambitions – from the Rio 2016 Olympics, 
the UPP pacification programme, the 
restructuring of Porto Maravilha and 
investment in major Bus Rapid Transit 
(BRT) lines – the City and State of Rio de 
Janeiro have developed new institutions to 
deliver these projects that can be seen to 
question the ‘right to the city’. 
London has confronted similar 
issues as it created its own ‘top-down’ 
institutions to deliver the 2012 Olympics, 
ensure its legacy and bring about lasting 
regeneration in the deprived zones of East 
London. The Olympic Delivery Authority, 
and the recently formed London Legacy 
Development Company (chaired by the 
Mayor), as Andy Altman explains, are 
charged with sweeping planning and 
decision-making powers, even though they 
have worked in partnership with boroughs 
and local groups. Despite some level of  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Savvas Verdis and Ricky 
Burdett introduce the core 
themes of the Urban Age  
City Transformations 
conference in Rio de Janeiro 
and its allied newspaper. 
criticism of democratic deficit, broadly their 
operation has been applauded for getting 
the job done. Hamburg’s HafenCity and 
experimental IBA initiative – both designed 
to tackle issues of deindustrialisation and 
the needs of large migrant communities 
(most notably Muslim Turks) – provide 
relevant models of intervention and 
delivery that take into account the need to 
ensure continuity of the urban fabric and 
the everyday needs of existing (and not 
just new) communities. All issues which 
resonate in the urban reality of Rio today. 
Brazil’s democratic commitment to 
the right of the city has been followed by 
many, including Edgar Pieterse writing in 
this newspaper, who have long admired 
the country’s 2001 Statute of the City. 
This national law seeks to prioritise the 
social use over the commercial use of land 
and to democratise the decision-making 
process in cities through compulsory 
participatory governance models. Yet, the 
reality on the ground is different. A large 
proportion of the urban public believe that 
mega-projects are tampering with strategic 
priorities through what Julia Michaels 
calls a favour-exchanging populist system, 
putting the private interest over the public 
good – tensions that exist as much in New 
York, London and Amsterdam, as Susan 
Fainstein argues, as they do in Rio de 
Janeiro. Despite the significant generational 
improvements in Rio’s social and economic 
life – decreasing levels of inequality and 
absolute poverty, homicides at a historical 
low, and GDP per capita double from 
its 2001 levels – the anthropologist Luiz 
Eduardo Soares defines the fine-grain 
cracks that are appearing in Brazilian 
society and account for the recent popular 
discontent and uprisings in Rio, São 
Paulo and other cities. How can planners, 
policymakers and designers deal with such 
contradictions?
The dilemma emerging from London 
in the 1850s and Rio in the 2010s is how 
to balance the large economic benefits 
that often accrue from large-scale projects 
to the individual and communal rights 
of citizens. As David Harvey writes in 
the classic The Right to the City, parts of 
which are reproduced in this newspaper, 
we need a ‘collective right to reshape the 
forces of urbanisation’. There is a very 
practical dimension to this call that has 
repercussions to the way projects are 
designed, procured and delivered. Part of 
the problem lies in the temporal conflicts 
that exist between democratic and project 
timelines. All too often, the collective right 
of decision-making cannot be practised 
because the time frame of project cycles do 
not run apace. A city such as Rio that has 
not seen major transport investments in 
over twenty years is having to think of who 
should be connected and how in the space 
of only seven years – the project cycle of an 
Olympic Games. Democratic processes and 
strategic planning take much longer. 
A second challenge of accelerated 
transformations occurs when the 
physical and social fabric of the city has 
to catch up with structural adjustments 
and transformations in the economy. 
Neighbourhoods and skills sets can 
become rapidly redundant, leaving 
local populations economically isolated, 
resulting in unemployment, alienation 
and increased income inequalities. This 
trend informs a second line of investigation 
addressed by the texts and research in 
this newspaper. LSE Cities has looked 
at how public transport infrastructure 
impacts on deprived and disconnected 
neighbourhoods, and how investment in 
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new mobility systems – like Rio’s BRT,  
TransMilenio in Bogotá and Crossrail in 
London – can bring people closer to their 
places of work. In addition to the effect 
of transport improvements discussed by 
Enrique Peñalosa, the publication also 
explores how spatially targeted policies are 
able to concentrate investment in lower 
income neighbourhoods. In this regard, 
the Mayor of London’s attention to the 
deprived area around Stratford and the 
Lower Lea Valley in East London, where the 
2012 Olympics were located – the poorest 
districts in the capital – can be compared 
to Rio’s ongoing project to ‘urbanise’ or 
upgrade all of the city’s favelas by 2020. To 
urbanise favelas means to reconnect them 
(socially, politically and economically) to 
the city so that the distinction between 
asphalt (city) and hill (favela), which 
was at the heart of the stigmatisation of 
residents of the latter for over thirty years, 
is challenged. This reconnection or opening 
of the favelas to the city is occurring 
in multiple ways. Sandra Jovchelovitch 
concentrates on the role that cultural 
groups play, acting as bridges to the outside 
world, and reflects on the relative porosity 
or openness of particular communities in 
Rio. Sérgio Magalhães and Fabiana Izaga 
focus on the role of the State in recovering 
the territory of the favela from the para-
state of drug traffickers, allowing some 
measure of normality to resume. Suketu 
Mehta sees their urbanisation as the 
replacement of para-state power with the 
speculative power of real estate. Rather than 
urbanisation programmes leading to greater 
equity, Mehta sees them as leading residents 
to the inequalities of a free economy. By 
eradicating one form of inequality do city 
transformations lead to new ones? The 
role of the city policymaker or planner 
therefore becomes more paramount, which 
takes us to the third critical dimension of 
accelerated transformations.
Rio’s current urban renaissance, just 
as London’s resurgence that started over 
twenty years ago and Barcelona’s that 
goes all the way back to the 1980s, share a 
common starting point. They are driven by 
a period of mass investment associated to 
a growing city economy. London’s recent 
transformation was underpinned by the 
globalisation of the financial services 
industry and Rio’s to the income from oil 
and gas and its indirect services economy. 
The role of the urban policymaker is to 
steer this investment into sustainable paths. 
The question is less about economic growth 
or population growth, but about how this 
growth rebalances the city. This rebalancing 
is both spatial as in London’s East-to-West 
asymmetry and Rio’s North-to-South, but 
also temporal. How are we to rebalance the 
interests of future against those of current 
generations? 
In this context, the need for strong 
planning systems that are both visionary 
and democratic offer a new life for 
‘big-picture planning’, as Deyan Sudjic 
intimates. As the Urban Age considers 
the spatial and temporal dynamics of big 
planning during periods of accelerated 
change, it is time to reconsider the best 
models that deliver, as Richard Sennett 
argues, both efficiency and sociability. 
Savvas Verdis is Senior Research 
Fellow at the London School of 
Economics and Political Science 
(LSE) and consultant at Siemens. 
Ricky Burdett is Professor of 
Urban Studies and Director of 
LSE Cities and the Urban Age 
Programme at the LSE.
Percentage of Brazil’s total oil 
production comes from State of  
Rio de Janeiro 
Source: ANP (2011)
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As Rio de Janeiro expands westwards, 
a new urban landscape is emerging 
reflecting the radical restructuring of the 
city’s social and economic profile.
8Pessimism about the transformative 
possibilities of urbanism has reappeared 
since the triumphant reconstruction 
of Barcelona before and after the 1992 
Olympics rekindled the pursuit of what 
might be called big-picture planning. 
Sometime in the second half of the 
1960s it had become clear that the public 
in most of the developed world had lost its 
faith in planning. And a lot of the planning 
professionals agreed. It is not hard to see 
why. The utopias of post-World War II 
planning had conspicuously failed to live up 
to the promises made for them. Dynamiting 
the Pruitt-Igoe housing estate in St. Louis 
was a huge and visible signal of all that 
could go wrong. But perhaps of greater 
significance to the low regard in which 
planning was held was Sir Peter Hall’s 
book Great Planning Disasters, published 
in 1981. Hall, one of the most influential 
urbanists of the second half of the twentieth 
century, took a scalpel to five fiascos, all 
of them intended to have been exercises in 
transformative planning. He looked at the 
absurdly expensive and inconclusive story 
of London’s strategy for a third airport, a 
story that more than 40 years later is still 
no nearer resolution. He was no more 
sympathetic to the Bay Area Rapid Transit 
system, which San Francisco did build, at 
least in part, and to the Opera House in 
Sydney. 
Opinion on the effectiveness of at least 
one of these projects has changed in the 
interim, but the book summed up a view of 
the dangers implicit in adopting big ideas 
about planning. They are expensive, they 
take too long, and often they don’t work.
If even some professionals saw things 
this way, it was no wonder that in the 
wider world of activists, intellectuals 
and politicians, as well as the everyday 
victims of slum clearances, and motorway 
construction, there was revulsion against 
any further evisceration of Europe’s and 
North America’s great cities, from London 
to Brussels, and Paris to Manhattan. 
Even in Japan, a country that has shown 
no reluctance to embrace break-neck 
modernisation, a generation of radical 
students spent a decade fighting riot police 
to stop the building of Narita Airport. The 
claims of rice farmers working on ancestral 
land were far more important for them 
than giving Japan a modern gateway to the 
world.
From her vantage point in Greenwich 
Village, Jane Jacobs stopped Robert Moses’s 
road building plans, and published her 
devastating attack on those who attempted 
drastic surgery on the fabric of the city. 
Small, she believed, was the future. Cities 
should be nurtured, not transformed. Not 
everyone believed her. Lewis Mumford 
reviewed The Life and Death of Great 
American Cities for the New Yorker,  
under the headline: ‘Home Remedies for 
Urban Cancer’.
But when Robert Caro wrote 
his onslaught on Robert Moses, The 
Powerbroker, he made the very idea of 
urban transformation suspect. Robert Lee, 
Mayor of New Haven in the 1960s, a Robert 
Moses for the Kennedy era, appeared on 
the front pages to boast that he had rid 
his city of what he called the shame of the 
10,000 rats evicted from just one run-down 
block in his campaign of scorched-earth 
planning. But after New Haven burnt in 
race riots, Lee’s approach looked a lot 
less plausible and planning took a much 
lower profile. It merely became a statistical 
analysis, or, at least, it was now shaped by 
many small steps, rather than in a single 
coup de théâtre.
Barcelona changed all that. This was 
a city in which architects, planners and 
politicians had suffered in the same prison 
cells during the Franco years, and were 
close enough to each other to be able to 
embark on the renewal of their city once 
the dictator had gone. It is true that there 
were protests about the gentrification of 
the red light district, and the destruction 
of the El Poblenou community on the 
waterfront. But the massive investment in 
infrastructure after the punishment of the 
city in the Franco years really did transform 
Barcelona in a universally popular way. 
Barcelona went from darkened, crumbling 
neglect to an architectural showcase that 
brought jobs, tourists and creative energy. 
It became a world city. And as a result 
it became a model for other attempts to 
transform cities around the world. From 
John Prescott, Tony Blair’s hapless planning 
minister, to the Mayor of Shanghai, 
everybody came to learn the lessons of 
Barcelona.
It was at least a more worthwhile lesson 
than the idea that a single building, in the 
Bilbao style, can transform a city. But a 
Spain in the grip of economic trauma no 
longer looks such a promising model for the 
world to learn from. Valencia in particular 
is a city that wasted a fortune on the vain 
glory of Santiago Calatrava. Barcelona did 
a lot of very sensible things to transform 
itself. But from the shuttered and empty 
Forum designed by Herzog & de Meuron, 
and built in a bout of hubris, to the Design 
Hub, designed by Martorell, Bohigas, and 
Mackay, and built under the shadow of Jean 
Nouvel’s Torre Agbar, without a real brief, 
it has shown itself better at starting things 
than it is at sustaining them.
Nowhere has this pessimism about 
the transformative potential of planning 
become clearer than in the idea of big 
event planning encapsulated by the idea 
of staging an Olympic games in the name 
of urbanism. For Barcelona it worked. For 
London it probably will too. The eastern 
fringes of the UK’s capital city had been the 
subject of long-term plans for decades. The 
Olympics finally put the infrastructure in 
place, and Stratford really has had the kick-
start it needed to reverse London’s endless 
Deyan Sudjic explores the 
resurgence of big-picture 
planning and defines its  
historical context as 
backdrop to the Urban Age 
discussions.
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prejudice for looking West rather than 
East. But for Montreal, the Olympics, and 
the Expo that preceded them, were almost 
as much of a financial catastrophe as they 
were for Athens. It is curious how in all the 
forensic analysis of the Greek economic 
meltdown associated with its membership 
of the Eurozone, little attention is paid to its 
borrowing spree to finance the Games and 
build all those pointless landmarks, now 
empty, in accounting for how things went 
so wrong. All these disasters make it easy 
to flinch away from any attempt to address 
the large and real problems that cities face, 
and to believe that they can be dealt with in 
small, comfortable, almost invisible steps.
Sometimes it seems as if all the complex 
arguments about how we should understand 
the future of cities might boil down to 
the resolution of just two questions that 
represent polar opposites. Are we best 
served by high- or by low-density models 
of urbanism? Is the market a better guide 
for shaping development than the State? 
They are models that keep appearing and 
reappearing around the world.
But perhaps, there is another, even more 
fundamental, question to face up to. What 
can we really do in order to address what 
might be described as the urban bigger 
picture, in order to transform it to achieve 
positive effects?  Are urban transformations 
actually possible? Or should we avoid the 
fall-out from taking risks, and confine 
ourselves instead to small, incremental 
steps, and attempt to deal with one pothole, 
and one traffic jam at a time? If for nothing 
else, because we want to avoid the law 
of unexpected consequences? Critics of 
big-picture planning characterise it as 
being concerned more with the image of 
development, than with its substance. It 
is presented as the product of egotistical 
politicians and their officials, sometimes 
incompetent, or corrupt, and always 
tending towards hubris. And instead they 
argue for a bottom-up approach.
Putting the argument that image 
building has always been a vitally important 
contributory factor in creating successful 
cities to one side, the greatest example 
suggesting that big-picture planning could 
work used to be the Paris of Haussmann 
and Napoleon III. For those who 
understand city planning on such a scale 
as primarily political in its motivations, it 
is true that the glory of the city of light did 
not keep Napoleon in power, or dissuade 
Prussia from invading France during the 
year of the Paris Commune. So on these 
terms it might be said to be a failure. But 
Paris is still a model for those who see the 
city as a work of art; a city that is capable 
of being completed, and as a result ready to 
accept a steady state. This is not an entirely 
positive model. The Paris that is defined by 
the limits of the Périphérique is incapable 
of the kind of change that brought the city 
into being in the first place. Paris, if present 
trends continue, is fated to become a large-
scale version of Venice, while the banlieues 
would be happy if they were able to turn 
into Mestre. Paris’s success was also the 
source of its failure. The Grand Projets of 
President Mitterrand in the 1980s could 
only change the architectural language, not 
the basic structure of the French capital.
Haussmann did not just build 
boulevards, and visually highly regimented 
streets. He installed the sewers that 
allowed Paris to escape from the medieval 
scourge of cholera. The dispossessed of 
Paris had to pay a price. For those who are 
looking to find a negative impact from the 
transformation of Morro da Providência 
in Rio into the Porto Maravilha, the city’s 
promised glittering new waterfront, or the 
pacification of the Complexo do Alemão, or, 
for that matter, the rebuilding of the centre 
of Mumbai and of Shanghai, Haussmann’s 
Paris provided a clue about what was to 
come. Paris was a century and a half ahead 
of Rio, Shanghai and Mumbai in seeing the 
eviction of existing communities from the 
homes they had occupied for a generation or 
two, to barrack life on the outer edges of the 
city, while wealthy speculators have profited 
from their forced departure. The same 
pattern was repeated in each city. 
It is an example that for 20 years 
provided an extraordinarily seductive 
model for cities looking to use big 
events as catalysts for large-scale urban 
transformation. Barcelona’s recent history 
in the past 25 years has a lot to do with 
the continuing willingness of cities to 
bid for the chance to pour billions of 
dollars, pounds, roubles or reais into bouts 
of stadium building and mass transit 
construction. And it is behind the fetish 
that the Olympic commission has made 
of the concept of legacy since the Beijing 
games, or earlier. Legacy and sustainability 
are an inevitable part of the rhetoric of the 
modern games now. Even Athens was able 
to persuade itself for a moment that it was 
bankrupting Greece for the sake of the 
Games in order to secure its future. The 
danger is that in regarding the big picture 
with suspicion, we end up with the worst 
of all worlds when we cannot avoid the 
challenge.
Rio is far from alone in facing the 
difficult questions about big-picture 
planning. The history of social housing in 
Britain, where in some areas there have been 
three cycles of demolition and rebuilding to 
different models in a single lifetime, would 
suggest the difficulty of expecting a big-idea 
approach to cities to work. Whatever we do, 
no matter how much we invest, gains are 
only temporary; one generation’s modernist 
utopia inexorably seems to turn into the 
slums of the next. The argument in London, 
about how to deal with Heathrow airport 
that is choking with passengers to the point 
that it is undermining the economic future 
of London, and so of Britain as a whole, 
reflects the reluctance, both of governments 
and the political class, to face up to large 
questions. But it is worth pointing out that 
Heathrow, Europe’s busiest airport, was not 
the product of a grand plan, but a series of 
accidents, and unintended consequences. 
London’s first international airport in the 
1920s and 1930s was in Croydon, far to the 
South of the city. Heathrow was an accident. 
Its first runway was built at the end of 
World War II as a jumping-off point for 
British bombers to attack Germany. In the 
postwar period, it became a civilian airport 
by default, with a tent for a departure hall. 
And it has gone on growing ever since. 
Britain is divided between those who 
see Isambard Kingdom Brunel – the great 
nineteenth-century engineer – as a hero, 
and those who regard him as a heroic 
failure. Of course, Brunel’s idea of a broad-
gauge railway was technically superior to 
the standard gauge that almost the whole 
world adopted. If all the existing railways 
had been torn up and relayed to Brunel’s 
broad gauge, it would have produced a 
better railway. But it was already too late: 
the world was full of expensive locomotives 
that could only run on the existing tracks. 
There was no point in wasting time on 
what might be better. Broad gauge was 
better than standard, but it was not the best 
possible railway. A more effective engineer 
would have focused on making the best of 
the possible.
9The fundamental questions for any city 
in search of a transformative future are; 
does it have the ability to articulate a vision 
shared by its citizens, and does it have the 
ability to make the vision possible? Rio saw 
the consequences of big-picture planning 
half a century ago, when Brazil’s president 
Juscelino Kubitchek decided to follow the 
promises of the country’s constitution, and 
move the national capital to the entirely 
new city of Brasília. The problem for 
those who question how appropriate big-
picture planning can be is that the issues 
facing cities have only grown larger and 
more complex. No matter how much we 
might wish to address them differently, 
big problems require a response on an 
appropriate scale.
Ignoring the issues of mobility, of 
poverty, of security and development, can 
only make matters more difficult. Leaving 
those who can afford the cost to create 
private enclaves with their own police, 
energy, and services, is clearly an approach 
that only creates more problems in the 
future. There are big things happening to 
the world cities, whether we want them to, 
or not. Years ago, I compared urbanism to 
meteorology. If you look carefully enough, 
you can tell when it is going to rain, but you 
can’t make it rain. Technologically, that is 
probably no longer true. Beijing certainly 
did its best to modify the weather during 
the Olympics. 
But if weather is no longer an 
appropriate analogy for understanding 
cities, then perhaps it is also important to 
understand that art is neither. When Jane 
Jacobs wrote The Life and Death of Great 
American Cities (1961), she also suggested 
that a city cannot be a work of art. But that 
does not mean we should abandon the 
idea of facing up to the large and troubling 
problems that cities must address if they 
are to flourish. The point is that there is 
no one single plan. Just as the city is never 
finished, there is never just one plan either: 
there is always the need to formulate the 
next one, and to explore the idea of another 
transformation.
Deyan Sudjic is Director of the 
Design Museum, London and co-
editor of Living in the Endless City.
We live in an era when ideals of human 
rights have moved centre stage both 
politically and ethically. A great deal of 
energy is expended in promoting their 
significance for the construction of a better 
world. But for the most part the concepts 
circulating do not fundamentally challenge 
hegemonic liberal and neo-liberal market 
logics, or the dominant modes of legality 
and state action. We live, after all, in a world 
in which the rights of private property and 
the profit rate trump all other notions of 
rights. I here want to explore another type 
of human right, that of the right to the city. 
Has the astonishing pace and scale of 
urbanisation over the last hundred years 
contributed to human well-being? The city, 
in the words of urban sociologist Robert 
Park, is: 
man’s most successful attempt to remake 
the world he lives in more after his heart’s 
desire. But, if the city is the world which 
man created, it is the world in which he 
is henceforth condemned to live. Thus, 
indirectly, and without any clear sense of the 
nature of his task, in making the city man 
has remade himself.1
The question of what kind of city we want 
cannot be divorced from that of what 
kind of social ties, relationship to nature, 
lifestyles, technologies and aesthetic 
values we desire. The right to the city is 
far more than the individual liberty to 
access urban resources: it is a right to 
change ourselves by changing the city. It 
is, moreover, a common rather than an 
individual right since this transformation 
inevitably depends upon the exercise of a 
collective power to reshape the processes 
of urbanisation. The freedom to make and 
remake our cities and ourselves is, I want 
to argue, one of the most precious yet most 
neglected of our human rights. 
From their inception, cities have 
arisen through geographical and social 
concentrations of a surplus product. 
Urbanisation has always been, therefore, 
a class phenomenon, since surpluses are 
extracted from somewhere and from 
somebody, while the control over their 
disbursement typically lies in a few hands. 
This general situation persists under 
capitalism, of course; but since urbanisation 
depends on the mobilisation of a surplus 
product, an intimate connection emerges 
between the development of capitalism and 
urbanisation. Capitalists have to produce a 
surplus product in order to produce surplus 
value; this in turn must be reinvested 
in order to generate more surplus value. 
The result of continued reinvestment is 
the expansion of surplus production at a 
compound rate – hence the logistic curves 
(money, output and population) attached 
to the history of capital accumulation, 
paralleled by the growth path of 
urbanisation under capitalism.
The perpetual need to find profitable 
terrains for capital-surplus production and 
absorption shapes the politics of capitalism. 
It also presents the capitalist with a number 
of barriers to continuous and trouble-free 
expansion. If labour is scarce and wages 
are high, either existing labour has to be 
disciplined – technologically induced 
unemployment or an assault on organised 
working-class power are two prime 
methods – or fresh labour forces must be 
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found by immigration, export of capital or 
proletarianisation of hitherto independent 
elements of the population. Capitalists must 
also discover new means of production in 
general and natural resources in particular, 
which puts increasing pressure on the 
natural environment to yield up necessary 
raw materials and absorb the inevitable 
waste. They need to open up terrains for 
raw-material extraction – often the objective 
of imperialist and neo-colonial endeavours.
The coercive laws of competition also 
force the continuous implementation of new 
technologies and organisational forms, since 
these enable capitalists to out-compete those 
using inferior methods. Innovations define 
new wants and needs, reduce the turnover 
time of capital and lessen the friction of 
distance, which limits the geographical 
range within which the capitalist can search 
for expanded labour supplies, raw materials, 
and so on. If there is not enough purchasing 
power in the market, then new markets 
must be found by expanding foreign trade, 
promoting novel products and lifestyles, 
creating new credit instruments, and debt-
financing state and private expenditures. 
If, finally, the profit rate is too low, then 
state regulation of ‘ruinous competition’, 
monopolisation (mergers and acquisitions) 
and capital exports provide ways out. 
If any of the above barriers cannot 
be circumvented, capitalists are unable 
profitably to reinvest their surplus product. 
Capital accumulation is blocked, leaving 
them facing a crisis, in which their capital 
can be devalued and in some instances even 
physically wiped out. Surplus commodities 
can lose value or be destroyed, while 
productive capacity and assets can be 
written down and left unused; money itself 
can be devalued through inflation, and 
labour through massive unemployment. 
How, then, has the need to circumvent 
these barriers and to expand the terrain 
of profitable activity driven capitalist 
urbanisation? I argue here that urbanisation 
has played a particularly active role, 
alongside such phenomena as military 
expenditures, in absorbing the surplus 
product that capitalists perpetually produce 
in their search for profits.
[....]
Property and pacification 
As in all the preceding phases, this most 
recent radical expansion of the urban 
process has brought with it incredible 
transformations of lifestyle. Quality of 
urban life has become a commodity, 
as has the city itself, in a world where 
consumerism, tourism, cultural and 
knowledge-based industries have become 
major aspects of the urban political 
economy. The postmodernist penchant for 
encouraging the formation of market niches 
– in both consumer habits and cultural 
forms – surrounds the contemporary 
urban experience with an aura of freedom 
of choice, provided you have the money. 
Shopping malls, multiplexes and box 
stores proliferate, as do fast-food and 
artisanal market-places. We now have, 
as urban sociologist Sharon Zukin puts 
it, ‘pacification by cappuccino’. Even 
the incoherent, bland and monotonous 
suburban tract development that continues 
to dominate in many areas now gets its 
antidote in a ‘new urbanism’ movement 
that touts the sale of community and 
boutique lifestyles to fulfil urban dreams. 
This is a world in which the neo-liberal 
ethic of intense possessive individualism, 
and its cognate of political withdrawal 
from collective forms of action, becomes 
the template for human socialisation.2 
The defence of property values becomes 
of such paramount political interest that, 
as Mike Davis points out, the homeowner 
associations in the state of California 
become bastions of political reaction, if not 
of fragmented neighbourhood fascisms.3
We increasingly live in divided and 
conflict-prone urban areas. In the past 
three decades, the neo-liberal turn has 
restored class power to rich elites. Fourteen 
billionaires have emerged in Mexico since 
then, and in 2006 that country boasted the 
richest man on earth, Carlos Slim, at the 
same time as the incomes of the poor had 
either stagnated or diminished. The results 
are indelibly etched on the spatial forms 
of our cities, which increasingly consist 
of fortified fragments, gated communities 
and privatised public spaces kept under 
constant surveillance. In the developing 
world in particular, the city is splitting 
into different separated parts, with the 
apparent formation of many ‘micro-states’. 
Wealthy neighbourhoods provided with all 
kinds of services, such as exclusive schools, 
golf courses, tennis courts and private 
police patrolling the area around the clock 
intertwine with illegal settlements where 
water is available only at public fountains, 
no sanitation system exists, electricity 
is pirated by a privileged few, the roads 
become mud streams whenever it rains, 
and where house-sharing is the norm. 
Each fragment appears to live and function 
autonomously, sticking firmly to what it 
has been able to grab in the daily fight for 
survival.4
Under these conditions, ideals of urban 
identity, citizenship and belonging – already 
threatened by the spreading malaise of a 
neo-liberal ethic – become much harder to 
sustain. Privatised redistribution through 
criminal activity threatens individual 
security at every turn, prompting popular 
demands for police suppression. Even 
the idea that the city might function as a 
collective body politic, a site within and 
from which progressive social movements 
might emanate, appears implausible. There 
are, however, urban social movements 
seeking to overcome isolation and reshape 
the city in a different image from that 
put forward by the developers, who are 
backed by finance, corporate capital and an 
increasingly entrepreneurially minded local 
state apparatus.
Dispossessions 
Surplus absorption through urban 
transformation has an even darker aspect. 
It has entailed repeated bouts of urban 
restructuring through ‘creative destruction’, 
which nearly always has a class dimension 
since it is the poor, the underprivileged and 
those marginalised from political power 
that suffer first and foremost from this 
process. Violence is required to build the 
new urban world on the wreckage of the old. 
Haussmann tore through the old Parisian 
slums, using powers of expropriation in the 
name of civic improvement and renovation. 
He deliberately engineered the removal of 
much of the working class and other unruly 
elements from the city centre, where they 
constituted a threat to public order and 
political power. He created an urban form 
where it was believed – incorrectly, as it 
turned out in 1871 – that sufficient levels 
of surveillance and military control could 
be attained to ensure that revolutionary 
movements would easily be brought to heel. 
Nevertheless, as Engels pointed out in 1872:
In reality, the bourgeoisie has only one 
method of solving the housing question 
after its fashion – that is to say, of solving it 
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‘asphalt’ in the Complexo do Alemão, one 
of Rio’s most visible, sprawling favelas. 
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During the most recent decade we have 
witnessed the mounting of very large 
development projects (mega-projects) in 
European and American cities. After a 
hiatus during the 1990s, brought on by the 
real estate bust early in the decade, major 
cities have responded to the pressures of 
the global economy by using very big, 
mixed-use developments as attractors 
of multinational business and sites for 
new housing. There is a striking physical 
similarity among the schemes, irrespective 
of the city in which they are located. At the 
same time they differ in social outcomes 
and planning processes, reflecting the 
level of commitment that the host city 
has towards social equity. The three to be 
discussed in this article are Atlantic Yards 
in Brooklyn, New York City; Stratford City 
and the larger Thames Gateway of which it 
forms a part, in London; and Amsterdam 
South (Zuidas).
By the start of the new century all 
three cities had converted their economic 
base from heavy reliance on seaport 
and manufacturing activities to finance, 
business services, tourism, and creative 
industries. This transformation of function 
had forced a restructuring of spatial 
relations, resulting in the growth of 
in such a way that the solution continually 
reproduces the question anew. This method 
is called ‘Haussmann’… No matter how 
different the reasons may be, the result is 
always the same; the scandalous alleys and 
lanes disappear to the accompaniment of 
lavish self-praise from the bourgeoisie on 
account of this tremendous success, but 
they appear again immediately somewhere 
else… The same economic necessity which 
produced them in the first place, produces 
them in the next place.5
It took more than a hundred years to 
complete the embourgeoisement of central 
Paris, with the consequences seen in recent 
years of uprisings and mayhem in those 
isolated suburbs that trap marginalised 
immigrants, unemployed workers and 
youth. The sad point here, of course, is that 
what Engels described recurs throughout 
history. Robert Moses ‘took a meat axe 
to the Bronx’, in his infamous words, 
bringing forth long and loud laments from 
neighbourhood groups and movements. 
In the cases of Paris and New York, once 
the power of state expropriations had been 
successfully resisted and contained, a more 
insidious and cancerous progression took 
hold through municipal fiscal discipline, 
property speculation and the sorting of 
land-use according to the rate of return for 
its ‘highest and best use’. Engels understood 
this sequence all too well: 
The growth of the big modern cities gives 
the land in certain areas, particularly in 
those areas which are centrally situated, 
an artificially and colossally increasing 
value; the buildings erected on these areas 
depress this value instead of increasing 
it, because they no longer belong to the 
changed circumstances. They are pulled 
down and replaced by others. This takes 
place above all with workers’ houses which 
are situated centrally and whose rents, even 
with the greatest overcrowding, can never, 
or only very slowly, increase above a certain 
maximum. They are pulled down and in 
their stead shops, warehouses and public 
buildings are erected.6
Though this description was written in 
1872, it applies directly to contemporary 
urban development in much of Asia – Delhi, 
Seoul, Mumbai – as well as gentrification in 
New York. A process of displacement and 
what I call ‘accumulation by dispossession’ 
lie at the core of urbanisation under 
capitalism.7 It is the mirror image of capital 
absorption through urban redevelopment, 
and is giving rise to numerous conflicts 
over the capture of valuable land from low-
income populations that may have lived 
there for many years. 
Consider the case of Seoul in the 1990s: 
construction companies and developers 
hired goon squads of sumo-wrestler types 
to invade neighbourhoods on the city’s 
hillsides. They sledgehammered down not 
only housing but also all the possessions 
of those who had built their own homes in 
the 1950s on what had become premium 
land. High-rise towers, which show no 
trace of the brutality that permitted their 
construction, now cover most of those 
hillsides. In Mumbai, meanwhile, 6 million 
people officially considered as slum dwellers 
are settled on land without legal title; all 
maps of the city leave these places blank. 
With the attempt to turn Mumbai into a 
global financial centre to rival Shanghai, the 
property-development boom has gathered 
pace, and the land that squatters occupy 
appears increasingly valuable. Dharavi, one 
of the most prominent slums in Mumbai, 
is estimated to be worth US$2 billion. The 
pressure to clear it – for environmental and 
social reasons that mask the land grab – is 
mounting daily. Financial powers backed by 
the state push for forcible slum clearance, 
in some cases violently taking possession 
of terrain occupied for a whole generation. 
Capital accumulation through real-estate 
activity booms, since the land is acquired at 
almost no cost.
Will the people who are displaced 
get compensation? The lucky ones get a 
bit. But while the Indian Constitution 
specifies that the state has an obligation 
to protect the lives and well-being of the 
whole population, irrespective of caste or 
class, and to guarantee rights to housing 
and shelter, the Supreme Court has issued 
judgements that rewrite this constitutional 
requirement. Since slum dwellers are illegal 
occupants and many cannot definitively 
prove their long-term residence, they have 
no right to compensation. To concede that 
right, says the Supreme Court, would be 
tantamount to rewarding pickpockets for 
their actions. So the squatters either resist 
and fight, or move with their few belongings 
to camp out on the sides of motorways 
or wherever they can find a tiny space.8 
Examples of dispossession can also be found 
in the US, though these tend to be less 
brutal and more legalistic: the government’s 
right of eminent domain has been abused 
in order to displace established residents 
in reasonable housing in favour of higher-
order land uses, such as condominiums and 
box stores. When this was challenged in the 
US Supreme Court, the justices ruled that it 
was constitutional for local jurisdictions to 
behave in this way in order to increase their 
property-tax base.9
In China millions are being dispossessed 
of the spaces they have long occupied – 
three million in Beijing alone. Since they 
lack private-property rights, the state can 
simply remove them by fiat, offering a minor 
cash payment to help them on their way 
before turning the land over to developers 
at a large profit. In some instances, people 
move willingly, but there are also reports of 
widespread resistance, the usual response 
to which is brutal repression by the 
Communist party. In the PRC it is often 
populations on the rural margins who are 
displaced, illustrating the significance of 
Henri Lefebvre’s argument, presciently laid 
out in the 1960s, that the clear distinction 
that once existed between the urban and the 
rural is gradually fading into a set of porous 
spaces of uneven geographical development, 
under the hegemonic command of capital 
and the State. This is also the case in India, 
where the central and state governments 
now favour the establishment of Special 
Economic Zones – ostensibly for industrial 
development, though most of the land is 
designated for urbanisation. This policy has 
led to pitched battles against agricultural 
producers, the grossest of which was the 
massacre at Nandigram in West Bengal 
in March 2007, orchestrated by the state’s 
Marxist government. Intent on opening up 
terrain for the Salim Group, an Indonesian 
conglomerate, the ruling CPI(M) sent 
armed police to disperse protesting 
villagers; at least 14 were shot dead and 
dozens wounded. Private property rights in 
this case provided no protection. 
What of the seemingly progressive 
proposal to award private-property rights 
to squatter populations, providing them 
with assets that will permit them to leave 
poverty behind?10 Such a scheme is now 
being mooted for Rio’s favelas, for example. 
The problem is that the poor, beset with 
income insecurity and frequent financial 
difficulties, can easily be persuaded to 
trade in that asset for a relatively low cash 
payment. The rich typically refuse to give 
up their valued assets at any price, which 
is why Moses could take a meat axe to the 
low-income Bronx but not to affluent Park 
Avenue. The lasting effect of Margaret 
Thatcher’s privatisation of social housing 
in Britain has been to create a rent and 
price structure throughout metropolitan 
London that precludes lower-income and 
even middle-class people from access to 
accommodation anywhere near the urban 
centre. I wager that within fifteen years, if 
present trends continue, all those hillsides 
in Rio now occupied by favelas will be 
covered by high-rise condominiums with 
fabulous views over the idyllic bay, while 
the erstwhile favela dwellers will have been 
filtered off into some remote periphery.
[….]
We have yet, however, to see a coherent 
opposition to these developments in the 
twenty-first century. ... At this point in 
history, this has to be a global struggle, 
predominantly with finance capital, for that 
is the scale at which urbanisation processes 
now work. To be sure, the political task of 
organising such a confrontation is difficult, 
if not daunting. However, the opportunities 
are multiple because, as this brief history 
shows, crises repeatedly erupt around 
urbanisation both locally and globally, 
and because the metropolis is now the 
point of massive collision – dare we call it 
class struggle? – over the accumulation by 
dispossession visited upon the least well-off 
and the developmental drive that seeks to 
colonise space for the affluent.
 One step towards unifying these 
struggles is to adopt the right to the city 
as both working slogan and political ideal, 
precisely because it focuses on the question 
of who commands the necessary connection 
between urbanisation and surplus 
production and use. The democratisation 
of that right, and the construction of a 
broad social movement to enforce its will 
is imperative if the dispossessed are to take 
back the control which they have for so long 
been denied, and if they are to institute 
new modes of urbanisation. Lefebvre was 
right to insist that the revolution has to be 
urban, in the broadest sense of that term, or 
nothing at all.
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office, entertainment, and luxury housing 
districts, as disused industrial and riverside 
structures were recycled, and glamorous 
new spaces, often designed by world-
famous architects, became the hallmarks of 
economic success. In London and New York 
they form part of a more comprehensive 
planning process than in the recent past. 
In Amsterdam, where comprehensive 
planning has always reigned, there has 
been a rethinking of spatial strategies 
away from the compact city towards a 
polycentric model. All three cities must deal 
with escalating housing prices and have 
incorporated housing into the new projects, 
claiming the residential component as an 
equity measure. They differ, however, in 
the extent to which they intend to provide 
affordable units and to which physical and 
social goals are tied together. 
Atlantic Yards, New York
The Atlantic Yards project forms part of 
a grand vision for New York presented by 
the Mayor’s Office as PlaNYC2030. This 
document represents the first effort at 
a masterplan for the city since the John 
Lindsay mayoralty of the 1970s. To its 
credit, the plan emphasises development  
in all five boroughs of the city, promotes 
the creation of affordable housing, and calls 
for environmentally sensitive measures. 
But, while parts of it reflect sensitivity 
to neighbourhood concerns, its major 
projects utilise huge sums of public money 
and tax forgiveness for endeavours that 
radically transform their locations, stir up 
neighbourhood opposition, and threaten 
to sharpen the contrast between the haves 
and have-nots. The concerns of the plan are 
restricted to land use and development;  
it does not link these initiatives to 
education, job training and placement,  
or social services.
The plan for Atlantic Yards did not 
originate within the city government, but 
instead was brought to it by a development 
firm, Forest City Ratner Companies 
(FCRC). FCRC had already built three 
large projects in downtown Brooklyn 
and was the principal developer working 
in that borough. Atlantic Yards, like 
the other mega-projects discussed in 
this essay, was the outcome of a public-
private partnership. Unlike the others, it 
was going up in an area that already was 
densely inhabited, although the bulk of 
the project was being built over railway 
goods yards. Also different from the 
others, the project did not originate in a 
publicly sponsored plan, but instead was 
the consequence of a developer’s initiative. 
The project, as it currently stands, reflects 
the form of developer-led planning that 
has characterised New York’s construction 
projects since the 1970s, and the reluctance 
of the city and state to start projects unless 
a developer is already committed.
Thames Gateway, London
Unlike the mayors of New York and 
Amsterdam, the Mayor of London has little 
authority over the day-to-day management 
of the city. Thus, his principal focus is on 
strategic planning and transportation. In 
terms of the former, he must rely on the 
borough authorities and a bewildering array 
of development partnerships to implement 
his guidance. Both because of the pressures 
upon him to produce development and his 
desire to leave a mark on the city despite his 
limited powers, Ken Livingstone, the first 
Mayor of London after the creation of the 
Greater London Authority, put considerable 
energy into regeneration schemes. The  
anti-growth sentiments within the 
suburban areas that surround London in  
all directions but the East mean that 
the major thrust of new programmes is 
eastward. This is justified on the grounds 
that East London represents the most 
deprived part of the city, thereby standing 
to benefit most, and that it contains 
numerous underutilised sites.
The eastward development of London 
has been labelled the Thames Gateway and 
billed as the largest development project in 
Europe. It extends 40 miles (64 kilometres) 
from Canary Wharf in the East End of 
London into the counties of Essex and 
Kent, covering 16 local authority districts. 
Goals set forth by the central government 
included 160,000 housing units, with 35 per 
cent classified as affordable; the creation 
of 180,000 new jobs; improvement in the 
skills levels of residents; access to high-
quality health care, and 53,000 hectares 
(131,000 acres) of green space protected 
and enhanced.1 The scheme involved both 
redevelopment of existing occupied or 
obsolete areas and growth on greenfield 
sites. In its London section it covered some 
extremely poor districts, while further 
out in the suburban counties it covered 
quite affluent settlements. The time frame 
involved was considerable – although the 
goals were ostensibly to be met by 2016, 40 
years was a more realistic estimate for the 
entire Gateway. Construction, however, 
would be rapid within the western area 
where the Olympic Park and associated 
facilities were going up for the 2012 
Games.2 The overall objective was the 
development of ‘sustainable communities’ 
and a decentralisation of business activity 
from the present core in Westminster and 
the City of London. 
Zuidas, Amsterdam South
In Amsterdam, as in London, planning 
and housing development nest within 
the context of planning guidelines and 
financial flows emanating from the national 
government. Considerable power, however, 
rests at the city level, where, because no 
single party dominates, consensus is the 
rule. There is less reliance on private for-
profit developers for housing construction 
than in London and New York, and, as 
in London, the construction of social 
housing relies on the activities of non-profit 
housing associations. Amsterdam, however, 
resembles both London and New York 
in depending on private investment for 
office development and in requiring office 
developers to contribute public benefits in 
return for the right to build. 
Amsterdam Zuidas involved the largest 
amount of office space of the developments 
discussed in this text. A number of the 
office blocks were already mostly built, not 
according to a plan, but opportunistically 
as a result of firms seeking convenient space 
outside the crowded city core. They went up 
with little relation of one to another. Many 
were bold architectural statements, but the 
area as a whole was incoherent, cold, and 
unfriendly to pedestrians. The ambitions 
of the planners were to retrofit an existing 
single-use area so as to create an urbane, 
multifunctional space. The challenge was 
particularly daunting because this district 
was divided by a multi-lane motorway and 
railroad tracks that, like the rail yards in 
Brooklyn, precluded pedestrian traffic and 
prevented design coherence. The proposed 
solution was extremely expensive – a 
1.2-kilometre-long tunnel to accommodate 
both the road and railroad tracks. 
Amsterdam Zuidas was already the largest 
office development in the Netherlands 
with 248,600 m2 (2.7 million square feet) 
built, or under construction. The national 
government envisioned it becoming an 
area that would allow Amsterdam to 
compete with Paris, Frankfurt, and Milan 
for global city functions. The municipality 
responded with a plan for the area due 
South of the centre that included housing, 
retail, educational and cultural facilities. 
However, only the office structures were 
built. Now the municipal government, 
with financial participation by the central 
government, was seeking to realise the 
vision of a multifunctional scheme. The 
project incorporated a larger role for the 
private sector in providing infrastructure 
than had previously characterised Dutch 
projects. The plan was to use the vehicle of 
a public-private partnership, with the very 
expensive covering of the rail and highway 
right-of-ways to be financed by the private 
sector. Sixty per cent of the costs would be 
borne by the private participants, who in 
return would receive development rights for 
one million m2 (10.76 million square feet)  
in the newly created space. The public 
portion involved the city, provincial and 
national governments.
Conclusion
The mega-projects described here reflect 
the evolution of urban redevelopment 
programmes since their post-World 
War II beginnings. They also represent 
a convergence between American and 
European approaches to government 
intervention in the built environment as 
embodied in private-sector involvement and 
market orientation.
At the same time, the European 
schemes, while incorporating a neo-liberal 
concern with competitiveness, manifest 
greater governmental direction and 
commitment to egalitarian goals. 
The contemporary mega-projects 
discussed here indicate that public-private 
partnerships can be a vehicle for the 
provision of public benefits, including 
job commitments, cultural facilities 
and affordable housing. They also show, 
however, that such projects are risky for 
both public and private participants, must 
primarily be oriented towards profitability, 
and typically produce a landscape 
dominated by bulky buildings that do not 
encourage urbanity, despite the claims of 
the projects’ developers. 
In London and Amsterdam, where 
to some extent a social-democratic ethos 
still prevails, more is being asked from 
developers than is the case in New York. 
Also, the direct governmental contribution 
to housing is larger, because the national 
governments play a much larger role in 
financing affordable housing development. 
Even in these cities, however, everything 
depends on profitability of the market-
driven parts of the project. There are 
only three forms of construction that can 
generate big profits: luxury residences and 
hotels, large-footprint office towers and 
shopping malls. Thus, what we can expect 
to see in both European and American 
cities are projects with similar design 
characteristics and product mixes, usually 
outside the old urban core and lacking 
the layering of old and new, small and big, 
that gives central cities their ambiance and 
opportunities. The requirements in all three 
projects for affordable housing and jobs 
represent a minimal commitment to socially 
just policies, but the primary orientation 
is to profitability and competitiveness. 
The extent to which the gains from 
increased competitiveness are spread 
throughout society depends on the size 
of the direct governmental commitment 
to public benefits. This is greatest in the 
Netherlands, where the welfare state, albeit 
shrunken, lives on. It is least in the United 
States, where the small size of national 
expenditures on housing and social welfare 
means that low-income people must depend 
almost wholly on trickle-down effects to 
gain from new development.
 This text was published previously in issue 783 of the 
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 2009. 
1  UK Department of Communities and Local Government,  
 2006.
2  Editors’ note: this essay was written before the completion  
 of the Olympic Park in 2012. 
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I’ll come clean. I’m profoundly envious at 
the capacity of Brazilians to do just about 
everything with flair and panache. Rewind 
to the dramatic waves of colour that filled 
Brazilian streets when citizens (with diverse 
and divergent agendas) decided to give 
FIFA the proverbial finger in protest against 
the absurdity of the World Cup investment 
requirements in terms of cost, extravagance 
and loss of sovereignty. As our social 
media and television screens illuminated 
with surreal admixtures of carnival, 
political theatre, street battles and militant 
uprisings, South Africans despaired at their 
incapacity to pull off the same levels of mass 
resistance and imaginative protest when the 
FIFA regime passed through our neck of 
the woods. 
This powerful display of popular revolt 
was striking, because for years I have been 
admiring the variety of innovative urban 
policy and management instruments 
under construction across Brazil as city 
governments, citizens and civil society 
laboured to give effect to the provisions in 
the Statute of the City. In other words, not 
only did Brazilians fare much better than 
most at democratising their cities, but now 
they also seem to be singular in changing 
Edgar Pieterse highlights 
why Brazil’s urban policy has 
set an important precedent 
for others to follow. 
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the rules of engagement when it comes to 
hosting beauty-pageant-like mega-events. 
Democratic envy was definitely in order. 
Brazil’s urban policy innovations 
include a willingness to tackle the thorny 
issue of landownership by introducing new 
legal criteria that stipulate that the social 
value of property trumps private rights. A 
provision that is exclusively in the realm 
of dreams and fantasy for South Africans 
labouring under the effects of colonial-
Apartheid practices of land dispossession 
and the concomitant concentration of 
wealth in the hands of the white minority.
Another dimension of the Brazilian 
approach has been the profoundly 
important legal acknowledgement that 
irregular and informal ways of building 
cities are a fact of contemporary life and 
need to be understood and supported 
– i.e. regularised – if cities are going to 
come to terms with their own essence. It 
has taken democratic South Africa more 
than a decade to come to this conclusion 
as reflected in the Breaking New Ground 
policy adopted in 2004. But until now the 
government remains tentative and fearful 
to give full expression to this commitment. 
The dominant urban policy approach in 
South Africa since 1994 has been to see 
informal settlements as an aberration that 
needs excising through the provision of 
freestanding public housing; a model that 
could only be realised on the peripheries 
of cities in mono-functional settlements 
devoid of public life, social infrastructure, 
and economic activity. It was, and remains, 
a profoundly top-down model in which 
the government bestows its munificence 
on a ‘grateful’ citizenry. This legacy 
stands in sharp contrast to the implicit 
Brazilian confidence in the capacity and 
power of ordinary citizens to take control 
of the consolidation and incremental 
formalisation of their neighbourhoods, 
connected with intelligent design.
In this regard it is instructive to cite 
the impressive campaign of the São Paulo 
municipality to run a national competition 
– Renova SP – to secure the proposals and 
services of interdisciplinary teams, led by 
architects, to address the unique conditions 
of favelas in the city. Significantly, the 
purpose of the competition was to promote 
innovative design proposals on the 
explicit assertion that auto-constructed 
communities reflect a form of tenacious 
urbanism that should be acknowledged 
and respected, with an eye to incorporating 
its logics into proposals for consolidation, 
informed by the opinions and desires of 
the residents themselves.1 Despite the fact 
that South Africa has processed well over 
3.2 million public housing opportunities 
since 1994, it is inconceivable that architects 
or other urban designers are ever enrolled 
in these processes. Instead, South Africa 
remains wedded to a Fordist roll-out model 
of poorly designed, poorly constructed, and 
anti-contextual public housing, making an 
already difficult context a lot worse.
This example underscores a profound 
cultural and epistemic difference between 
the Latin and African contexts. Brazil, 
and most other Latin American countries, 
comes from a tradition in which urbanism 
is fused in the cauldron of architecture, 
design, philosophy and social theory. 
In the African context, design-based 
disciplines are generally invisible but also 
disconnected from thought about the 
social and political life of cities. As a result, 
Latin urbanists see the city as a coy lover; a 
sensual challenge that can only be engaged 
through a subtle mixture of paying careful 
attention, seduction, experimentation, and 
a deep commitment to understanding and 
supporting it to realise its full potential. In 
contrast, African urbanists perceive the city 
as a stubborn, naughty and irredeemable 
stepchild in need of stern discipline and 
paternalistic/authoritarian guidance. 
It is for this reason that it is absolutely 
consistent for many Brazilian city 
governments to recognise the importance 
of slum upgrading, public culture and 
social infrastructure in activating the 
energies of neighbourhoods and the city 
at large. According to Teresa Caldeira, the 
penetration of democracy can be seen in the 
degree to which living conditions of people 
in the peripheries have improved: ‘In spite 
of continuing poverty, in the past decades 
urban infrastructure and the material 
quality of space in São Paulo have improved 
considerably, thus bettering the conditions 
of the life of the poor in the improved 
peripheries.’2 This in turn, she points out, 
has given rise to a number of rogue and 
unpredictable cultural practices, especially 
among the youth in Brazilian cities.
Of course I am not as naïve as to 
believe that Brazilian cities have got it 
all figured out, or that any of the suite of 
urban reform measures instituted by the 
Statute of Cities work perfectly. I accept the 
conclusions drawn by Edesio Fernandes 
on the remaining challenges surrounding 
participatory budgeting, masterplanning 
processes to concretise social zoning, slum 
upgrading and so forth.3 Yet, the vibrant 
Brazilian experiment in democratic and 
inclusive city building remains profoundly 
important for debates in South Africa and 
other members of the BRICS axis. A brief 
update on contemporary developments 
in South Africa in the urban domain will 
clarify this assertion. 
In 2012, the National Planning 
Commission unveiled a twenty-year plan 
for South Africa. The plan asserts: 
Reshaping South Africa’s cities, towns 
and rural settlements is a complex, long-
term project requiring major reforms 
and political will. It is, however, a 
necessary project given the enormous 
social, environmental and financial costs 
imposed by existing spatial divides. […] 
Transforming human settlements is a large 
and complex agenda requiring far-reaching 
policy changes and shifts in household, 
business and government practices. 
Planning for transformation happens 
within an uncertain context and requires 
foresight, resilience and versatility, as well 
as updated information and continually 
revised knowledge.’4 This statement reflects 
a coming of age in the urban policy debates 
in South Africa. In its wake, the national 
government commissioned the preparation 
of the Integrated Urban Development 
Framework. This policy is likely to make a 
strong case for a number of the elements of 
the Brazilian model to be indigenised in the 
South African context, alongside a strong 
push for reorienting urban policy to foster 
resilient and inclusive cities as a central 
strand in the national efforts to foster a 
green economy.
It is envisaged that city-wide, long-term 
planning and management instruments 
such as growth management strategies  
will have to be produced for all major cities 
and towns. These will have to articulate 
spatial frameworks, infrastructure plans, 
land assembly strategies, and resource 
efficiency targets connected to innovative 
financing tools. It is self-evident that the 
Brazilian experience with masterplanning 
and social zoning will prove instructive for 
South Africa. 
These macro frameworks at the city-
wide or regional scale will need to be 
reinforced by neighbourhood-level planning 
and community management systems.  
Since citizens will be central to the 
formulation of these, public investments 
will be required to engender citizen skills in 
spatial literacy, budget interpretation and 
community project management. Again, 
the now deeply entrenched methodologies 
of community-driven planning and 
management in many Brazilian favelas 
can offer crucial insights. Moreover, South 
Africa will have to draw heavily on the 
rich tradition of participatory design 
that has become the hallmark of radical 
incrementalism across many Brazilian and 
Latin American cities such as Medellín and 
Rio de Janeiro. My hunch and hope is that 
such exposure could make the difference 
in changing the mindsets of South African 
policy makers and citizens so that they too 
can fall in love with their imperfect cities.
 
1  For details on the competition and its outcomes, see São  
 Paulo Municipality,  (2011) Renova SP. Concurso De  
 Projetos De Arquitetura E Urbanismo, Series: Novos  
 Bairros de São Paulo, São Paulo Municipality, 2011.
2  Teresa Caldeira, ‘Imprinting and Moving Around: New  
 Visibilities and Configurations of Public Space in São  
 Paulo’, Public Culture, Vol. 24, No. 2, 2012, pp. 385–419.
3  Fernandes (p. 298) argues that participatory budgeting  
 ‘… have not called into question the exclusionary nature 
 of the overall land and urban development model,  
 especially as they have not significantly supported  
 the strengthening of a more inclusive framework for  
 land governance.’ At a more superficial level, they could  
 also be argued to have become overly bureaucratised and  
 performative. See: E. Fernandes, ‘Participatory Budgeting  
 Processes in Brazil – Fifteen Years Later’, in: Kihato, C.  
 et al (eds.) Urban Diversity. Space, Culture and Inclusive  
 Pluralism in Cities Worldwide. Washington DC &  
 Baltimore, Woodrow Wilson Centre Press & John  
 Hopkins University Press, 2010.
4  National Planning Commission, Our Future – Make it 
 work. National Development Plan 2030. Pretoria,  
 National Planning Commission, The Presidency, 2012, 
 p. 47, p. 289.
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This is an age of cities, a time when the 
mass of people in the world live in cities of 
a size never seen before in human history. 
The new city of 15 million or more people, 
like Shanghai, São Paulo, Mumbai, or 
Mexico City, has transformed the politics, 
economics, infrastructure and culture 
of everyday existence. Yet, as in the past, 
urbanites now have two basic desires: they 
want cities that are efficient, and they want 
cities full of life.
The need for efficiency comes into 
conflict constantly with the desire for 
sociability. The quest for efficiency aims at 
balance and harmony. Sociability in cities 
involves complex mixtures of people with 
diverging interests; they have to negotiate 
their relationships day by day, and the 
results are messy.
The distinction between efficient and 
sociable is particularly acute for a huge 
class of people to whom urbanists seem 
indifferent. This is the class that is neither 
poor nor bourgeois, the classes moyens, 
as French sociologists call them, or the 
lower-middle-class in English terms: 
small shopkeepers and salesmen, clerks 
and other low-level bureaucrats, skilled 
manual labourers.  These are the people for 
whom efficiency means a safer, healthier 
environment than that of the dramatically 
poor. But they are just on the edge of 
experiencing a better-quality life; the 
spectre of poverty, which is just below them, 
which they may have just left, is haunting. 
This is the life evoked by Louis-Ferdinand 
Céline in the novel Voyage au Bout de la 
Nuit [Journey to the End of the Night], or 
by Truffaut’s film Les Quatre Cents Coups 
[The 400 Blows]. The experience of an 
efficient and workable everyday life feels 
fragile. Class consciousness puts those two 
words, efficient and fragile, together.
The sociability bred of this fragility 
is often hostile to those both above and 
below, and inward-turning. Sociologists 
label this kind of outlook ressentiment, a 
combination of resentment and withdrawal, 
and it possesses a right-wing political sting; 
numerous studies show that ressentiment 
animates racial prejudices, hostility to 
immigrants. Ressentiment is not urbane. 
And literally so, groups motivated by this 
passion have, as Michel de Certeau has 
documented, practised an intensely local 
form of excluding those below. But I’m 
convinced that it is not inevitable for people 
newly emerged from poverty, or living a 
cut above it. The physical conditions in 
which the classes moyennes live can orient 
people in a different, more positive, more 
integrated way.
As a visitor to Rio de Janeiro, I have 
been struck by how much of the city belongs 
As cities become more 
complex, Richard Sennett 
explores the social and 
cultural dynamics of change 
in the contemporary city.
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Bolsa Família helped increase the 
share of the middle class population 
from 38% in 2003, to 55% in 2011. 
Between 1993 and 2011 GINI levels 
both in Rio and Brazil have also fallen.
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Lagoa is an affluent neighbourhood in 
Rio’s south zone which displays the 
city’s dense urban typology framed and 
contained by its natural contours.
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to the classes moyennes. Particularly due 
to the growth of this class in recent years, 
poor people have moved just one or two 
steps up if they exit poverty – just as was the 
case in New York a century ago in boroughs 
like Queens and the Bronx, or today in the 
expansion of North-West Shanghai. Given 
the peculiar fabric of Rio, an archipelago of 
different socio-economic communities, the 
issue of integration is particularly difficult 
in terms of city planning. I am no expert on 
Rio, but I’d like to offer some ideas about 
how a more integrated approach could join 
efficiency to sociability.
The Edge Condition
Integration happens at the edges between 
communities. Urbanists have in general 
been very bad at creating edges of the 
‘open’ sort; instead, the great urban growth 
spurt of recent decades has strengthened 
segregation. This is true not only of gated 
residential communities, but of places to 
work or consume – the office campus, the 
shopping mall – which are mono-functional 
in character.  Segregation of function has 
become the planner’s yardstick of efficiency.
Edges come in two forms: the boundary 
and the border. Rigid controls over 
movement from country to country are 
meant to enforce the boundary condition, 
while the Schengen arrangements in 
Europe, for example, are meant to create 
more open borders between its member 
states. At the urban level, motorways create 
boundaries between communities, while 
spine-streets create more open borders. 
A more provocative distinction is the 
difference between a cell wall and a cell 
membrane. A cell wall serves mainly to 
conserve vital ingredients within the cell, 
while a membrane functions to exchange 
ingredients between a cell’s in- and outside. 
But the membrane is not, as it were, an open 
door; this edge is both porous and resistant, 
that is, it both admits new matter and also 
resists loss of its own substance.
Porosity and resistance combined tell 
something about the concept of integration, 
a concept all-important in urban planning. 
Too often, well-meaning planners confuse 
integration with erasure, a clearing flat of 
urban space, destroying traces of the past, 
leaving no physical markers of difference 
in the present. This is the story of much 
urban renewal in twentieth-century North 
American cities, and twenty-first century 
cities in China. Erasure does not stimulate 
integration, on the contrary; the result, 
in Shanghai as much as Chicago, has left 
people, particularly in the classes moyennes, 
feeling exposed and vulnerable.
An alternative way to create a living 
edge is embodied in the work that urbanists 
did on the reconstruction of Beirut after its 
long civil war ended in the 1990s. The ‘green 
line’ in the city was a zone where warring 
Christians and Muslims had fought each 
other for 14 years; by the war’s end, it had 
reverted to trees and weeds. The planners 
made use of this natural resurgence to 
carve out a shaded market extending along 
the line of former combat; the buildings 
on either side were left to local or family 
development. The market structures were 
themselves temporary constructions, 
quickly put up or taken down. People out 
shopping could mix with their former 
enemies, but as easily recoil and withdraw. 
Such an uneasy truce exemplifies the 
urban membrane, which was both porous 
and resistant. Admittedly this was an 
extreme case, but the membrane logic is 
a good one, and urbanists should apply it 
to more ordinary urban scenes. Could it 
apply in Rio, for instance, to the relations 
between the favelas and surrounding 
neighbourhoods?
Complex Public Space
Our received notions of public space are  
one reason membrane creation has failed. 
The design of good urban space is an 
endless subject, which has preoccupied me 
my entire professional life. I want to focus 
just on one aspect, one which relates to 
mono-functional and multiple-function 
spaces. In principle, an overlay of functions 
creates public space: the thicker the collage 
of functions, the more public a space 
becomes. To understand why this is so, we 
might contrast the agora of ancient Athens 
to modern Times Square in New York.
The agora, a six-hectare (nearly 15 acres) 
open space, contained all the elements 
of Athenian civic life in plain sight. The 
ancient Athenian visiting his banker at 
a table set out in the agora could see and 
hear the proceedings of a court of justice 
occurring in the same space, separated only 
by a low wall; if so minded he could shout 
out his own comment on the accused while 
counting his money. Several small shrines 
and a temple lining the agora permitted 
him to pray if the spirit moved him; he 
could dine and flirt in several private 
rooms whose doors gave directly onto the 
agora. Not only was this public space multi-
functional, it was ambiguously defined, 
the edges between activities more borders 
rather than boundaries; the Athenian was 
constantly obliged to interpret what was 
happening in the agora.
Modern Times Square in New York 
on the other hand does not require that 
effort of interpreting. It has become pure 
tourist space, which is to say, its recent 
‘renewal’ development has made the centre 
of New York’s central public space mono-
functional, devoted to tourists serviced 
by cheap hotels and restaurants, and, of 
course, popular theatres. There are other 
sorts of commercial and civic activities 
near Times Square, but they are out of 
sight, occurring within heavily-guarded 
buildings. Few native New Yorkers frequent 
Times Square: it has become a void at the 
heart of the city.  
The recipe for a live public realm 
in cities is more complicated than 
might first appear. Multiple functions 
generate ambiguity. Ambiguity requires 
interpretation. Interpretations are unstable 
in time. This recipe requires much 
unpacking. I simply want to stress that a 
live public space is not efficient, if we think 
of efficiency as a steady-state condition. 
Quality of Life
I have touched on a number of principles 
of urban integration, in edges and 
public space. They stimulate exchange 
at the borders between territories, and 
they engage people in experiencing and 
interpreting complexity. These principles 
have a particular application to the fabric 
of ordinary life – that is, to people who are 
neither wealthy nor impoverished. They 
secure the quality of life by supplying, as 
it were, rules of engagement. They provide 
positive, sociable orientations to the city for 
people who may feel that class-bound kind 
of fragility that results in ressentiment.
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Cities in South Asia are characterised 
by physical and visual contradictions 
that coalesce in a landscape of incredible 
pluralism. Historically, particularly 
during the period of British colonisation, 
the distinct worlds active within these 
cities – which could be economic, social 
or cultural – occupied different spaces 
and operated under different rules. The 
aim of their separation was to maximise 
control and minimise conflict between 
these, often opposing, worlds.1 However, 
today these worlds share the same space, 
but they understand and use it differently.2 
Massive waves of distressed rural migration 
during the latter half of the 1900s triggered 
their convergence into a singular, but 
multifaceted entity. Combined with the 
inadequate supply of urban land and the 
lack of the creation of new urban centres, 
this resulted in extremely high densities 
in existing cities. With the emergence of 
a post-industrial, service-based economy, 
the intertwining of these worlds within the 
same space is now even greater.3 
In this post-industrial scenario, cities 
in India have become critical sites for 
negotiations between elite and subaltern 
cultures. The new relationships between 
social classes in a post-industrial economy 
are quite different from those that existed 
in state-controlled economies.4 The 
fragmentation of the economy in service 
and production sectors has spatially 
resulted in a new, bazaar-like urbanism, 
which has woven its presence throughout 
the entire urban landscape.5 This is an 
urbanism created by those outside the elite 
domains of the formal modernity of the 
state. It is a ‘pirate’ modernity that has to 
slip under the laws of the city simply in 
order to survive, without any conscious 
attempt at constructing a counterculture.6 
With the retreat of the state in the course of 
the 1980s and 1990s (in different measures 
across South Asia), the space of the 
‘everyday’ is where economic and cultural 
struggles are articulated. These common 
spaces have been largely excluded from  
the cultural discourses on globalisation, 
which focus on elite domains of production 
in the city.7
Today, Indian cities are comprised 
of two components occupying the same 
physical space. The first is the Static City. 
Built of more permanent material such 
as concrete, steel and brick, it forms a 
two-dimensional entity on conventional 
city maps and is monumental in its 
presence. The second is the Kinetic City. 
Incomprehensible as a two-dimensional 
entity, this is a city in motion – a three-
dimensional construct of incremental 
development. The Kinetic City is temporary 
in nature and often built with recycled 
material: plastic sheets, scrap metal, canvas 
and waste wood. It constantly modifies and 
reinvents itself. The Kinetic City’s building 
blocks are not pieces of architecture, 
but spaces that hold associative values 
and that support their residents’ lives 
and livelihoods. Patterns of occupation 
determine its form and perception. It is an 
indigenous urbanism that has its particular 
‘local’ logic. It is not necessarily the city 
of the poor, as most images might suggest; 
rather it is a temporal articulation and 
occupation of space, which not only creates 
a richer sensibility of spatial occupation, 
but also suggests how spatial limits are 
expanded to include formally unimagined 
uses in dense urban conditions.8
The Kinetic City presents a compelling 
vision that potentially allows us to 
better understand the blurred lines of 
contemporary urbanism and the changing 
roles of people and spaces in urban 
society. The increasing concentrations of 
global flows – of money and goods – have 
exacerbated the inequalities and spatial 
divisions of social classes. In this context, 
an architecture or urbanism of equality in 
an increasingly unequal economic world 
requires looking deeper to find a wide range 
of places to mark and commemorate the 
cultures of those excluded from the spaces 
of wealth and economic boom. These don’t 
necessarily lie in the formal production of 
architecture, but often challenge it. Here the 
idea of a city is an elastic urban condition, 
not a grand vision, but a ‘grand adjustment’. 
The Kinetic City can be seen as the 
symbolic image of the emerging urban 
South Asian condition. The processions, 
weddings, festivals, hawkers, street vendors 
and slum dwellers or Katchi Abadis, all 
create an ever-transforming streetscape 
– a city in constant motion where the 
very physical fabric is characterised by 
continuous change. The Static City, on the 
other hand, dependent on architecture for 
its representation, is no longer the single 
image by which the city is read. Thus 
architecture is not the ‘spectacle’ of the 
city, nor does it even comprise the single 
dominant image. In contrast, festivals such 
as Diwali, Dussera, Navrathri, Muhharam, 
Durga Puja, Ganesh Chathurthi and many 
more, have emerged as the spectacles of the 
Kinetic City. Their presence in the everyday 
landscape is pervasive and dominates the 
popular visual culture of Indian cities. 
Festivals create a forum through which the 
fantasies of the subalterns are articulated 
and even organised into political action. 
[…]
What then is our cultural reading 
for the Kinetic City, which now forms a 
greater part of our urban reality? If the 
production or preservation of architecture 
or urban form has to be informed by our 
reading of cultural significance in this 
dynamic context, it will necessarily have 
to include the notion of ‘constructing 
significance’ both in the architectural as 
well as conservation debates.9 In fact, an 
understanding that ‘cultural significance’ 
evolves, will truly clarify the role of the 
architect as an advocate of change (versus 
a preservationist who opposes change) – 
Rahul Mehrotra argues 
that only kinetic cities and 
processes will be able to 
respond to challenges of 
future of Indian cities. 
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one who can engage with both the Kinetic 
and Static City on equal terms. Under such 
conditions, a draining of the symbolic 
import of the architectural landscape leads 
to a deepening of ties between architecture 
and contemporary realities and experiences. 
This understanding allows architecture and 
urban typologies to be transformed through 
intervention and placed in the service of 
contemporary life, realities, and emerging 
aspirations. Here, the Static City embraces 
the Kinetic City and is informed and 
remade by its logic. 
The phenomenon of bazaars in the 
Victorian arcades in the old Fort Area, 
Mumbai’s Historic District, is emblematic 
of this potential negotiation between 
the Static and Kinetic City. The original 
use of the arcades was two-fold. First, 
they provided spatial mediation between 
building and street. Second, the arcades 
were a perfect response to Bombay’s 
climate. They served as a zone protecting 
pedestrians from both the harsh sun and 
lashing rains. Today, with the informal 
bazaar occupying the arcade, its original 
intent is challenged. This emergent 
relationship of the arcade and bazaar not 
only forces a confrontation of uses and 
interest groups, but also demands new 
preservation approaches. For the average 
Mumbai resident, the hawker provides a 
wide range of goods at prices considerably 
lower than those found in local shops. Thus, 
the bazaars in the arcades characterise the 
Fort Area area’s thriving businesses. For the 
elite and for conservationists, the Victorian 
core represents the old city centre, complete 
with monumental icons. In fact, as the city 
sprawls, dissipating the clarity of its form, 
these images, places, and icons acquire 
even greater meaning for preservationists 
as critical symbols of the city’s historic 
image. Consequently, hawking is deemed 
illegal by city authorities that are constantly 
attempting to relocate the bazaars. 
The challenge in Mumbai is to cope with 
the city’s transformation, not by inducing 
or polarising its dualism, but by attempting 
to reconcile these opposite conditions as 
being simultaneously valid. The existence 
of two worlds in the same space implies 
that we must accommodate and overlap 
varying uses, perceptions, and physical 
forms. The arcades in the Fort Area possess 
a rare capacity for reinterpretation. As 
an architectural solution, they display an 
incredible resilience; they can accommodate 
new uses while keeping the illusion of their 
architecture intact. 
One design solution might be to re-adapt 
the functioning of the arcades. They could 
be restructured to allow for easy pedestrian 
movement and accommodate hawkers 
at the same time. They could contain the 
amorphous bazaar encased in the illusion 
of the disciplined Victorian arcade. With 
this sort of approach, the key components 
of the city would have a greater ability 
to survive, because they could be more 
adaptable to changing economic and social 
conditions. There are no total solutions in 
an urban landscape characterised by both 
permanence and rapid transformation. At 
best, the city could constantly evolve and 
invent solutions for the present through 
safeguarding the crucial components of our 
historically important ‘urban hardware’. 
Could ‘Bazaars in Victorian Arcades’ 
become an authentic symbol of an emergent 
reality of temporary adjustment? Clearly 
the Static and Kinetic Cities go beyond 
their obvious differences to establish a 
much richer relationship, both spatially 
and metaphorically, than their physical 
manifestations would suggest. Here affinity 
and rejection are simultaneously played out 
– in a state of equilibrium maintained by a 
seemingly irresolvable tension. 
The informal economy of the city vividly 
illustrates the collapsed and intertwined 
existence of the Static and Kinetic Cities. 
The dabbawalas (literally translated as ‘tiffin 
men’) are an example of this relationship 
between the formal and informal, the 
static and kinetic. The tiffin delivery 
service, which relies on the train system 
for transportation, costs approx Rs.200 
(US$4) per month. A dabbawala picks up 
a lunch tiffin from a house anywhere in 
the city. Then he delivers the tiffin to one’s 
place of work by lunchtime and returns it to 
the house later in the day. The dabbawalas 
deliver hundreds of thousands of lunch 
boxes every day. The efficiency of Mumbai’s 
train system, the spine of the linear city, 
enables this complex informal system to 
work. The dabbawalas have innovatively 
set up a network that facilitates an informal 
system to take advantage of a formal 
infrastructure. The network involves the 
dabba, or tiffin, being exchanged up to four 
or five times between its pickup and return 
to the house in the evening. The average 
box travels about 30 km (18 miles) each 
way. It is estimated that around 200,000 
boxes are delivered around the city per day, 
involving approximately 4,500 dabbawalas. 
In economic terms, the annual turnover 
amounts to roughly 50 million Rupees or 
about a US$1 million.10 
Entrepreneurship in the Kinetic City 
is an autonomous and oral process that 
demonstrates the ability to fold the formal 
and informal into a symbiotic relationship. 
The dabbawalas, like several other informal 
services that range from banking, money 
transfer, courier, and electronic goods 
bazaars, leverage community relationships 
and networks and deftly use the Static City 
and its infrastructure beyond its intended 
margins. These networks create a synergy 
that depends on mutual integration 
without the obsession of formalised 
structures. The Kinetic City is where 
the intersection of need (often reduced 
to survival) and unexploited potentials 
of existing infrastructure give rise to 
new innovative services. The trains in 
Mumbai are emblematic of a kinetic space, 
supporting and blurring the formal and 
the informal, slicing through these worlds 
while momentarily collapsing them into a 
singular entity. Here the self-consciousness 
about modernity and the regulations 
imposed by the Static City are suspended 
and redundant. The Kinetic City carries 
local wisdom into the contemporary world 
without fear of the modern, while the Static 
City aspires to erase the local and re-codify 
it in a written ‘macro-moral’ order.11
The urbanism of Mumbai represents a 
fascinating intersection where the Kinetic 
City – a landscape of dystopia, and yet 
a symbol of optimism – challenges the 
Static City – encoded in architecture – to 
reposition and remake the city as a whole.12 
The Kinetic City forces the Static City to 
re-engage itself in present conditions by 
dissolving its utopian project to fabricate 
multiple dialogues with its context. 
Could this become the basis for a rational 
discussion about coexistence? Or is 
Mumbai’s emergent urbanism inherently 
paradoxical, and are the coexistence of the 
Static and Kinetic Cities and their particular 
states of utopia and dystopia inevitable? 
Can the spatial configuration for how this 
simultaneity occurs actually be formally 
imagined? The Kinetic City obviously 
cannot be seen as a design tool, but rather 
as a demand that conceptions of urbanism 
create and facilitate environments that are 
versatile and flexible, robust and ambiguous 
enough to allow this kinetic quality of the 
city to flourish. Perhaps the Kinetic City 
might be the tactical approach to take when 
dealing with the urbanism of the temporary, 
of high densities and intensities? In spite 
of these many potential disjunctures, what 
this reading of the city does celebrate is 
the dynamic and pluralist processes that 
make the urban Indian landscape. Within 
this urbanism, the Static and Kinetic 
cities necessarily coexist and blur into an 
integral entity, even if momentarily, to 
create the margins for adjustment that their 
simultaneous existences demand. 
This article is based on an essay entitled ’Negotiating the 
Static and Kinetic Cities’ published in A. Huyssen, ed., Urban 
Imaginaries, Durham, NC, 2007.
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Urban mobility is perceived by developing 
country cities’ leaders as their most pressing 
and difficult challenge. Citizens spend 
hours in traffic. Seeking to overcome it, 
powerful and wealthy citizens create odious 
symbols of inequality, such as the exclusive 
road lanes for high-level bureaucrats in 
Moscow, or the private helicopters over 
São Paulo. Inequality is indeed the main 
obstacle to effective mobility solutions, as  
I will propose here. 
Mobility is peculiar: different from 
other challenges such as education or 
housing, it tends to get worse as societies 
become richer. It is particular as well, 
in that solutions are largely counter-
intuitive: as it seems to us the Sun circles 
around the Earth, it seems that more road 
infrastructure will solve traffic jams. And, 
of course, both perceptions are equally 
flawed. 
Population growth, and all that comes 
with a higher income per capita, such as 
smaller households, larger living spaces per 
person, and an increase in the percentage  
of non-residential buildings, will make 
Latin American cities double or treble their 
built-up area over the next 50 years. It will 
make most Asian cities grow more than 
1,000 per cent and African ones more than 
that, albeit over a longer period. How will 
mobility be solved in these giant cities? 
BRT: not just a cheaper 
alternative 
Clearly it will not be car based; public 
transport is the only option. But, which 
public transport? In the age of maglev 
high-speed trains, rail appears to be 
the obvious, modern solution. Rail 
manufacturers’ enormous marketing and 
public relations budgets – and sometimes 
that is a euphemism – often counting on 
their embassies’ support – reinforce this 
view. However, the only possible means 
to provide mass public transport to all 
inhabitants of a developing country city 
are bus-based systems. While São Paulo 
recent underground lines have cost US$250 
(R$560) million per kilometre, Rio is 
constructing Bus Rapid Transport (BRT) 
lines for less than US$10 (R$22) million per 
kilometre. Operational costs are also lower 
for BRTs than for rail systems. 
The advantages of bus over rail are not 
just a matter of cost. While underground 
systems have some advantages over 
BRT, the opposite is true as well. In 
terms of capacity BRT is very similar 
to an underground system: Bogotá’s 
TransMilenio moves up to 47,000 
As Rio marks a massive 
investment in Bus Rapid 
Transit systems, Enrique 
Peñalosa explains how 
mobility and equity are 
closely connected.
BUSES: NOT SEXY 
BUT THE ONLY 
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THE NATURAL AND THE ARTIFICIAL
Topography defines the conditions of 
everyday life in Rio de Janeiro where built 
form adheres and invades the natural 
landscape
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passengers/hour/direction (PHD), which is 
more than all of the world’s underground 
lines, except for a handful. And there 
are many known ways to optimise and 
increase TransMilenio’s speed and capacity, 
which have not yet been implemented. 
Guangzhou’s BRT moves up to 37,000 PHD, 
more than all Chinese underground lines, 
except for Beijing’s line number 2.
Speed-wise express BRT lines are 
similar to an underground on roads 
without traffic lights; and it does not cost 
much to construct underpasses for BRT 
at intersections.  It is usually easy to add 
a passing lane at stations, in order to have 
express routes with buses stopping only 
every several stations. Undergrounds 
cannot have express routes unless a second 
parallel line is built. More importantly, 
BRT journey times can be shorter for 
several reasons. When changing lines, 
underground passengers have to alight, 
walk hundreds of metres and wait for 
another train; BRT buses can change 
lines without wasting time getting off 
and walking to the other line. In order 
to carry any given amount of passengers, 
many more buses than trains are required. 
Therefore, BRT frequency is much higher, 
particularly at off-peak hours. This means, 
unpleasant waiting time at the station  
is shorter. 
Underground stations need to be at 
least one kilometre apart from each other 
for efficiency’s sake; BRT stations can be 
efficiently located 500 metres apart. This 
means walking time from the origin of 
the trip to the station and from station to 
destination is shorter. Some BRT systems, 
such as Guangzhou’s, operate buses in 
ordinary mixed-traffic streets and the BRT 
trunk-way in the same route; which means 
buses can collect passengers close to their 
trips’ origin and leave them close to their 
destinations.
Public transport users are exemplary 
citizens who contribute to reduce 
congestion. They should be rewarded 
with low-cost, high-quality travel. Why 
send them underground? It is much more 
pleasant to travel on the surface, enjoying 
natural sunlight and views of the city. It is 
also preferable not to spend time in long 
underground corridors and stairways, 
which, even when they are mechanical, 
often break down. 
If buses are so wonderful, 
why weren’t they preferred in 
London?
If buses are so wonderful, why weren’t they 
preferred in London, Paris or New York? 
Why aren’t they preferred in developing 
country cities? Before getting into that, let’s 
be clear that my position is that all public 
transport is good and undergrounds are 
formidable, wonderful systems. The issue is 
what to do when the mobility challenge is 
vast and the resources to tackle it are scarce. 
At any rate, what should be done first?
When the first undergrounds were 
built, in the late 1880s, buses did not 
exist. As Dinesh Mohan points out, into 
the first decades of the twentieth century 
streets were still cobblestoned, like they 
were during Roman times.1 A ride on solid 
rubber wheels would have been rough. 
And the technology for pneumatic tires, 
which could support heavy vehicles, only 
appeared in the 1930s. Therefore, buses only 
fully entered the scene around 1940. Then 
they were the new thing, sexier than trams, 
which they replaced all over the world in a 
couple of decades. But of course, by then, 
what was truly sexy was the private car. 
Another reason for underground systems 
was that historic centres of cities, such as 
Paris or London, had narrow, winding 
streets. The only way to move fast across 
them was by underground. 
Developing country cities are different. 
They usually have large arterial roads. And 
they do not have a unique, well-defined 
centre. They have many centralities, the 
importance of which is ever-changing, often 
waning. They are well suited for BRT. But 
they have middle-class and high-income 
citizens whose political priority is to obtain 
more and more road space for their cars. 
They do not want to give up an inch of road 
space, existing or newly built, to buses.  
At the top of their demands to government 
are more road infrastructure and 
undergrounds. In very unequal developing 
country societies, higher-income citizens 
rarely have the intention of using the 
undergrounds they demand. They only see 
them as a means to reduce traffic by putting 
others underground, namely, bus riders. 
In more advanced developing countries, 
high car-ownership levels hide the fact that 
many households own a car, but cannot 
drive to work: relatively few in an office 
building have access to parking. The fact 
is that a large majority of those who drive 
to work in developing country cities have a 
higher income than most public transport 
users. Giving in to the pressures of the 
powerful society members who drive to 
work is what governments tend to do. 
It is politically easy to spend billions on 
undergrounds and other rail systems, which 
do not take space away from cars. However, 
it is neither the best technical, nor the most 
democratic option.
If there are alternatives, it is not 
technically correct to prioritise a system 
that will only solve mobility for a small 
minority of a city s´ population, leaving the 
majority stranded. Not even the largest 
underground and suburban rail networks 
in developing country cities reach 15 per 
cent of their populations; in fact most 
undergrounds in those cities move less  
than 5 per cent of their population. Such  
is the case with Rio’s two underground lines 
whose share in the city’s daily trips is only 
1.78 per cent. Building one underground 
line is expensive, and the cost per passenger 
increases with each additional line, as  
they are prioritised by demand: each 
additional line costs the same per 
kilometre, but moves progressively less 
passengers per kilometre. 
Suburban rail?
Most developing country cities have 
relatively unused, often abandoned, 
rail lines that are said to offer a great 
opportunity for the operation of urban and 
suburban passenger rail service. Suburban 
rail differs from undergrounds in that it 
has lower acceleration and longer distances 
between stations, and train carriages are 
designed for mostly seated passengers. 
While suburban rail investment costs can 
be low, operational costs per passenger are 
high. When an overground urban rail line 
is in service, it has to be fenced off, creating 
an inconvenient barrier through urban 
areas, which also tend to deteriorate and 
lower the values of surrounding areas, and 
sometimes even foster crime. Negotiating 
road intersections can be complex and 
expensive for overground urban rail. In 
fact, when such urban rail corridors exist, 
BRT works better than rail. High-capacity 
BRT systems have a much higher PHD than 
any suburban rail line; buses can come in 
and out of the rail/BRT trunk-way. And 
it is much simpler to solve the issue of 
intersections with the road network with 
bus underpasses, or even traffic lights. 
As for light rail or tram systems: they 
are pretty and usually more stable than 
buses, but they costs more, have lower 
capacities and are operationally less flexible.
Before investing in rail, it seems logical 
to first use the existing road infrastructure 
to accommodate public transport. It does 
not take an MIT PhD; a committee of 
12-year-olds would also conclude within 
half an hour that the best way to use scarce 
road space is with exclusive lanes for buses. 
An exclusive BRT lane may move up to 70 
times more passengers than a lane used by 
cars. To clarify the issue, let´ s imagine that 
a catastrophe leaves us with enough fuel for 
only 5 per cent of vehicles in a city: to whom 
would we allocate it? For survival, we would 
necessarily allocate it to trucks and buses. 
Now, if what is scarce is not fuel, but rather 
road space? Shouldn´ t we do likewise? 
History shows how societies accustomed 
to flagrant injustices do not perceive 
anything wrong with them. That was the 
case with everything the French Revolution 
changed, before it happened. In the United 
States women could not vote for President 
less than 100 years ago, and African 
Americans had to give up their seats to 
white citizens in a bus until the middle  
of the twentieth century, and good, 
ordinary people and great thinkers 
saw nothing wrong with it. Now, a bus 
slowed down by traffic is as flagrantly 
undemocratic as women not being able 
to vote. If all citizens are equal before the 
Law, as all Constitutions state in their first 
article, a bus with 100 passengers has a 100 
times more right to road space than a car 
with one. 
Road space, the space between 
buildings, is probably the most valuable 
physical asset of a city. How should we 
distribute it between pedestrians, cyclists, 
public transport and cars? Regardless of 
what is done, it should be clear it is neither 
a technical issue, nor a legal one: it is a 
political issue.
A different solution, a different 
way of thinking
Implementing solutions to this political 
issue requires first a different way of 
thinking; a democratic way of thinking that 
truly assumes all citizens are equal and  
have the same right to public assets such as 
road space.  
New technologies such as maglev should 
make rail systems faster and less costly. Bus 
systems will benefit from new technologies 
too. Driverless cars are anticipated in a few 
years; but driverless buses, operating on 
established routes, exclusive lanes in the 
case of BRTs, are simpler to implement and 
should arrive sooner. Advances in battery 
technologies should also make electrical 
buses more efficient and less costly. 
New urban design can accommodate 
buses in creative ways: hundreds of 
thousands of hectares of new cities to 
be built in the developing world over 
the next few decades could incorporate 
thousands of kilometres of bus-only roads 
along greenways, which would constitute 
formidable, low-cost, high-quality, public 
transport systems. 
Let’s imagine a city in which clean, 
well-lit, safe buses, operating on exclusive 
lanes anywhere where there is traffic, with 
underpasses to avoid traffic lights, are 
found everywhere at all times. Above all, 
public transport trip times in such a bus 
system would be much shorter than those 
by private car, which would be discouraged 
not just by longer travel times, but also by a 
gamut of parking restrictions. Such  
a public transport system would achieve 
that most difficult challenge in a developing 
country city: get higher income citizens to 
use it alongside their fellow citizens. Most 
importantly, such a system is economically 
possible for any city. As a symbol, the sight 
of a bus moving swiftly along a bus-only 
lane as expensive cars stand still in traffic  
is a picture of democracy in action.
 
1  Dinesh Mohan, Mythologies, Metros & Future Urban  
 Transport, Indian Institute of Technology, TRIPP  Report  
 Series, 2008.
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Cities are an ‘act of will’ wrote Edmund 
Bacon, the acclaimed city planner from 
Philadelphia, in Design of Cities (1976). 
But whether the building of cities is an act 
of great imagination or brutal disregard 
depends on a complex interplay of forces 
– political, ideological, social, economic, 
environmental.  
As an act of twenty-first-century city 
building, the 2012 Olympic Games in 
London created one of the largest urban 
regeneration projects in Europe, and – to 
my mind – one of the most imaginative. 
It offers a unique lens to take stock of the 
craft of city building. Many may be inclined 
to dismiss the London Olympics as being 
an exceptional event that holds few lessons 
for cities other than those wealthy enough 
to bid for hosting the Olympics. This 
would be a mistake. While mega-events 
are massively capitalised, singular events, 
it is precisely these unique circumstances 
of urban transformation on a grand scale 
and at hyper speed that allow us to observe 
the dynamic of city-building that would 
otherwise take decades to realise. How 
London used the Olympics to further its 
Andy Altman offers a 
detailed account on how 
legacy-first and design-led 
planning was implemented 
in London for and after the 
2012 Games.
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ambition for urban growth, and organised 
public and private resources and roles, 
institutional structures, masterplanning 
and design processes to align vision and 
action has applicability to a broad range 
of urban intervention as these are the 
ingredients, in one form or another, of 
urban transformation.
In the current epoch of cities, during 
which hundreds of new, large-scale city-
building enterprises will be required to 
absorb exploding rural-urban migration 
and population growth, our understanding 
of the city-building craft is an urgent 
matter. How we build cities not only has an 
immediate impact on the lives of millions 
of people who are and will become city 
dwellers, but the morphological legacy 
and settlement patterns that will be 
imprinted in the coming decades will have 
a profound effect on the ability of future 
generations to meet the challenge of global 
sustainability and resilience. The space 
between where ideas for city building 
are generated and their implementation 
through political, planning, financial, 
regulatory and institutional structures is 
often where there is a disjuncture between 
theory and practice, between urban visions 
and political realities, between what is 
planned versus what is actually built. It in 
this context that the London 2012 Games 
become instructive.
London 2012: an aspiration for 
city building 
Despite some vociferous critics, the London 
2012 Olympics have been acclaimed as a 
successful four-week celebration of sport, 
a spectacular show and a shining moment 
of British pride. But the more profound, 
lasting impact will be their role in shifting 
the trajectory of London’s growth. The 
regeneration of a 600-acre (243-hectare) 
brownfield site will join the history of 
London’s totemic moments of city-building 
where its pattern of growth was irrevocably 
transformed. The Olympics have been 
focused in East London, one of the 
historically most deprived areas of the city 
where surveys of urban distress from the 
late-nineteenth century – the famous Booth 
Poverty Maps of 1898–99 – are largely 
unchanged a century later; an area of the 
city that has suffered the familiar saga of 
urban deterioration resulting from de-
industrialisation, concentrated poverty, and 
the destruction of the urban fabric through 
the de-urbanising forces of urban renewal. 
Against this backdrop, the 2012 
Olympics were merely an actor – albeit 
a transformative one – in a larger urban 
narrative the origins of which lie in the last 
four decades of vision, policy, and tenacity 
to reverse this declining condition. Through 
the vicissitudes of markets, politics and 
changing ideas of urban planning and ‘good 
urban form’ there has been a determination 
that for London to successfully grow 
it must ‘move East’. With vast areas of 
lower-value land sitting only minutes from 
central London, its potential cried out 
to be unlocked through the building of 
infrastructure and the assembly of land. 
The term ‘legacy’, often posited as 
a post-hoc rationalisation to justify 
massive investment in sports facilities and 
infrastructure, was just the opposite in 
London’s case. Here, the Olympics were the 
tangible manifestation of a clear vision for 
urban transformation in search of a means 
to be realised. Vision, politics, urban ideas, 
economic realities and the land constraints 
of a global city colluded to produce the 
Olympic Park in East London. 
While not a scientific accounting,  
a cartoon version tracing key moments in 
the lineage of the Olympic Park might go 
something like this: 
•	The	1947	Town	and	Country	Act	and	the		
 Abercrombie Plan established a   
 Green Belt that circumscribed London’s  
 expansion, forcing inward regeneration  
 when London grows; 
•	The	development	of	the	Docklands	and		
 Canary Wharf throughout the 1980s and  
 1990s, re-positioned obsolete East London 
 waterfront lands as a new financial centre  
 to secure London’s competitive economic  
 position in Europe and globally;  
•	The	Urban	Task	Force,	a	government		
 study chaired by Lord Richard Rogers in  
 the late 1990s, which advocated for  
 compact urban form, building on  
 brownfield land near good public  
 transport hubs and the value of urban  
 regeneration, especially along the river  
 Thames; 
•	The	election	of	Ken	Livingstone	 
 in 2000 as the first elected Mayor of  
 London represented the beginning of  
 a devolution of power to London that  
 has been strengthened during the  
 mayoralty of current Mayor Boris  
 Johnson. Both supported the regeneration  
 of East London as their highest priority  
 for urban reinvestment, representing  
 a critical continuity of vision and  
 commitment.
•	The	development	and	consent	for	the		
 Stratford Master Plan, spearheaded by  
 visionary developers Stuart Lipton and  
 Nigel Hugill in 2004, before the bid was  
 even won, signalled the potential of this  
 part of East London for major investment  
 from the private and public sector, an area 
 ripe for regeneration.
The salient point is that the decision to 
build London’s Olympic Park in the East 
London community of Stratford was taken 
in the larger context of London’s plan for 
growth and was a deliberate strategy to 
rebuild the fabric of a city that had been 
ruptured. Building a new, compact piece of 
urbanism on a brownfield site connected 
to a dense network of upgraded transport 
infrastructure, with the ambition to 
integrate it physically, economically and 
socially with the adjacent communities may 
seem obvious, but that is not the case in too 
many new cities that are being built and 
rebuilt in the rapidly urbanising world.
How was it achieved?
When London was awarded the Olympics 
in 2015, among the first priorities was to 
acquire the 600-acre (243-hectare) future 
site of the Olympic Park. At the time it 
was largely blighted industrial and derelict 
land, some of which had in fact been used 
as the dumping ground for debris from 
the devastation East London suffered from 
bombings in World War II. Sitting on top of 
a dense transport network, the regeneration 
potential of the area was stymied by the 
hundreds of disparate freehold interests 
that needed to be assembled to unlock the 
latent opportunity. The Olympics provided 
the political will and capital to undertake 
the task that had previously been seen as 
too difficult.  
Concomitant with organising the land 
was the need to establish the institutional 
architecture to deliver the Olympic Park, 
both for Games and for their legacy. This 
seemingly mundane matter would be the 
unsung hero of the success of the Olympics. 
The alignment of national, metropolitan 
(mayoral) and local political interests, 
and the creation of well-designed, focused 
delivery structures, was critical to get right 
from the outset of the project. And there 
was no time to waste with an immovable 
deadline looming large for the opening 
ceremony of the Olympics. Multiple central 
government ministries, national sports 
bodies, the Mayor of London, the four 
local ‘host boroughs’ that owned land or 
were adjacent to the Olympic Park, and the 
diverse communities of East London all 
had to be engaged and, most dauntingly, 
aligned.
While a vast network of governance and 
consultation structures were established 
to coordinate the Olympics enterprise – 
from the highest level Cabinet Committee 
chaired by the Prime Minister to local 
community organisations throughout East 
London – three principal delivery vehicles 
were created to deliver the Games:
•	The	Olympic	Delivery	Authority	(ODA):		
 the infrastructure company focused  
 on the building of the Park and off-site  
 venues. A time-limited organisation with  
 a board of private and public   
 representatives which received the bulk  
 of public funding from central   
 government and the mayor to deliver the  
 facilities for the Games; 
•	The	London	Organising	Committee	of		
 the Olympic and Paralympic Games  
 (LOCOG): the organisation charged  
 with staging the Olympic events, securing 
 sponsors and liaising with the   
 International Olympic Committee (IOC)  
 and other national and international  
 sports bodies;
•	The	Olympic	Park	Legacy	Company		
 (OPLC), later renamed the London  
 Legacy Development Corporation  
 (LLDC): master developer and landowner  
 of the Olympic Park, focused on the post- 
 Games transformation from event mode  
 to regeneration and attracting investment  
 in the land and venues. 
The creation of the OPLC in 2009 (of which 
the author was its first Chief Executive, 
eds.) fully three years before the Games, 
was novel for an Olympic host city and 
testament to the core regeneration purpose 
of the Olympics investment. A company 
jointly owned by the Mayor of London and 
the national government, and including 
the representation on its board of the two 
principal boroughs owning land in the 
Park – the London boroughs of Hackney 
and Newham – this unique creation was 
designed to reflect the delicate balancing 
of interests and power that needed to be 
aligned to deliver successful regeneration. 
This division of labour among the 
three entities did not of course recuse the 
other delivery entities from incorporating 
legacy considerations into the core of their 
programme, as this mission was embodied 
in the ethos of the Olympics enterprise 
in London. However, the OPLC, with a 
singular focus on the post-Games agenda 
of city building was critical to setting and 
overseeing that vision and ensuring that 
actions were taken to deliver physical, social 
and economic regeneration of the Olympic 
Park, spreading its benefits to surrounding 
communities. In this way, there could 
be as seamless as possible integration 
between the Games and post-Games use of 
infrastructure, land, buildings and venues.
 Crucial to the city-building task 
was the development of the masterplan 
that would establish the framework for the 
GB£6 billion government infrastructure 
investment to be expended on the site.  
And key to this were three integrated 
but distinct phases: the Games Plan, the 
Transformation Plan (for the transition 
from Games upon completion) and the 
Legacy Communities Plan (the long-term 
plan for the build-out of the site). The 
strength of London’s approach was to 
conceive these three plans in exact opposite 
chronology; that is, planning for the site 
started from the long view of a vision for 
the future city and then worked back to the 
requirements of the Games. The starting 
point was the vision for the future. And this 
basic premise has profound ramifications 
for all that was to be planned and built, the 
main features of which included:
•	The	creation	of	a	central	park	of	over		
 200 acres (81 hectares) along the River  
 Lea (following the removal of electricity  
 pylons) that formed the central spine of  
 the site and created the armature around  
 which five future neighbourhoods would  
 be built, very much in keeping with  
 London precedents for the integration  
 of urban parks and built-up areas, such as  
 Victoria Park and Regents Park;
•	The	building	of	only	those	venues	that		
 were needed on a permanent basis  
 and would have future uses and   
 constituencies, all other venues would be  
 interim facilities that would be removed  
 to create the sites for the future mixed- 
 use area with homes, schools, shops and  
 places of work;
•	 Dispersing	the	venues	throughout	the	site	 
 in strategic locations rather than   
 clustering all the facilities in the usual  
 ‘sports zone’. In this way the sports  
 venues could become anchors of activity  
 and physical icons integrated with the  
 new neighbourhoods;
•	The	Olympic	Athletes	Village,	which		
 during Games would host 17,000   
 athletes, staff and residents, was built to  
 be transformed into the first complete  
 post-Games complex of 3,000 units of  
 housing;
•	 GB£1	billion	invested	in	upgrading		
 existing rail and bus lines serving  
 the site, including the building of a  
 new international transport centre to  
 accommodate future connections to  
 Europe and immediate connections to  
 London’s major transport hub of Kings  
 Cross, which makes central London only  
 a five-minute ride and one-stop away;
•	 A	central	energy	centre	was	built	with		
 sufficient capacity to service the entire site  
 in legacy as well as having the potential to 
 export energy to surrounding   
 communities;
•	 An	underground	network	of	new	sewers,		
 utilities, and telecommunications ducts  
 was built to accommodate future capacity  
 needs. 
These basic and interrelated building blocks 
of the masterplan, and the investment it 
guided, resulted in about 75 per cent of 
the total Olympics budget being spent 
to create a platform for the future city. 
While distinctive buildings were certainly 
constructed, such as Zaha Hadid’s Aquatics 
Centre and Hopkins Architects’ Velodrome, 
the main focus of investment was putting 
in place the prerequisites of a new piece of 
London.
And this intensity of focus on legacy 
did not end with the Games: institutions, 
funding, commercial transactions and 
community partnerships were established 
to ensure a smooth transition from an 
Olympic Park for Games to its post-Games 
urban life. Importantly, both commercially 
and symbolically, all of the permanent 
sports venues have secured future uses, 
thus removing the fear of ‘white elephants’ 
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that had plagued so many mega-event cities 
and stymied their future development by 
standing vacant. The unfolding transition 
also included:
•	 A	masterplan	and	design	guidelines		
 that establish the framework (adopted  
 and approved by the planning authority)  
 for the future development of 8,000 new  
 homes and creating certainty required for  
 private sector investment and community  
 confidence; 
•	 An	additional	GB£500	million	of	funding		
 from central government was dedicated  
 to the post-Games transformation of the  
 Park to retrofit venues, prepare sites and  
 build open spaces and amenities;
•	The	Athletes	Village’s	3,000	units	were		
 sold for a mixed-income community, half  
 for affordable housing and half to a  
 private developer for what is now being  
 marketed as London’s newest ‘cool’  
 residential neighbourhood, East Village;
•	The	International	Broadcast	Centre		
 (IBC) and Media Centre, two buildings  
 that together comprise over 100,000  
 square metres of space and the length  
 of 7 jumbo jets, are being transformed  
 into a new technology hub – iCity – to  
 house British Telecommunications sports  
 studios, a research and teaching centre for  
 Loughborough University, a data centre  
 and an accelerator space for start-ups.
To oversee and manage this complex 
interweaving of city-building activities, 
and the choreography of public and 
private investment and actions that need 
to be carefully staged, the OPLC was re-
engineered and given powers to ensure 
that the integration of planning and 
implementation, that proved so essential 
in the success of the delivery of the Games, 
was carried through in legacy. 
Through national legislation enabling 
the mayor to create local development 
corporations, very much a modern version 
of the government development corporation 
in the 1970s that spearheaded the first 
generation of East London’s transformation 
in the Docklands, OPLC was reconstituted 
as the London Legacy Development 
Corporation (LLDC) under the Mayor of 
London’s control. It was given not only 
ownership of the Olympic Park land, but 
also the planning authority for the Olympic 
Park and surrounding neighbourhoods 
under the jurisdiction of local boroughs. 
This exceptional consolidation of 
land ownership and planning power, 
unthinkable in most Western cities too 
timid to assert such power since the mass 
urban renewal of the post-World War II 
era, was agreed to by all levels of national 
and local government with a common 
purpose to maintain the regeneration 
momentum fuelled by the Games. What 
will be surprising to observers of urban 
development is that there was virtually no 
community opposition to the creation of 
the LLDC and its extraordinary powers.
The Convergence Agenda
London is spatially and socio-economically 
unequal: it has an affluent West and a more 
deprived East. Life expectancy drops from 
80 years to 73 years as you move eastwards 
across the city. This dramatic statistic 
captures the disparity in many social and 
economic indicators between East London 
and the rest of the city. The Olympic ‘host’ 
boroughs have historically been among the 
worse off in England.  To counteract this 
grim reality and leverage investment for the 
Games, local mayors developed the concept 
of convergence as they key driver for change 
amongst their communities. Convergence 
establishes an aspiration that East 
Londoners’ life chances and opportunities 
should, at a minimum, be on a par with the 
average of all of London. Far from being 
modest, this simple aspiration established 
bold and comprehensive goals in improving 
employment, health, education, housing 
conditions and all the indices of life chances 
and circumstances that would help ensure 
that the conditions documented by Booth’s 
Survey a century ago were ameliorated 
beyond the artificial confines of the Park. 
And, importantly, it recognised that for 
genuine regeneration to occur beyond the 
traditional ‘bricks and mortar’ of the Park, 
there had to be a more comprehensive 
programme of investment and change.
Translating the Convergence Policy to 
the Olympic Park was as much of a mindset 
as it was a legislative matter. Every piece of 
the building of a new piece of city needed 
to be understood as an asset through which 
mixture and diversity are promoted. Too 
often this perspective is compartmentalised 
as a separate ‘programme’, as opposed 
to being a core part of everything that 
is delivered. To address this, the OPLC 
adopted an inter-related set of policies to 
promote convergence, such as:
•	 Requiring	affordable	housing	(35	per	cent		
 of all new housing built on the Park);
•	 Proactively	creating	local	employment		
 and small business opportunities  
 generated by the venues, such as the  
 Aquatics Centre, so that they are operated  
 by small business enterprises; 
•	 Setting	affordable	rates	for	the	sports		
 venues for local residents so that the  
 poorest of residents could swim in world- 
 class facilities or attend a football game in  
 the Olympic Stadium;  
•	 Using	the	International	Press,	Media		
 Broadcast Centre facilities as a resource  
 to diversify the economy of East London  
 by actively creating a technology hub and  
 connecting this to local community  
 colleges and training for opportunities in  
 the new economy;
•	 Creating	community	programming	for		
 future activities in the Olympic Park so  
 that the Park would be first and foremost  
 a park enjoyed by local communities, and  
 not solely for tourists;
•	Working	with	Westfield,	the	largest		
 urban shopping centre operator in  
 Europe, to support of a ‘retail academy’ to  
 train local residents for service jobs,  
 which has resulted in the majority of  
 positions being filled locally;
•	 Constructing	bridges	to	connect	the	 
 Park over canals, roads and railways that  
 divide the site from adjacent communities. 
Ultimately, the London Legacy 
Corporation has significantly been able 
to extend its remit beyond the Olympic 
Park itself, to ensure the integration of the 
Park with surrounding communities. On 
reflection, the role of the agency has been 
to bridge between vision and action, ideas 
and institutions, and the integration of the 
physical, social and economic aspects of 
diversity and mixture essential to realise 
successful urbanism. In this case, without 
the Convergence Agenda the Park could 
easily become an elite island unto itself, 
rather than part of an integrated whole: a 
new piece of London. 
What does this mean for Rio 2016? 
Imaginative city building, and the 
marshalling of forces necessary to achieve 
it, is a complex task that too often occurs 
in silos. The London Olympics story may 
sound too perfect in attempting to rectify 
that divide and create the platform to 
connect imagination with the fine grain 
of urban form. Time will be the ultimate 
judge as to whether the foundation will 
work. Affordable housing and employment 
policies to ensure diversity could be 
eroded; design guidelines intended to 
ensure diversity in the built environment 
could be discarded at the behest of capital; 
land could be sold too quickly, in too 
large swathes for revenue which would 
obstruct a more diverse city created by 
many hands over time; the institutions 
created to steward this precious asset could 
be prevented from taking the longer view. 
And, of course, we will look back at today’s 
statistics of the fortunes of East London 
to measure whether they have genuinely 
‘converged’ or deprivation has simply been 
pushed further out of sight. 
For Rio de Janeiro, as it is mobilises to 
deliver its legacy of the 2016 Games, the 
questions of how the investments will lead 
to greater integration or further segregation 
of the city are paramount. Will Porto 
Maravilha evolve to reflect the dynamism of 
Rio’s urbanism, its lively streets, mix of uses 
and pedestrian-oriented street culture, and 
not simply become a platform for capital? 
Will the new, important investments in 
transport help to heal the North-South 
divide or serve to further greater sprawl? 
Will the recent investment in the favelas 
lead not only to improved conditions but 
greater economic and social integration 
with the dynamics of Rio’s growth?  
Hopefully, London’s recent experience 
offers insights for debate.
Andy Altman is Visiting Senior 
Fellow at LSE Cities, London 
School of Economics and 
Political Science. He was Chief 
Executive of the London Legacy 
Development Corporation,  
2009-2012.
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DATA
The information on the following pages summarises research 
undertaken by LSE Cities over the past year. It places Rio de Janeiro 
in a comparative context with other Urban Age cities, including New 
York, London, Hong Kong, Mumbai, Johannesburg, Mexico City and 
São Paulo. The section illustrates the unequal distribution of global 
urban growth and tracks the speed at which selected world cities are 
changing and growing. It provides a unique comparative database  
of twelve cities including urban size and growth rates, inequality  
and murder rates, water consumption and CO2 emissions. Finally,  
it identifies the sharp contrasts between residential and employment 
densities and the varying patterns of mobility and distribution of 
public transport infrastructure, which are key determinants of social, 
economic and environmental sustainability.
RESEARCH TEAM
Savvas Verdis
Duncan Smith
Adam Towle
Catarina  Heeckt
Ömer Çavuşoğlu
Danielle Hoppe
We would like to especially thank the following 
organisations for their help in accessing key data  
that are displayed in the following pages. 
Barcelona City Council
Bogotá Secretariat of Planning
Geoprocessamento - Port Region Urban Development  
Company (CDURP), Rio de Janeiro 
HafenCity Hamburg GmbH
Institute for Transport and Development Policy, Rio de Janeiro
Instituto Pereira Passos, Rio de Janeiro
MPU Architects, Rio de Janeiro  
Rio de Janeiro Municipal Olympic Company
Rio de Janeiro Municipal Transportation Department
State of Rio de Janeiro Public Works Company
For full references to data sources, please see: http://rio2013.lsecities.net/newspaper/
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DYNAMICS OF URBANISATION
WHERE CITIES ARE GROWING
HOW CITIES ARE GROWING
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* Pricewaterhouse Coopers projection using UN urban agglomeration definitions and population estimates. 
Data published in 2009 and may not fully reflect the impact of the global economic recession on GDP growth trends.
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There are dramatic regional differences in the pace and 
scale of urban transformations at the global level. The map 
above charts the size and growth of a selection of world 
cities with more than a million people from 1950 to 2025. 
Some of the cities predicted to be among the largest in 
the world in 2025 were no more than villages and small 
towns in 1950, while others are barely growing anymore. 
The acceleration of growth in African and Asian cities and 
the relative slow-down of urbanisation in Latin America 
becomes even more evident in the table to the left, which 
compares a range of past and future growth patterns for a 
selection of thirty cities.
1.1    Metropolitan population  
in millions  (2010)
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HOW CITIES PERFORM
Behind the statistics of global city growth lie very different 
patterns of urbanisation, with diverse spatial, social and 
economic characteristics that dramatically affect the urban 
experience. In addition to standard measures of population 
growth and the economy, LSE Cities has assembled spatial, 
social, transport and environmental data from a range of official 
sources, providing an overview of how twelve selected cities 
compare to each other on a set of key performance indicators.
The graphic overview of these results highlights some 
striking differences, especially when it comes to these cities’ 
speed of growth. While Mexico City, Istanbul, São Paulo 
and New York are growing by more than 200,000 people a 
year, it is Mumbai that is changing the fastest of the twelve, 
adding 54 additional residents every hour. In comparison, 
Hamburg will only gain 1 person per hour, Hong Kong 8, 
London 10 and Rio de Janeiro 13. Patterns of habitation 
also differ significantly. While London and New York have 
similar population sizes, New York has twice as many 
people per km2, a density level that is dwarfed by Mumbai, 
where peak densities reach well over 120,000 people per 
km2. Mumbai also leads on economic growth, having 
experienced an average annual increase in GVA of 6.7 per 
cent between 1993 and 2010, even though it is now slowing 
down. Over the same period, the economies of Johannesburg 
and Bogotá grew at about half that speed – nevertheless 
impressive compared to the relatively slow growth for the 
European cities in this table. Looking at GVA per capita, 
New York (US$51,337/R$114,728) and London (US$47,313/
R$105,735) top the list, followed by Hamburg (US$42,270/
R$94,465) and Hong Kong (US$31,340R$70,038). People 
living in these four cities are many times wealthier, on 
average, than in other world cities such as Rio de Janeiro 
and Istanbul (around US$10,000/R$22,348), which in 
turn are significantly wealthier than the average resident 
of Mumbai (US$1,550/R$3,464). Despite its low per capita 
GVA, Mumbai’s level of income inequality indicated by the 
Gini coefficient – a measure of income distribution with a 
higher number representing greater inequality – is nearly 
half that of Johannesburg, which is the most unequal of the 
twelve cities, followed closely by Mexico City, Bogotá, and 
Rio de Janeiro, with Barcelona and Hamburg being the most 
equitable. With a murder rate of more than 20 per 100,000 
people Johannesburg, Bogotá and Rio are proving to be the 
most dangerous places to live in. Although this figure has 
been dropping rapidly in all of these cities, it remains in stark 
contrast to the situation in  Hong Kong, Mumbai, Barcelona, 
Hamburg, Istanbul and London, which all record less than 2 
murders per 100,000 people a year.
Variations in life expectancy have slowly narrowed and 
residents of nearly all of the Urban Age cities can now expect 
to live at least to the age of 70, with people in Hong Kong, 
Barcelona, London, New York and Hamburg enjoying a 
life expectancy of 80 years or above. A Carioca can expect 
to live to an average age of 75.7 years. The exception is 
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Johannesburg at just 51 years, reflecting the HIV-related 
drop in life expectancy experienced across the country. 
Demographic differences are more pronounced when it 
comes to patterns of age distribution. While more than 
a third of the residents of Mexico City, Johannesburg, 
Mumbai, and Bogotá are under the age of 20 – with Rio close 
behind at 26.5 per cent - this drops to a fifth or less for Hong 
Kong, Barcelona and Hamburg, which will have to adjust 
to the socio-economic and cultural consequences of this 
increasing generational imbalance.
Environmental performance indicators highlight 
divergent consumption patterns and lifestyles, although 
it is important to note that these figures mask significant 
variations in consumption within individual cities. On 
the whole, Bogotá has the smallest consumption footprint, 
using just 114 litres of water per person per day, compared 
to 572 litres in New York, 349 in Johannesburg and 302 
in Rio de Janeiro, and generating less waste than all other 
cities except for Mumbai. London and São Paulo generate 
the most, at 558 and 550 kg per person per year respectively. 
Six of the twelve cities emit more than 5 tonnes of CO2 per 
person, ten times as much as a resident of Mumbai and 
twice as much as someone in Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, 
Barcelona or Bogotá. Variation in car ownership is equally 
drastic. At 465 cars per 1,000 inhabitants São Paulo has 
the second highest motorisation rate of all cities (over 50 
per cent more than Rio at 310), although improvements 
in public transport over the past few years are slowing the 
trend. Hamburg has more than twice as many cars per 1,000 
inhabitants as New York, Johannesburg, Bogotá or Istanbul 
and ten times more than Hong Kong or Mumbai. Mumbai, 
however, is catching up fast, with an increase of 35 per cent 
in vehicles on the city’s roads in the past 5 years alone. The 
rapid motorisation rate is contributing to the already severe 
air pollution the city experiences: at 132 µg/m3, Mumbai 
recorded the highest annual PM10 levels, compared to just 
21 in New York, 23 in Hamburg and 38 in São Paulo. Yet the 
majority of Mumbaikars still get around the city on foot or 
by bicycle, making it the city with the highest non-motorised 
modal share of the twelve (56 per cent). In contrast, only 
11 per cent of all trips in New York are made by walking 
and cycling, with most people relying on the city’s nearly 
600-km-long rail network, buses and taxis. Looking at rail 
network systems for other cities provides an indication of 
the development of their public transport infrastructure, 
although it should be noted that many cities in this table 
have substantial BRT networks, which are not accounted for 
here. London and Barcelona have by far the most extensive 
rail network (1,393 km and 1,121 km respectively), with the 
average rail network length for all cities just above 500 km. 
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RESIDENTIAL DENSITY
RIO DE JANEIRO LONDON NEW YORKpeak 42,300 pp/km2 peak 27,100 pp/km2 peak 59,150 pp/km2
HONG KONG BOGOTÁ STOCKHOLMpeak 111,100 pp/km2 peak 55,800 pp/km2 peak 24,900 pp/km2
MUMBAI ISTANBUL BARCELONApeak 121,300 pp/km2 peak 77,300 pp/km2 peak 56,800 pp/km2
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EMPLOYMENT DENSITY
RIO DE JANEIRO LONDON NEW YORK CITYpeak 76,700 jobs/km2 peak 141,600 jobs/km2 peak 151,600 jobs/km2
HONG KONG BOGOTÁ STOCKHOLMpeak 120,200 jobs/km2 peak 61,550 jobs/km2 peak 51,950 jobs/km2
Overall urban density is driven by topographical constraints, the provision of 
infrastructure and by inherited traditions of urban development. The highest density cities 
typically have grown around a harbour with limited land availability, as is the case in New 
York, Istanbul and Mumbai. Bogotá is constrained by a mountainous hinterland, while Rio 
and Hong Kong are bounded by both water and steep terrain.
Density is a fundamental measure of urban structure that can be used to quantify the 
immense diversity in urban form across the globe. Higher urban densities can improve 
service delivery efficiency, promote urban vitality and facilitate more sustainable public 
transport, walking and cycling. These advantages depend, however, on effective city 
management and urban design that minimises the negative costs of overcrowding and 
pollution. Here we map residential densities – where people live – for nine case-study cities 
(opposite) and employment densities – where people work – for six of these cities (above). 
Each diagram measures density at the square kilometre scale, using a standard region of 
100 by 100 kilometres.
Rio de Janeiro has a peak residential density of 42,300 people per km2 – higher than 
London (27,100 people per km2) and Stockholm (24,900 people per km2), but lower than 
Hong Kong (111,100 people per km2), New York (59,150 people per km2) and Bogotá (55,800 
people per km2). Despite having areas of low but closely packed buildings and some high-
rise developments, Rio is relatively unique in showing consistent density levels across a 
very large metropolitan region, compared to cities like New York and Istanbul where high 
densities are strongly focused in the urban core. Hong Kong stands out for its high-density 
development across the city, and extremely high peaks achieved by Mumbai reflect the large 
families living in overcrowded conditions in many of the city’s neighbourhoods. 
The mapping of employment densities provides a very different perspective on urban 
form, and offers insights into current trends in city economies. Some of the world cities 
documented here specialise in knowledge-economy sectors, such as finance and creative 
industries, where competitiveness is maximised by high-density environments. In these 
cities there is high demand for office space, and consequently high employment densities in 
the inner core areas of New York, Hong Kong and London. New York has the highest peak 
employment density at 151,600 jobs per km2, while Hong Kong (120,200 jobs per km2, much 
closer to the residential density peak) and London (141,600 jobs per km2) are not far behind. 
This level of density requires an extensive public transport network to enable millions of 
employees to flow efficiently in and out of central business districts on a daily basis. Rio 
de Janeiro and Bogotá also show high peak employment densities of 76,700 jobs per km2 
and 61,500 jobs per km2 respectively, reflecting expanding service sectors, but given their 
significant industrial base both cities have more dispersed spatial patterns of employment, 
which, in Rio’s case, is spread across the wider metropolitan region.
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INFRASTRUCTURE OF MOBILITY
HONG KONG BARCELONA BOGOTÁ
MUMBAI ISTANBUL HAMBURG
RIO DE JANEIRO LONDON NEW YORK CITY
Public transport development (last 15 years)
Intercity & regional rail Metro Bus Rapid Transit Light RailUrban area
Administrative city Infrastructure under construction
Public transport networks
Intercity & regional rail Metro Light Rail
A significant factor in city transformations of the last 
decades has been renewed investment in public transport 
and a new focus on improving urban sustainability and 
quality of life through facilitating walking and cycling. The 
maps below illustrate public transport networks in 9 Urban 
Age cities, highlighting recently developed infrastructure 
from the last 15 years (shown in orange).
Some mature cities have made improvements to 
existing public transport networks and other rapidly 
growing cities have invested in almost completely new 
networks. London, Barcelona and Hamburg – which 
expanded dramatically more than a century ago - have a 
rich heritage of public transport infrastructure. Recent 
investment here has focussed on high speed international 
rail networks, extending existing lines and connecting to 
new areas of urban expansion or densification of previously 
industrial areas – such as London Docklands and Hamburg 
HafenCity. While Rio de Janeiro and Mumbai also have 
historic rail infrastructure, this is highly inadequate for 
their current needs given the pace and scale of urban 
growth. Rio is developing an extensive Bus Rapid Transit 
system and a new metro line to integrate the wider urban 
region to the West. Mumbai is constructing several new 
metro lines, providing missing East-West connections. 
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HOW PEOPLE TRAVEL 
This section explores the proportion of trips made by 
different transport modes in 9 Urban Age cities, enabling 
an understanding of how transport infrastructure and 
policies translate into real world behaviour. The extensive 
transport networks found in all 9 cities ensure that public 
transport use is substantial. There is wide variation in 
which public transport modes are the most prominent. In 
Rio, the bus dominates, with the currently limited metro 
and rail networks making up only 3.3% of trips. The bus is 
also most prominent in Bogotá at 42% of trips. Other cities 
show a more balanced picture split between rail, metro and 
bus modes.
There is also widespread variation between cities in 
terms of car travel. Despite the affluence of a city like 
Hong Kong, only 7% use their cars for typical journeys as 
a result of the exceptional efficiency of the public transport 
network. New York and London display similar but less 
marked patterns, with some central office areas (the City 
of London and downtown New York) experiencing over 
90% of public transport usage on daily basis. Despite the 
experience of seemingly endless traffic congestion, only 
18%, 13% and 5% of residents of Rio, Istanbul and Mumbai 
use cars, with public transport and walking taking the 
bigger share. 
The New York data refers to work travel only
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CITY  
TRANSFORMATIONS
TRANSPORT INVESTMENTS
PATTERNS OF URBAN CHANGE SINCE 1980
PORT REDEVELOPMENTS
RETROFITTING URBANISM
RIO DE JANEIRO: Sistema BRT (Bus Rapid Transit)
BOGOTÁ: TransMilenio (Bus Rapid Transit) 
LONDON: Crossrail
BARCELONA
LONDON
RIO DE JANEIRO: Porto Maravilha
HAMBURG: HafenCity
RIO DE JANEIRO: Complexo do Alemão
MUMBAI: Dharavi
This section investigates examples of recent initiatives and projects that highlight the 
transformative potential of recent physical interventions on the social and economic life 
of six cities, moving from large-scale transport infrastructure, to the regeneration of 
brownfield sites and retrofitting of urban communities.
Starting at the city-wide scale, the connections between new investments in public 
transport, social equity and density are explored through the Bus Rapid Transit systems in 
use and under construction in Bogotá and Rio de Janeiro, and the ambitious Crossrail high-
frequency rail line that is currently being built in tunnels under central London, allowing 
passengers to cross this 60km-wide city in under one hour.  
The dramatic changes that have reshaped Barcelona and London – both Olympic  
cities – are documented to show the impact of subsequent phases of public and private 
investment, which have transformed the social and economic vitality of these European 
cities in the last decades. 
Moving to a more detailed scale, the radical effects of the restructuring of city 
economies are explored in the redesign of redundant port areas located in critical points of 
the urban fabric of Rio de Janeiro and Hamburg, Germany’s leading port city. The urban 
structure of Rio’s Porto Maravilha and Hamburg’s HafenCity are compared providing 
different models of spatial intervention.
The need to improve and upgrade informal neighbourhoods – such as the Complexo do 
Alemão in Rio and Dharavi in Mumbai – sheds light on the potential of retrofitting existing 
communities with new facilities – schools, streets, transport, security – that make these 
areas more liveable and build social capital for their residents.
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CITY  
TRANSFORMATIONS
TRANSPORT AND  
SOCIAL EQUITY
BOGOTÁ: TRANSMILENIO
Total system length: 87km 
Budget: R$1.71bn (US$785m)
Bogotá’s TransMilenio BRT system is recognised as a 
model of best practice of accessibility-based planning in a 
developing country context. The system, operational since 
2000, has grown to encompass 11 lines totalling 87 km, with 
plans to expand this to more than 300 km by 2020. Recent 
upgrades include Linea K towards the airport and Linea J 
providing improved links to the university. TransMilenio 
has enabled greater transport equity in Bogotá by 
significantly increasing mobility for residents without car 
access, as well as by improving pedestrian safety through 
linked infrastructure investments. As the map (right) 
demonstrates, existing lines connect several of Bogotá’s 
lowest-income neighbourhoods with the city centre. Yet the 
map also highlights that some of the poorest peripheries 
of the city remain outside the reach of the current system, 
partly due to the steep terrain and unpaved roads that 
characterise these settlements. 
LONDON: CROSSRAIL
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RIO DE JANEIRO: SISTEMA BRT
Total system length: 159km 
Budget: R$5bn (US$2.3bn)
In preparation for the Olympic Games, Rio de Janeiro is 
undertaking the largest single investment in the history 
of the city’s transportation network, centered on the 
construction of 159 km of Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) lines. 
The TransOeste line, operational since June 2012, connects 
the wealthy coastal strip area of Barra da Tijuca to the south 
with low-income neighbourhoods in the far West of the 
city. The line has reduced average travel times along this 
corridor by more than 50 per cent compared to traditional 
bus trips. The remaining TransCarioca, TransOlimpica 
and TransBrazil lines are currently under construction, 
connecting Barra to the city centre and main international 
airport to the west. These lines will improve connections 
between more deprived areas in the northern zone of the 
city with the western zone and city centre. As with any 
relatively dispersed city – Rio de Janeiro extends for over  
60 kilometres in length – a number of areas remain  
ill-served by public transport, including some low-income 
neighbourhoods. 
Total system length: 97km 
Budget: R$51bn (US$23.3bn)
London’s ambitious new 97-km rail line, scheduled for 
completion in late 2018, will connect West London, 
including the major hub of Heathrow Airport, with the city 
centre and strategic development areas to the east, such as 
Canary Wharf and Stratford, drastically cutting travel times 
across the capital. Crossrail will help to focus investment 
activity in brownfield sites in the vicinity of new stations 
and also play an important role as a catalyst for regeneration 
in key areas of deprivation. As the map (right) shows, this 
is particularly relevant to East London, where the north-
eastern and south-eastern branches of the line will improve 
services for some of the most deprived communities in 
London. Several of these areas have traditionally been 
isolated from the centres of work and services due to a 
lack of adequate public transport connections. Crossrail 
does not, however, improve accessibility for large areas of 
deprivation in north and south London. There are plans for 
a second North-South Crossrail line to address this gap, yet 
the great expense of tunnelling through Central London is a 
significant hurdle for these proposals. 
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BOGOTÁ: TRANSMILENIO
Average built-up density: 21,950 pp/km2 
Accessibility to BRT: 76% of residents within  
2 km of a stop 
TransMilenio routes are closely linked to areas of high 
population density, with over three quarters of Bogotá 
residents living within two kilometres of a BRT stop. The 
exceptions are the informal neighbourhoods located on 
the outskirts of the city. Although there are more than 600 
kilometres of additional feeder routes that move passengers 
from remote areas to the main TransMilenio system, a 
significant number of people continue to rely on other 
forms of transport. The wealthier residents of the city get 
around by car, while the more deprived continue to rely on 
walking, cycling and bus, which still makes up nearly 70 per 
cent of the city’s public transport trips. One estimate shows 
that the number of jobs reachable within an hour’s travel 
time increased by a factor of three for families moving along 
BRT lines. These programmes have the benefit of reducing 
housing and transport costs, which can often consume two-
thirds of the income of poorer residents.
LONDON: CROSSRAIL
RIO DE JANEIRO: SISTEMA BRT
Average built-up density: 7,730 pp/km2 
Accessibility to BRT:  49% of residents within 
2 km of a stop
Rio’s new BRT lines connect several high-density residential 
areas, particularly in the northern inner city and around the 
international airport. Nearly 50 per cent of Rio’s population 
will be within two kilometres of a BRT stop when all the 
lines are completed. Yet many large high-density residential 
areas will not be covered by the system, particularly inner-
city areas to the west and north-west. Denser areas in 
the southern and central northern zone are served by the 
metro and rail network. The completed TransOeste line 
passes through areas of fairly low residential density before 
reaching the higher-density suburbs of Santa Cruz and 
Campo Grande. Rio has been expanding rapidly towards 
the west, with average population increases of over 20 per 
cent between 2000 and 2010, suggesting that the line will be 
a timely investment to facilitate growth in an area of the city 
chronically underserved by public transport.
Average built-up density: 6,080 pp/km2 
Accessibility to Crossrail:  20% of residents within  
2 km of a station
Crossrail was conceived as a project to improve journey 
times and capacity for east-west trips across London in 
the context of the city’s extensive rail and underground 
networks. Although the route passes through metropolitan 
town centres and important residential hubs, it is not 
specifically aligned to areas of highest density, and only 
20 per cent of London residents currently live within 
two kilometres of Crossrail station locations. Crossrail 
is expected to catalyse a significant increase in value of 
commercial and residential real estate along the new line, 
and to support the delivery of over 57,000 new homes 
and 3.25 million square metres of commercial space. A 
significant appreciation in property values is expected 
immediately around new stations. This means that 
residential densities along the line are likely to increase 
in the future, as previously remote locations become 
directly connected to the city centre and other areas with 
employment and service provision. 
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BOGOTÁ: TRANSMILENIO
Average employment density: 9,750 jobs/km2 
Jobs accessibility to BRT:  88% of jobs within  
2 km of a stop
Today the system carries 1.6 million passengers a day, and 
has a throughput of 36,000 passengers per direction per 
hour, which matches the capacity of London’s Crossrail 
project. The map (right) shows the correlation between the 
current TransMilenio lines and Bogotá’s highly centralised 
pattern of employment density. This density distribution 
is essentially the inverse of the residential density map 
for Bogotá (opposite). TransMilenio links the main 
employment corridors with the areas of highest residential 
density, significantly reducing travel times for residents with 
access to the system. Residents of informal settlements not 
connected to TransMilenio often have a daily commute of 
more than two hours and have to pay multiple fares to take 
several informal minibus connections to work, consuming 
as much as 15 per cent of daily wages. 
LONDON: CROSSRAIL
RIO DE JANEIRO: SISTEMA BRT
Average employment density: 4,580 jobs/km2 
Jobs accessibility to BRT:  54% of jobs within  
2 km of a stop
The connection created by the TransCarioca and 
TransBrasil lines between the populated areas of the 
northern zone and the airport and port region will have 
a significant impact on commuting times to these core 
employment centres. They will also improve connections 
from the North to Barra and the Olympic sites, although 
there is an obvious lack of connection to the South zone, 
which is served by the metro network. Three of the four 
lines will converge in Barra da Tijuca, an area which 
currently has fairly low employment densities, although an 
increasing number of international companies have located 
there in recent years. This trend is likely to be accelerated 
by the improved transport connections to the rest of the 
city. The presence of several large development sites along 
the TransOlimpica and TransBrasil is also likely to increase 
employment opportunities in these areas over the coming 
years.
Average employment density: 3,300 jobs/km2 
Jobs accessibility to BRT: 48% of jobs within  
2 km of a station
The great expense of the Crossrail project has been justified 
in large part by the improved business and commuter 
connectivity that the line will enable. Businesses in 
London’s central clusters of the City and West End, and 
the rapidly expanding location of Canary Wharf, have 
long complained about the need for new public transport 
capacity to allow expansion, and the long travel times to 
the key airport hub of Heathrow. Crossrail is intended to 
address these demands, bringing an additional 1.5 million 
commuters within 45 minutes of central London and 
increasing rail capacity by 10 per cent once the system is 
completed. The line will significantly improve connections 
between and East and West London, cutting travel times  
for many journeys by half. Expanding development 
locations in East London, such as the developments around 
the Olympic Park at Stratford, will become more accessible 
and arguably become more competitive for attracting 
businesses and residents.
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PATTERNS OF URBAN CHANGE SINCE 1980
Many European cities have experienced the negative impacts of waves of 
deindustrialisation, successive recessions and political decline since the 1970s, but few 
have been able to respond as resiliently as Barcelona and London. Each in their own way 
has pursued its own path towards recovery and growth, with ‘big planning’, policy-led 
regeneration set by a succession of strong and visionary mayors – from Pasqual Maragall 
and Joan Clos in Barcelona, to Ken Livingstone and Boris Johnson in London. This has 
resulted in major shifts to the physical appearance, spatial dynamics and economic 
performance of both cities in the space of 30 years. 
The maps indicate the broad time frames of this transformation since the 1980s 
when Barcelona rediscovered its freedom after the death of General Franco and London 
reinvented itself and its institutions after 15 years of absence of metropolitan governance 
following the abolition of the Greater London Council by Margaret Thatcher in 1985. Apart 
from creating the new role of a directly elected Mayor in 2000, London followed Barcelona 
in becoming host to the 2012 Olympics, 20 years after its Mediterranean counterpart held 
the successful 1992 Games.
 
Historically, land development in the two cities has been guided by two urban planning 
legacies. In Barcelona Ildefons Cerda’s urban grid dating from the mid-nineteenth century 
has set a compact city benchmark for future development, which extends and connects 
the city fabric over time. In London the combination of the 1940s Green Belt, centrifugal 
transport network and large swathes of industrial land along the River Thames and its 
extension eastwards has framed the pattern of development.
Barcelona’s urban resurgence started in the 1980s, a decade before London. The 
rebalancing was more widespread with the city providing public investment in disadvantaged 
areas with over 200 public squares, open spaces and schools spread across the city as part 
of the Olympic Games in 1992. The Olympics were also the catalyst to reorient the city 
towards the Mediterranean by removing the railway lines and re-using industrial land that 
separated the city from the sea. Post Olympics developments have focused on the logistics, 
port and airport area, the Forum of Cultures and conference centre along the coast, and La 
Sagrera high-speed railway hub as well as the extensive 22@Barcelona innovation district. 
More recent urban policies are focusing on hitherto neglected areas on the edges of the city, 
including the Torre Baró hills and Tres Turons green areas.
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With the exception of London’s Docklands and commercial investments in the City of 
London in the 1980s, London’s urban renaissance only kicked off in the mid to late 1990s, 
with the economy recovering from a period of recession and a new alignment between 
met opolitan and national governments working together on a new ‘urban agenda’. A series of 
large-scale projects such as King’s Cross, the Olympic Park and the Royal Docks – the latter 
two forming part of the Mayor of London’s Thames Gateway spatial strategy – are part of this 
continuing legacy that are rebalancing the East End with the city’s historically more affluent 
western side. 
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With the relocation of the Port of Rio’s commercial shipping 
activities in the 1980s and the privatisation of Brazilian 
ports in 1998, a large swathe of valuable urban land became 
available for redevelopment, right on the doorstep of the 
city’s historic centre. Porto Maravilha encompasses 500 
hectares (1,236 acres) occupied by empty warehouses, 
industrial buildings and wharves that surround one of Rio’s 
historic favelas, the Morro da Providência. Its west-facing 
waterfront offers extraordinary opportunities to reconnect 
the city with Guanabara Bay, close to the main railway 
station and the historic office district of Centro. Following 
a familiar process of abandonment and part-occupation by 
fringe activities (artists and small entrepreneurs), the City 
embarked on a programme of revitalisation of the area that 
has been given further impetus since Rio was awarded the 
2016 Olympic Games.  
As a delivery vehicle, Porto Maravilha has been set 
up a as public agency (CDURP), which acquired the land 
on behalf of the municipality, giving it full control over 
future developments. Since 2009, the agency has been 
tasked to sell development rights for each plot to help fund 
the considerable upfront investment in infrastructure, 
which includes the demolition of an elevated motorway 
(typical of post-war planning in port cities in Europe and 
North America), the construction of a light rail system and 
undergrounding of road traffic. The objective is to create  
a mixed housing and commercial neighbourhood that will 
both attract major international investors and increase the 
residential population in the area from 30,000 to 100,000  
by 2020. 
Porto Maravilha has chosen to operate a development 
model that provides maximum flexibility for potential 
investors. It has worked up a financial model with 
maximum allowable areas for individual plots that fit 
within a transport network and incentives for developers to 
provide more residential space. Nonetheless, it has stopped 
short of defining a three-dimensional spatial masterplan 
that regulates the footprint and character of buildings and 
public spaces, or the exact mix of functions on a street-
by-street basis. While construction has already begun on 
several large scale projects – including the Olympic media 
village (Porto Olímpico), five 150-metre Trump Towers 
as well as high-rise hotels, residential and office towers – 
details of the proposed urban fabric and its porosity with 
respect to neighbouring areas are yet to evolve. Cultural 
projects include the completed Rio Museum of Arts and 
highly iconic Museu do Amanhã (Museum of Tomorrow) is 
seen by some as Rio’s answer to Bilbao’s Guggenheim. 
Three per cent of the income raised from land sales is 
invested in social inclusion, heritage and arts programmes 
for communities living in the area. Not unlike other 
projects of this scale and ambition, Porto Maravilha is 
seen as an important part of the revitalisation of the city’s 
waterfront, but has been criticised for over-development, 
increased traffic flows, alien urban typology, lack of 
provision of local services and public consultation.
RIO DE JANEIRO: PORTO MARAVILHA
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Hamburg’s historic role as a major European port, 
going back 800 years, has been recently recalibrated 
as a result of globalisation, market restructuring and 
rationalisation of port activities. Located on the River Elbe, 
the port remains a major force among Europe’s maritime 
gateways, but a significant section of its dock areas was 
vacated and released to the City of Hamburg as part of a 
comprehensive city-wide redevelopment plan in the late 
1990s. Hafencity, the 3.2km strip of over 150 hectares (371 
acres) of waterfront land, provided a rare opportunity to 
expand the city core by 40 per cent, connecting the historic 
inner city to the water, revitalising the area with a mixed-
use neighbourhood designed to promote jobs, inward 
investment and inner-city living. A number of high-quality 
granary warehouses close to the water provided further 
opportunity to connect to the city’s past.
From the outset, the City of Hamburg (which owned 
the port) increased ownership of the land in HafenCity 
from 75 per cent to 97 per cent as a result of large-scale 
land acquisitions, giving it almost complete control over 
the land and its uses. The redevelopment is managed by 
HafenCity Hamburg GmbH, which is a subsidiary owned 
entirely by the Free and Hanseatic City of Hamburg. 
HafenCity launched a special fund called Stadt und Hafen 
which owned all of the land on the site. Fifty per cent 
of this land was sold upfront raising R$4.4 billion (US$ 
2 billion) with a further R$2.7 billion (US$ 1.2 billion) 
billion of public investment. The entirety of the R$7.1 
billion (US$3.2 billion) public funds were used to pay 
for the infrastructure covering roads, bridges, squares, 
parks, quays and promenades. However, the vast majority 
of investments,around R$23.6 billion (US$ 10.8 billion) 
billion, have come from private investments in real estate.
As an institution wholly owned by the City, Hafencity 
works in close collaboration with its Planning Department 
and shares the overall vision for how Hamburg is set to 
grow over the next decades. The agency drew up a three-
dimensional spatial masterplan for the entire area, defining 
building heights, ground floor uses, street widths, public 
routes and landscaped open spaces. Connections to and 
from the old inner city were to be preserved and enhanced, 
taking into account flood risks and the need to ensure 
active street frontages throughout. Within this overall 
spatial framework, open design competitions were held 
for interested parties (developers, investors and architects) 
whose projects had to respect the strict design guidelines 
imposed by the masterplan. Around 50 per cent of the 
available land has been sold as ‘building plots’ (rather than 
‘development plots’ as in Porto Maravilha).
The result of the process is architecturally varied and 
urbanistically consistent. It has proven attractive to the 
private sector even at a time of recession in Europe, with 
major media, insurance and commercial organisations 
locating new headquarters on the site, alongside housing 
and cultural buildings. When complete by 2015, Hafencity 
will have a population of 12,000 residents and 45,000 jobs.
HAMBURG: HAFENCITY
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RETROFITTING URBANISM
The Complexo do Alemão – a complex of twelve communities - is one of the largest 
and most visible favelas in Rio with a growing population of over 80,000 people. It has 
undergone a continued and sustained process of upgrading and retrofitting for a number 
of decades. During the 1980s it benefitted from public investment in sanitation, paving and 
primary education. Since 2007, the government’s Growth and Acceleration Programme 
(PAC) has funded new amenities including a library, youth centre, school, health centre, 
2,600 new homes and a major cable-car system with six stations that extends for nearly 
three kilometres, with a maximum capacity of 30,000 passengers per day (highlighted 
on the map above). The pacification process (UPP) has added local and police facilities 
next to the cable car stations. 82 per cent of households are privately owned - with only 12 
per cent renting. At 12 per cent, the unemployment rate is higher than the average in Rio 
and over 5,000 businesses are split between services and retail, with a small number of 
manufacturing activities. Some businesses are responding to the growing needs of tourists 
who use the cable car system. The process of retrofitting is on-going with a new hospital 
and other facilities in or next to the favela.
RIO DE JANEIRO: COMPLEXO DO ALEMÃO
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RETROFITTING URBANISM
Dharavi is spread over 200 hectares (494 acres), the size of the Olympic Park in London 
with a population of about one million people living at extremely high densities. The local 
community is engaged in traditional industries such as pottery, textiles and the recycling 
industry, with 80 per cent of its residents employed in the area’s 5,000 businesses and 15,000 
single-room factories (most of them illegal). The total turnover from formal and informal 
activities is between US$500-600 million (R$1.1-1.3bn). Major problems are related to 
inadequate sanitation and water supply, with only one toilet per 1000 residents. While 
most houses have electricity, 70 per cent is connected on an ad-hoc basis to the national 
grid and there is no official waste collection. Government interventions began in the 1970s 
when the area was formally declared a slum. As a retrofitting process, there have been some 
basic sanitation investments and new housing and infrastructure provided with 85 new 
buildings by the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme. There are controversial plans by the Dharavi 
Redevelopment Authority to transform the area by subdividing it into five sectors, with 
developers providing private sector housing to subsidise social housing for eligible slum 
dwellers and public infrastructure.
MUMBAI: DHARAVI
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LEARNING  
FROM RIO
The following essays, data and maps offer an over
view of Rio de Janeiro’s spatial, social, economic 
and political evolution.
THE PARADOXES  
OF INEQUALITY 
Luiz E. Soares
Progress as a condition for 
rebellion
The series of startling events in June 2013 
began with a movement against increasing 
public transportation costs in São Paulo. 
Until then, everything seemed business as 
usual, under the conservative media’s fire, 
with arrogant declarations made by the right-
wing governor and the left-wing mayor, who 
both refused to even negotiate a reduction 
in transport fares. The scene was typical and 
the unfolding events were predictable. At that 
juncture, the protests seemed to be waning 
and likely to remain local. But, on the second 
day of the protests, the military police in São 
Paulo offered its invaluable contribution to 
the country’s history, acting with criminal 
brutality, also against journalists. It was 
enough to ignite Brazil’s collective spirit. 
Within a few days the proposed increase in 
transport costs had been revoked, but the 
inflamed masses did not retreat.
The starting point is justified. In Rio 
and São Paulo, workers spend up to four 
hours every day making their way across 
urban spaces jammed with cars, which have 
multiplied in the last decade due to the growth 
of the middle classes by 40,000 Brazilians. This 
crisis in urban mobility is the unanticipated 
and contradictory result of a decrease in 
inequality together with rapid growth – 
one of whose focal points has been the car 
industry. In addition, the combination of more 
consumers, more access to education, and 
the citizenry’s increased cultural appreciation 
creates a new context. Improvements have 
converged in such a way that certain situations 
that in the past would have been tolerated 
passively, have become unacceptable. 
This apparent paradox is not new: in the 
nineteenth century Alexis de Tocqueville 
taught us that the social groups most willing 
to act and react are not the poorest and 
most powerless, but rather those that have 
something to lose. This means that the social 
improvements during Brazil’s last two decades 
(especially the last ten years) have broadened 
the slice of the population potentially willing 
to resist if faced with losing. Those who have 
risen will not surrender their gains without a 
fight. What gains, exactly, am I referring to?
Recent gains in Brazilian society
Using the Gini coefficient to measure income 
inequality, Brazil achieved its lowest level 
[representing less rather than more inequality, 
eds.] in 2011, the lowest for 51 years since 
this measurement was introduced in 1960. 
Between 1960 and 1990, inequality grew 
from 0.5367 to 0.6091. From that point it 
decreased until 2010, when it reached 0.5304. 
It continued to fall in 2011, when it reached 
the lowest number ever, 0.527. Even though 
the inequality coefficient was at its lowest ever 
two years ago, Brazil continues to be one of the 
twelve most unequal countries in the world.1 
Yet luckily, a steady trend is beginning to 
reverse the inequality at a considerable rate.
In the first decade of the twenty-first 
century, the compound annual growth rate 
in income for the wealthiest 10 per cent of 
Brazilians was 10.03 per cent, while for the 
poorest 50 per cent it was 67.93 per cent. 
Ricardo Paes de Barros, director of social 
policy and research at Brazil’s National 
Institute for Applied Economic Research 
(IPEA), points out that the 10 per cent poorest 
obtained an increase in income per capita of 
about 7 per cent per year, between 2001 and 
2009, only a little lower than the celebrated 
average growth in per-capita income in China. 
He estimates that few countries could achieve 
an outcome comparable to Brazil’s decrease of 
income inequality between 1999 and 2009. The 
10 per cent wealthiest Brazilians held 47 per 
cent of national income, and that decreased 
to 43 per cent, while the 50 per cent poorest 
had 12.65 per cent of total income in 1999, and 
went on to earn 15 per cent by 2009.2 
The fact that stands out most is that in 
1993, the year before the implementation of 
the Plano Real (designed to control inflation), 
23 per cent of Brazil’s people lived in extreme 
poverty. In other words, they did not have 
access to the income necessary to consume 
the minimum number of calories required for 
healthy survival. The Plano Real transformed 
that devastating situation in one year. In 1995, 
the first year of Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s 
first term as President, the percentage of the 
population in extreme poverty decreased 
from 23 per cent to 17 per cent. By 2003, the 
proportion of people in extreme poverty had 
remained the same. In 2009 it fell to 8.4 per 
cent. While it is still an excessively high and 
unacceptable number, it is much lower than it 
was at the beginning of the 1990s.
In 1993, there were 51 million Brazilians 
with a monthly household income below 
R$752 (2011 value, US$450). In 2001, there 
were 46 million. By 2011, the number had 
decreased to 24 million. In 1993 there were 41 
million Brazilians whose monthly household 
income was between R$752 and R$1,200, 
and dropped to 38 million by 2011. On the 
other hand, there were 45 million people in 
1993 whose household income was between 
R$1,200 and R$5,147 and that figure more 
than doubled, reaching 105 million by 2011. 
Note that during the 18 years in question (1993 
to 2011), Brazil’s population grew at a slower 
rate than previous decades. The accelerated 
growth, seen in the 1940s (when the average 
birth rate was 2.39) and the 1950s (when it 
reached 2.99), fell in the 1990s (to 1.64) and 
even further (to 1.17) in the first decade of the 
twenty-first century.3
When the dynamics of demography are 
taken into account, the meaning behind the 
worthy process of inequality reduction is 
more effectively revealed. These figures enable 
Marcelo Neri, economist and former president 
of the IPEA, to affirm that ‘39.6 million 
Brazilians entered the tier of the so-called new 
middle class (class C) between 2003 and 2011 
(59.8 million since 1993).’4
 
Plural agendas and the collapse  
of political representation
The agenda of this evolving political movement 
is not uniform, and each participant holds up 
his small sign with a proposal, a criticism, a 
demand, in formal language or with humour, 
whether it is against homophobia or the 
technocratic authoritarianism of governments. 
Meanwhile, in spite of the immense thematic 
spectrum, some topics are constant: public 
transportation, urban mobility, corruption, 
police brutality, unequal access to justice, more 
resources for education and health, and fewer 
resources for building lavish stadiums for the 
2014 World Cup, or the 2016 Rio Olympics. In 
this way, the price of public transport ticket 
merely put a metonymic chain into circulation 
in Brazil’s individual and collective imaginary, 
connecting the most diverse contemporary 
national issues. And each individual felt 
motivated to contribute to this epic narrative 
their own description of what they find to be 
the fundamental and urgent drama. Note that 
the legitimacy of the federal government was 
never seriously questioned.
The common axis, however, underlying 
these diverse positions, is an indignant 
proclamation of the collapse of political 
representation. The protestors have lost faith 
in parties and politicians who renew their 
mandates through the electoral system without 
realising that a mere respect for the rules of 
the game is not enough to keep democracy 
on its feet. Since the establishment of the 1988 
Constitution, following 21 years of military 
dictatorship and three hybrid years, Brazil has 
been a democratic state that follows the rule 
of law. But democratic institutionalisation 
came to be seen by the majority of society 
as a hollow shell, a form without content, 
taken over by unscrupulous political agents. 
The formal endorsement of members of 
parliament and political rulers through the 
electoral process, in a country where voting 
is obligatory, does not guarantee legitimacy 
from society’s point of view. The breakdown 
of political representation has occurred while 
the country’s leadership has demonstrated no 
sign of understanding the magnitude of the 
abyss that could open up – and swiftly deepen 
– between political institutionalism and the 
feeling of the majority. 
The defining characteristic of the current 
movement is its intensity. The protests 
occur in the language of excess: many 
people, all day long, demonstrating about 
every possible theme and topic – and there 
is always the exalted and violent minority 
that defaces public property. On the fringes 
a few professional crooks go along for the 
ride, as well as those who enjoy destroying 
things for no reason. Why the passion and 
intensity? I suggest a hypothesis: the linked 
political problems and symbolic bonds are, 
as I explained, interrelated, accentuating 
one permanent feature: inequality. And this 
happens in an institutional and normative 
context, the democratic state under the rule 
of law, where equality is the declared and 
reiterated principle. For this reason, negative 
associations become aggravated, accentuating 
the emotional intensity with which they are 
experienced and communicated: anything 
that condones inequality stands out because it 
strongly contradicts the expectations created 
by the constitutional pact. In the end, is the 
dialogue about citizenship worth it or not? 
 
 
Despite the very significant reduction in 
inequality, it persists in many forms. Just 
as violence and police brutality against the 
poor and blacks persist. The outrageous 
inequality between blacks and whites has been 
decreasing, but it endures, revealing structural 
racism within the country. Between 1950 and 
1980, whites lived 7.5 years longer on average 
than blacks and mulattos – classifications 
used at that time. In 1980, the life expectancy 
of blacks remained at 59 years. In 1987 the 
white population lived on average until the 
age of 72, while the life expectancy of blacks 
was 64.5. Another lurid confirmation. In 
1980 the infant mortality rate of blacks and 
mulattos was the same as the infant mortality 
of whites in 1960: 105 out of every 1000 live 
births. Skin colour, which means nothing 
according to those who believe in the myth 
of Brazil’s racial democracy, separated life 
expectancy among blacks and mulattos – by 
20 years – from the social advances achieved 
by the white population, advances that would 
have been impossible without the labour of the 
non-whites.5
Marcelo Neri provides revealing data about 
three phenomena, the historical significance 
of which is profound. First, the demographic 
effect of the social construction of Brazilian 
identity: the portion of society that defines 
itself as black is growing dramatically. If you 
compare the last two censuses executed by 
Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics, 
2000 and 2010, the number of blacks in Brazil’s 
population increased by 22.6 per cent. In my 
mind, the main reason is the growing political 
consciousness of Afro-descendants, who 
increasingly acknowledge their colour and 
what it means with pride.5
The second phenomenon studied by 
Neri is the shocking level of inequality. The 
probability that a person who calls themselves 
white is poor is 49 per cent less likely than 
someone who is black, and 56 per cent less 
likely than a mulatto. For example, a white 
illiterate middle-aged woman who lives in a 
favela in the city of Salvador is 29.4 per cent 
less likely to be poor than if she is non-white. 
The 2010 census made clear the colour of 
economic inequality, indicating that 70 per 
cent of extremely poor Brazilians are black. 
I can add other alarming figures regarding 
violence, public safety and the criminal justice 
system.6 The Mapa da Violência, published in 
2011, reveals that in 2002 to 2008, the number 
of blacks who had been murdered grew by 
20.2 per cent, while the number of white 
victims of the same crime decreased by 22.3 
per cent. There is no doubt that blacks and the 
poor are the main victims of the worst crime 
– premeditated murder – just as they are the 
main victims of lethal policy brutality and 
illegal searches.
The third phenomenon is good news. 
Between 2001 and 2009, 44.6 per cent of 
income growth occurred among blacks, 48.2 
per cent among mulattos and 21.6 per cent 
among whites. The growth of the proportion of 
the black population in Brazil and the extreme 
significance of increased access by black 
youths to university – thanks to the affirmative 
actions of policies such as the Programa 
Universidade para Todos (Prouni) and bank 
loans for blacks – has created a new scenario 
that bodes well for the future democratisation 
of Brazilian society. According to data released 
by IPEA in its Boletim Políticas Públicas: 
acompanhamento e análise (No. 19), the net 
rate of student enrollment among 18- to 
24-year-olds grew more than five-fold between 
1992 and 2009. While in 1992 only 1.5 per 
cent of young blacks entered university, in 
2009 8.3 per cent pursued higher education. In 
this period the net rate of enrolment of young 
whites jumped from 7.2 per cent to 21.3 per 
Persistent historic inequities
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cent, and the contingent of black students grew 
from 20.8 per cent of the total white group in 
1992 to 38.9 per cent in 2009.7
 
From invisibility to the fight for 
recognition
Another important dimension of the current 
political climate is captured by access to the 
Internet. In 2011, 115,433,000 Brazilians aged 
ten or older owned a mobile phone (in 2005, a 
little less than half, 56,105,000 Brazilians, had 
mobile phones) and 78,672,000 surfed the web. 
The growing participation in social networks 
made the June 2013 protests viable, which then 
began to depend on the conventional media 
itself. In addition, it has allowed Brazilians 
to identify themselves and put in practice 
the global model of taking over public spaces 
as a kind of direct democracy or political 
action not mediated by institutions, parties or 
representatives. The model recalls the classic 
idea of direct democracy as the ideal, while not 
achieving it entirely. 
Once begun, the mediations never 
cease, connecting different institutionalised 
processes to the energy of the masses in the 
public squares. What matters in this dramatic 
scenario are idealised memories and common 
languages, as if these events were cited 
mutually creating a virtual constellation of 
hypertexts. 
In this context, it becomes possible to feel 
included in the transnational narrative about 
new democracy; to feel pride for those who felt 
disrespected and invisible before public power; 
to promote the identification with the persona 
of the civic hero, where collective political 
experiences become cult entertainment 
for the anti-political (even if it involves the 
risking of one’s life); to engage in a fraternal 
and gregarious experience (before an enemy 
that is abstract and ghostlike while being 
obviously and immediately identified with the 
face of a police officer); and, to participate in 
an experience that fills one’s heart with joy, 
exalting the emotions and elevating them to 
an almost spiritual level.  
This text, originally entitled ‘Ground-shakes in a country of 
inequalities and paradoxes’, was written just after the June 
2013 protests that took place in many of Brazil major cities. It 
is an edited version of the text that was originally published 
in Los Angeles Review of Books on 1 July 2013; see http://
lareviewofbooks.org/article.php?id=1821 for the full text. 
Original translation by Magdalena Edwards.
1  By comparison, the UK’s Gini coefficient is 0.34, while  
 South Africa’s is 0.63, eds.
2  Paes de Barro cited by Rafael Cariello in ‘O liberal contra  
 a miséria’, in Revista Piauí, No. 74, November 2012, p. 30.
3  Elza Berquó, ‘Evolução demográfica’, in Ignacy Sachs,  
 Jorge Wilheim and Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro, eds., Brasil, um  
 século de tranformações, São Paulo, Cia das Letras, 2001,  
 p. 17.
4  Marcelo Neri, A Nova classe media. São Paulo, Saraiva,  
 2011, p. 26; PNAD – Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra  
 Domiciliar, by IBGE, Instituo Brasileiro de Geografia e  
 Estatística.
5  C.H. Wood & P.L. Webster, Racial inequality and child  
 mortality in Brazil. Mimeo, 1987, APUD; Berquó,  
 op.cit., 27; Garcia Tamburo, E.M., “Mortalidade infantile  
 da população negra brasileira,” Texto NEPO 11,  
 Campinas, NEPO/UNICAMP, 1987, APUD.
6  Silvia Ramos and Leonarda Musumeci, Elemento supeito,  
 Rio de Janeiro, Civilização Brasileira, 2005. 
7  For data on college attendance see: hhtp://www.ipea.gov. 
 br/igualdaderacial.
Luiz E. Soares is anthropologist, 
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CLOSE, YET FAR 
Sérgio Magalhães  
and Fabiana Izaga
Arriving in Rio de Janeiro in 1955, Nelson 
Pereira dos Santos, the director of Rio 40 
Graus [Rio 100 degrees Fahrenheit] – a film 
that received an award at the Film Festival 
of Brasília – was enraptured by the view of 
what he called ‘the exposed favela’. Originally 
from São Paulo, Nelson described how he 
found the perfect backdrop to the narrative 
of the ambiguous relationships of proximity 
and distance between the bourgeoisie of the 
asphalt, and the majority black population 
and rogues living on the hillsides in the 
South Zone of Rio de Janeiro. Although 
spatially close, that did not mean that they 
were integrated. In São Paulo, the favelas were 
not as exposed as those of Rio, juxtaposed 
with middle-class apartment buildings of 
the characteristic hillsides, typical of Rio de 
Janeiro’s South Zone. With its depiction of 
Brazilian reality through one day in the life of 
five kids in a favela in the North Zone – Morro 
do Cabuçu – who sold peanuts in Copacabana, 
Pão de Açúcar hill, and at the Maracanã 
stadium, some of the city’s main tourist 
attractions, the film inspired the Cinema  
Novo movement.
Since then, socio-spatial relationships 
in the city of Rio de Janeiro have deepened, 
and cannot be viewed simplistically through 
dual oppositions, as is sometimes attempted. 
Between the hills and the asphalt, legality and 
illegality, or even in the idea of a divided city, 
there is a lot more. The classic definition of rich 
central areas and poor outskirts manifested 
itself alongside the existence of pockets of 
poverty within wealthy neighbourhoods. The 
relations of proximity and distance between 
social groups focused on their material 
expressions, juxtaposed throughout the city, 
and came to represent and structure the 
metropolis of Rio de Janeiro.
The favelas, seen as a place of poverty, 
samba and trickery, and precarious areas 
ignored by public authorities, have gone 
through significant transformations since 
then. From the early 1970s onwards, the 
‘urbanisation’, or upgrading, of the favelas 
has provided positive experiences in some 
communities that received infrastructure 
and pavements, the basic requirements of 
urbanisation. In Rio de Janeiro, for instance, 
this process was strengthened in 1993 and 
following years with the Favela-Bairro 
programme created by the Municipality.
However, perhaps the most remarkable 
aspect of low-income settlements – including 
the favelas, but also the irregular land 
divisions and housing complexes – is the 
presence, from the 1990s onwards, of armed 
violence, which has settled into those areas 
in connection with drug trafficking. The 
existence of areas dominated by organisations, 
gangs or commandos came to define 
territories of exception, characterised by the 
‘absence’ or ‘scarcity’ of the State, shaping a 
social reality in which there is no rule of law. 
It is only since 2008 that these areas have 
been tackled by public authorities, through 
the Pacifying Police Units, or UPPs. What 
we need is a better way to understand how 
these areas have come about and how they are 
ingrained in the political, social and economic 
fabric of the city.
The origins of armed violence 
Initially, the city treated favelas as provisional 
settlements, with the expectation that 
development would soon arrive and replace 
them. This meant that these sites were ignored. 
This was followed by a period in which the 
Brazilian State banned them, at the same time 
as it discouraged the construction of rental 
housing and took up the task of producing 
subsidised homes – a task that was evidently 
not accomplished. The favelas could not be 
part of the city map.1 And since they were not 
on the map, the problem was solved. This legal 
determination prevailed even into the 1990s.
Irregular developments, in turn, appeared 
in the mid-twentieth century, at a time when 
accelerated population growth could not be 
accommodated in rental houses and when 
there was no funding for the construction of 
homes. The families that did not want to live 
in the  favelas occupied new areas in the West, 
building their own houses.
We could think that both the  favelas and 
the clandestine development areas resulted 
from low-income families adopting the 
nuclear family model, which they achieved 
without support from collective savings. 
Thus,  favelas and irregular settlements did 
not come about as a rejection to the city; they 
actually show the willingness of poor people to 
integrate in the city.
Housing complexes are the result of 
government decisions. Throughout the 
middle decades of the last century, complexes 
were built as the main – and almost 
exclusive – housing policy action. Residential 
complexes were to a large extent aimed for the 
compulsory resettlement of families living 
in  favelas that were demolished by public 
authorities.
In Rio de Janeiro, recent data (2010) 
indicates the existence of about 425,000 
households in 763 clusters called ‘subnormal’, 
including  favelas, irregular development 
areas, and settlements without infrastructure 
or land ownership. These numbers suggest 
that about 1.5 million people live in informal 
areas, or about 25 per cent of the population of 
Rio. The first census of the  favelas, carried out 
in 1948, revealed the existence of about 35,000 
households, 138,000 inhabitants, or 7 per 
cent of the total population. This significant 
increase marks the tortuous trajectory of poor 
people in relation to the city’s housing stock.
Favelas, developments and housing 
complexes are the three main models of low-
income urban settlements in Brazil. In Rio de 
Janeiro nearly half of its population lives in 
these conditions. This is clear when we look at 
the city map.
Common conditions
From the point of view of access to 
infrastructure and urban services, the degree 
of integration of these settlements varies. But 
there is a condition common to almost all of 
them: the absence of the State. Governments 
are not as present as they are in the ordinary 
city – on the asphalt. Even in the residential 
complexes of Cidade de Deus, Vila Kennedy 
and Vila do João/Maré, where regular 
settlements were created, governments usually 
do not provide good public services to the 
residents. 
Regularisation of property, for instance, 
does not exist, even though the earliest 
communities date back to the 1960s. ‘Absence’ 
or ‘lack of State presence’ is not a way of 
saying public services are bad, it is much 
more: a reality in which there are no effective 
laws governing society. In most of these low-
income settlements, tenancy law does not 
apply. Relationships between landlords and 
tenants are mediated by forces that do not 
comply with the Brazilian Constitution. In 
case of tension, the parties will seek to resolve 
their conflicts with support from the powers 
that replace the absent State. 
The tax code and building laws have no 
power either. In those favelas, in case of land 
divisions and housing developments where the 
State is not present, there are no guarantees 
that the right to legal defence, the right of the 
adversary or the right to come and go – key 
pillars of the Brazilian Constitution – will be 
respected. So, what are the rules in force? How 
are they established? Who enforces them? 
Structuring of territorial control
Without a rule of law, these settlements are at 
the mercy of organisations or gangs for which 
the areas have some value. In general, the value 
attributed is one linked to the drugs trade. 
Today this business is certainly a relevant 
aspect, but it is no longer the only one, and 
perhaps not even the most important.
Illegal trade of public services, like 
transport, communications and electricity, 
are part of everyday life in these settlements, 
the control of which has acquired increasing 
value. Recently, with the advent of the milícias, 
security services were also created. The 
construction of irregular housing is another 
very profitable business, with much better 
profits than the ones in the formal housing 
economy. And, as rent collection cannot be 
dissociated from the ‘dissuasive argument’ 
of the strongest, it reinforces the circle of 
illegality, secrecy, and of the better armed.
In Rio de Janeiro, the way territorial 
control is structured is no longer based on 
drugs sales points, but on a network. By 
consolidating itself, this network of illegality 
forms ‘islands’ that are controlled by different 
laws. The absolutists at the top exceed the 
control of their territories and expand their 
tentacles beyond the archipelago. Thus, the 
network also unfolds over the legal urban 
fabric and reaches successive neighbourhoods 
and important regions of the city.
Thus, in these territories ignored by the 
State, an economic-political-social network 
has been established with negative impacts on 
the economy, politics, society, and urban life.
Causes and effects x recovery and 
permanence
Since urban violence has become part of 
everyday life, it was first understood to be part 
of the economic forces of modernity. Trapped 
between authoritarianism and social chaos, 
illegality was seen as part of a kind of political 
protest. Next, violence was treated in a context 
of symbiosis between marginality and the 
agents of the State, where corruption was the 
common element. To this we could add the 
absence of fully-shared moral boundaries, 
which attributes a certain incentive to illegality 
in the pursuit of social mobility. Permeating 
these stages, there were several ways to tackle 
violence based on the role of the repressive 
apparatus of the State, which assumed greater 
or lesser importance, without connections to 
the social, political or economic causes.
It was only after the Brazilian State lost 
its legitimacy – and citizens their spirit – that 
the Pacifying Police Units, or UPPs, started 
to be deployed from 2008 onwards. Since 
then, there has been an arduous attempt to 
re-constitutionalise those territories. This does 
not mean the end of clandestine networks. On 
the contrary, the symbolic recovery that is the 
result of the presence of the State in these areas 
represents the beginning of a new process.
Close, yet far from the rest of the legal city, 
those territories of exception are beginning to 
recover their citizenship. Permanent services, 
viewed as banal in great part of the city, such 
as regular refuse collection, home delivery of 
goods and mail, among others, in addition 
to the simple possibility for children to get 
to and from school in safety, have started to 
happen without the threatening control of 
drugs trafficking. With the now permanent 
presence of the State, it is a matter of time 
before services reach these areas. The ways 
vary, and new problems may arise. In the 
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LIVES APART
With a population of over 130,000, 
the Complexo da Maré is one of Rio’s 
largest unpacified favelas. Travelling 
from the Maré to Leblon – a high income 
neighbourhood in Rio’s South zone- life 
expectancy decreases by nearly half  
a year for every kilometre travelled.
45
South Zone, boutique hotels have already 
arrived, and sightseeing tours take place in the 
pacified favelas, attracted by the proximity of 
the wealthy areas and the fine views over the 
city. However, many areas of the metropolis, 
especially the North Zone, from Bonsucesso to 
Irajá, remain critical. 
Once the initial stages of recovery of 
these territories are overcome, one of the 
main challenges arising is the permanence of 
public services – which cannot be understood 
merely as the presence of police forces. Full 
consolidation of state control is essential. The 
recent mass protests have brought to the fore 
the issue of lack of consistent public urban 
development policies. Our cities still need a 
more cohesive agenda, with a much stronger 
commitment to urban development.
1 According to Rio de Janeiro’s Municipal Legislation of  
 1937.
Sérgio Magalhães is President 
of the Brazilian Institute of 
Architects. Fabiana Izaga is 
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WORK HAS ONLY 
JUST BEGUN 
Julia Michaels
In Brazil, change has always come slowly, 
while inequality has weighed heavily. In 
this context, Rio de Janeiro developed with 
informal settlements scattered among 
middle- and upper-class neighbourhoods. The 
rich didn’t want to live on hilltops without 
electricity, water or rubbish and sewage 
collection, but they didn’t mind if their 
servants resided conveniently close by. 
Such geography led to a symbiosis that 
produced rich interconnecting webs of 
personal relations, Carnival, samba, funk, 
beach culture, art, and much else worth 
celebrating. At the same time, those webs, 
unchecked by government or the press, 
together with a phase of liberalisation 
following the departure of the 1964–85 
military government, allowed criminal  
gangs to take over and run informal 
territories, or favelas. 
As kidnappings and other crimes spread, 
and the economy foundered, in the 1980s 
Rio lost banks, the stock market and much 
else, to São Paulo. Factories closed. The city’s 
downtown and its contiguous port went into 
decay and lost its residential population. 
Due to the ensuing safety issues as well as 
the daunting complexity of urban renewal, 
residents, commerce, investment and real 
estate developers turned westwards to rural 
and empty beachfront areas within the city 
limits. 
This exodus was particularly devastating 
for the industrial and working-class North 
Zone, close to the port and the international 
airport (which then became assets for those 
who went into the drugs and weapons 
businesses). But even the glitzy South Zone – 
Copacabana, Ipanema, and Leblon – suffered 
private- and public-sector neglect and 
depreciation, with residents dodging bullets 
flying off drug-dealers’ hilltops. 
And, although there are few hilltops in 
the expanding lagoon-dotted West Zone, a 
similar pattern emerged there: construction 
workers and other unskilled labourers 
were relegated to the edges of mangrove 
swamps, while their employers swarmed 
to beachfront property, gated communities 
and shopping malls. Ultimately, the city had 
allowed developers to build what amounted 
to a Brazilian Miami – without a sewerage 
system or effective public transportation. 
Traffic jams, favelas and clogged lagoons 
ensued, with the city’s poorest section in its 
furthest reaches.
The 1990s and 2000s saw the rich 
building ever-higher walls in the entire 
city, hiring ever-bigger armies of security 
personnel, and keeping close to home 
and work. The city withered. In the latter 
decade, the Rio’s state-run police force, 
largely corrupt (partnering with the drug 
and weapons trade), kept an uneasy peace 
by way of periodic incursions into North 
and South Zone favelas. In the West Zone, 
off-duty and retired police and firemen 
organised milícias. Welcomed at first, these 
groups evolved into violent extortionist 
gangs with their own wheeling and dealing 
in the areas of transport, bottled cooking gas 
and infrastructure – and got themselves duly 
represented on the city council and in the 
state legislature. 
With the election of Sérgio Cabral as 
governor in 2006, the Rio police took a new 
approach to public safety, which gained 
continuity with his 2010 re-election. Dubbed 
pacification, the largely successful policy 
focuses on retaking territory from drug 
traffickers, mostly in the North and South 
Zones. Reducing daily gun violence directly, 
so far, for about 500,000 favela residents, the 
policy has halved Rio’s homicide rate (to 24 
per 100,000 a year, although numbers seem 
to fluctuate slightly between sources), raised 
real estate values, drawn investment and 
allowed citizens greater mobility. 1 
Thus began an urban turnaround that 
now faces huge challenges. Rio has become 
in effect two cities. The sprawling West Zone, 
riddled with milícias and new construction, 
will host most of the 2016 Olympic Games. 
The degraded, more densely populated 
North and South Zones, safer than in 
decades past, are starting to integrate both 
formal and informally settled areas into a 
single vibrant fabric. 
Then there is the Centre, where tunnels 
and open areas will replace an elevated 
motorway, augmenting access to the Bay. 
Light rail transportation will connect new 
office buildings in the renovated port area 
to the traditional centre. A cable-car system 
will take residents and tourists up and down 
to Rio’s oldest favela, Morro da Providência. 
What the expanded downtown will look 
and feel like in five or ten years is an open 
question.
It should be noted that all of this takes 
place in a context of nearly full employment, 
the result of local petroleum and gas 
investment, a series of mega-events, federal 
funding for local initiatives, significant 
national economic growth (starting to ebb 
now), and the widening of Brazil’s socio-
economic pyramid, with thousands of 
Rio’s 1.4 million favela residents joining the 
formal economy and the lower ranks of the 
middle classes.
The challenge is basically to transform 
a two-tier system (public, for the poor, and 
private, for the better-off) of transport, 
education, public safety, housing and health 
into something more democratic. Added 
to this are the inefficiencies of a state-run 
public sanitation company that provides 
water to just about everyone, but collects and 
adequately treats the sewage of only 30 per 
cent of the city.
The transformation requires changing 
the priorities, the mindset and the 
standing of a host of entrenched interests, 
political and economic. These interests 
have long called the shots in Rio. Elected 
representatives rubber-stamped the mayor 
and governor’s wishes, with little initiative 
or accountability to voters, perpetuating and 
strengthening the power of urban players, 
including the milícias, bus and construction 
companies, and real estate developers.
The elected city council is apparently so 
useless that Mayor Eduardo Paes, a modern-
minded, yet authoritarian young politician 
voted into a second term last year, appointed 
a new City Council of 136 members to advise 
him on two strategic plans. Notably, none 
of its illustrious, mostly white, mostly male, 
members live in a favela.
Meanwhile, citizens have traditionally 
shunned what they consider to be ‘dirty 
politics’, with the upper classes simply pulling 
strings when they need to. Local media, 
virtually monopolised by the Globo empire, 
have only this year begun to report on how 
Rio truly functions.
To further close the inequality gap, 
preserve diversity and hasten lasting social 
change – in other words, to realise its 
enormous cultural and economic potential – 
the  city of Rio proper (population 6.3 million) 
must now provide full-blown city and state 
services to both formal and informal areas, 
address transportation issues stemming from 
urban sprawl, and bring together North, South 
and West Zones into a workable territory that, 
at 1,182 km2, is an enormous challenge even 
without the neighbouring towns that double 
the population to a metropolitan area of twelve 
million souls. In comparison, New York City, 
covering 1,213 km2 and London, at 1,572 km2, 
are each home to just over eight million. But 
these megalopolises are set in more highly 
developed democracies, with many more 
checks and balances on urban development.
Governor Cabral and Mayor Paes, 
supported by ample federal funding, have 
achieved much. Yet the progress seems 
diminished by the long roster of what remains 
to be done:
•	 Coordinate	with	neighbouring	cities	 
 around metropolitan issues such  
 as harbour clean-up, inter-municipal  
 transport, employment and long-term  
 public safety policies. Greater Rio  
 accounts for three quarters of the state’s  
 total population of 16 million.
•	 Demilitarise	and	unify	Rio’s	several		
 police forces, with better training and  
 efficiency, to reduce abuse and improve  
 pacification efforts. Although public  
 safety officials have arrested growing  
 numbers of drug traffickers, they must  
 also address criminals’ flight within the  
 metropolitan area.
•	 Focus	on	housing,	particularly	low-	
 income, and particularly close to jobs.  
 Housing policy centres on the federal  
 low-income Minha Casa Minha Vida  
 (MCMV, My House My Life) programme,  
 plagued by corruption, bureaucracy,  
 shoddy construction, and a lack of  
 community participation and vision as to  
 where and how low-income families  
 should live in dignity. The MCMV  
 programme contracted the build of 90,211 
 homes in the state of Rio de Janeiro, and  
 by last July had only delivered 16,216  
 units. Other efforts have produced even  
 smaller results.
•	 Further	improve	public	health	and		
 education, while increasing coordination  
 between state and municipal levels.
•	 Make	good	on	a	widely	heralded			
 programme, Morar Carioca, to upgrade  
 all favelas by 2020, now scaled back to  
 provide infrastructure only – due to lack  
 of government funds and market  
 incentives. 
•	 Further	improve	public	transport.	This	 
 has focused on connecting the West  
 Zone to the rest of the city, with dedicated  
 bus lanes and an extension to a line of  
 the state metro concession. Experts  
 call for upgrades of existing North Zone  
 train lines, to keep residents closer to the  
 centre and add value to a region in  
 decline. The city has noticeably  
 reorganised and improved bus service  
 but this still falls far short of passenger  
 demands, at the centre of constant  
 pressure on the city council. 
The constant pressure on the elected city 
council demand has arisen from street 
demonstrations that erupted last June, settling 
in downtown Rio and outside the governor’s 
South Zone offices and apartment building. 
Before June 2013, it looked as though 
Rio’s transformation would undermine the 
unusual symbiosis among its diverse groups, 
gentrifying the South and some North Zone 
hilltops and pushing westwards those unable 
to afford these areas. It seemed as though the 
historic port area, almost wholly restricted 
to office buildings, museums and cruise ship 
services (including tourism), would remain 
mostly dark and silent at night and  
on weekends.
This may still happen. But politicians have 
demonstrated increased sensitivity to voters. 
Some backtracking has occurred, and new 
dialogues are under way. Growing foreign 
interest and pressure, together with better 
access to information and a sense that real 
change is possible, are fuelling the process.
Notably, significant give and take, 
particularly on the subjects of mobility and 
housing, has begun between city hall and 
the local chapter of the Brazilian Architects’ 
Institute, which represents the city’s top 
architects and planners. The mayor’s July 
decision to allow urban renewal for residents 
of Vila Autódromo, an informal settlement 
previously in the path of Olympic Village 
bulldozers, indicates the possibility of 
preserving, in some cases, the positive features 
of informal settlements. And the governor is 
rethinking plans to privatise the renovated 
Maracanã football stadium, set to exclude 
less prosperous sports enthusiasts and slated 
to demolish a public school, a swimming 
complex and a building used by Brazilian 
indigenous groups.
Rio’s citizens and media (and, perhaps, 
the politicians themselves) have begun to 
understand that politics need not be quite 
so ‘dirty’. In fact, what’s occurring in Rio de 
Janeiro is a transition away from a favour-
exchanging populist system towards a more 
complete participatory democracy. And 
this, though messy and unpredictable, can 
only bode well for one of the world’s most 
charming and unique cities.
 
1  United States Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic  
 Security, OSAC. Brazil 2013 Crime and Safety Report:  
 Rio de Janeiro. Available at https://www.osac.gov/Pages/ 
 ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=13966.
Julia Michaels is a journalist and 
produces the RioReal blog.
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IN THE VIOLENT 
FAVELAS OF BRAZIL 
Suketu Mehta
My Brazilian friend Marina and I were picking 
up a visiting friend from New York, who heads 
an NGO, in her hotel lobby near Paulista, the 
most prestigious avenue in São Paulo. It was 
7.30pm on a busy Friday night last October. 
We walked up to a taxi outside the hotel. I sat 
in the front to let the two women chat in the 
back. I saw a teenage boy run up to the taxi 
and gesticulate through my open window. I 
thought he was a beggar, asking for money. 
Then I saw the gun, going from my head to the 
cell phone.
‘Just give him the phone,’ 
Marina said from the back seat.
I gave him the phone. He didn’t go away.
‘Dinheiro, dinheiro!’
I didn’t want to give him my wallet. 
The boy was shouting obscenities.
‘Dinheiro, dinheiro!’
The boy’s body suddenly jerked back, as 
a man’s arm around his neck pulled him off 
his feet. The man, dressed in a black shirt, 
was shouting; he had jumped the boy from 
behind. He started hitting the boy. The taxi 
driver sitting next to me was stoic. He said that 
this had never happened to him before, but he 
couldn’t have been more blasé. 
The next thing I saw was the boy and 
another teenager, probably his accomplice, 
running away fast up the street. The man in 
the black shirt chased them a bit, then came 
back panting to the taxi. ‘Did the bastard get 
anything?’ our saviour ...  asked. He wasn’t a 
plainclothes cop, as I’d originally thought; he 
was just an ordinary citizen who was tired of 
the criminals. The taxi driver drove us to the 
nearest police station. Two lethargic cops were 
the only people there. ‘We get ten of these a 
day, just in this precinct,’ said one of them. The 
other cop went over to check in his register. 
‘Three before you today.’ There are 319 armed 
robberies a day in São Paulo.
Everyone in this country has a story. The 
cities of Brazil are some of the most violent 
places in the world today. More people are 
murdered in Brazil than in almost any other 
country. In 2010, there were 43,684 murders, 
22 per 100,000 inhabitants, according to the 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC), compared to the global rate of 6.9 
or to London’s rate of 1.6 (in 2009). Between 
5 to 8 per cent of Brazilian homicides are 
solved – compared to 65 per cent of murders 
in the US and 90 per cent of murders in the 
UK. Most of the victims are male and poor, 
between 15 and just shy of 30. The homicide 
rate has shaved seven years off the life 
expectancy in the Rio favelas.
The violence hasn’t prevented Brazil from 
emerging on the world stage as the preeminent 
country in Latin America. Next year, it will 
host the World Cup, two years after that the 
Olympics. Between 2003 and 2011, Luiz Inácio 
Lula da Silva – Lula – Brazil’s remarkable 
president, brought about one reform after 
another that improved the country’s economy. 
Rousseff, his successor, was until the protests 
of this June favoured to win a second term 
next year. Both she and Lula are from the 
centre-left Workers’ Party. Now, while not 
growing as fast as it did in the days before the 
crisis of 2008, the economy is still the world’s 
seventh largest. 
Brazilians like to think of themselves as 
a multiracial society, but a walk around the 
favelas of the cities demolishes this myth. 
Most of the residents have a dark complexion, 
much darker than most of the rich who live by 
the water or in the suburbs, and darker than 
most of the young people who have recently 
been protesting in the streets. Over the last 
year and a half, I have been visiting São Paulo 
and, especially, Rio de Janeiro, observing 
the process of ‘pacification’, by which the 
government attempts to peacefully enter and 
re-establish state control over the most violent 
enclaves of the city; those dominated by drug 
gangs, called traficantes, or by syndicates of 
corrupt police called milícias. Until 2008, 
when the pacification programme started, 
the traficantes controlled roughly half of the 
favelas, and the milícias the other half. Both 
still hold power in most favelas. The ultimate 
aim of the state government of Rio’s plan, 
called the Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora 
(UPP), or Police Pacification Unit, is to drive 
both of these groups out and replace them by 
the state.
Today, of Rio’s 6.3 million people, 1.4 
million live in the favelas. There are some 630 
of them, containing more than a thousand 
‘communities’. The state government aims 
to ‘pacify’ 40 of these favelas by the time 
of the World Cup next year – a kind of 
demonstration effect that will get attention 
from visitors. In the past, the police would raid 
individual favelas, capture or kill the biggest 
drug dealers, and leave. They would soon be 
replaced by other dealers, and the violence 
would continue. ‘The new strategy is not to 
target individual drug dealers. It is to take 
back territory,’ a high-ranking police official 
told me.
Under the UPP program, elite police units 
– and in some cases troops from the army and 
even the navy – invade the favelas and stay for 
up to three months. Then they are replaced 
by the regular police and squads of UPP 
civil servants. The UPP establishes schools 
and rubbish collection, brings in public and 
private companies to provide utilities such 
as electricity and television, and hands out 
legal documents such as employment and 
residency certificates. In the areas under 
its control, the UPP has set up community 
security councils, which attempt to mediate 
conflicts between local hotheads before they 
spread. The message is: the State is here to stay. 
So far, the programme has generally been seen 
as a success, and was a major factor in the re-
election of Sérgio Cabral in 2010 as the state 
governor backed by the Workers’ Party. 
One night in Rio, Walter Mesquita, a 
street photographer, took me to a baile funk, 
a street party organised by the drug dealers, 
in the unpacified favela of Arará. It was 
an extraordinary scene: at midnight, the 
traficantes had cordoned off many blocks, 
turning the favela into a giant open-air 
nightclub. One end of the street was a giant 
wall of dozens of loudspeakers, booming songs 
and stories about cop-killing and underage 
sex. Teenagers walked around carrying AK-
47s; prepubescent girls inhaled drugs and 
danced. On some corners, cocaine was being 
sold out of large plastic bags. Everybody 
danced: grandmothers danced, children 
danced, I danced. It went on until eight in the 
morning. 
Although such parties are officially 
prohibited in the pacified favelas because of 
their multiple breaches of the law, ranging 
from noise violations to exhortations to 
murder – even the music played there is called 
baile funk proibidão – the State and its forces 
were nowhere to be seen. The rival gangs were 
a bigger threat than the police. The three gangs 
that control much of Rio have remained more 
or less stable for the last couple of decades: the 
Red Command, the [Pure] Third Command, 
and Friends of Friends. According to a top 
police official I spoke to, in a city of just over 
6 million there are some 30 to 40 thousand 
people in the gangs.
The day after the baile funk, I was flying 
in a police helicopter over Rio. It took us over 
Ipanema and the newly pacified favela of 
Rocinha. I asked if we could fly over Arará. 
The pilot pointed it out in the distance, and 
said he could not fly directly over it. He was 
concerned about getting shot down. A couple 
of years ago, the traficantes had brought down 
a police helicopter with anti-aircraft guns. 
This, too, is the future of many megacities 
in the developing world, from Nairobi to 
Caracas. There is a de facto sharing of power 
between the legitimate organs of the state and 
the gangs, the milícias. Many people will die 
as the exact contours of this power sharing are 
negotiated.
Mário Sérgio Duarte is the high-raking 
police official who led the invasion of Alemão, 
one of the largest and most dangerous favelas 
in Rio. In an eight-day operation in 2010, 
the police found more than 500 guns: 106 
carbines, rocket launchers, bazookas, 39 
Browning anti-aircraft guns. ‘Pacification 
started with me,’ he tells me in the bar at 
the top of my hotel. Duarte’s mother was a 
seamstress, his father was murdered in 1972 
over a ‘personal dispute’. Duarte studied 
philosophy in college, but chose to join the 
police force. His T-shirt says, ‘Listen as your 
day unfolds’.
In the 1980s, cocaine from Colombia 
and Bolivia started coming into the favelas, 
accompanied by Eastern European AK-47s 
from Paraguay. A carbine, such as an AK-
47 or M-15, now costs around R$15-20,000 
(US$6,800-9,000). The traficantes have 
rocket launchers now, says Duarte, ‘better 
weapons than the police,’ who have .38s and 
9-millimetre revolvers. Each year, some 50 
cops and around 1,500 traffickers are killed. 
Last year, over a hundred police in São Paulo 
were murdered by the drug dealers, and police 
promised to kill five ‘bad guys’ for every cop 
killed.
The drug trade in just one favela, Rocinha, 
Duarte tells me, runs to around a million R$ 
(US$450,000) per week. But it’s not just drugs. 
The dealers run a parallel economy in pirated 
cable TV, phones, and moto taxis, and have 
their own systems of justice. ‘We don’t expect 
drugs to be stopped, just the violence with 
the drugs,’ Duarte says. He points to Santa 
Marta as an example of a pacified favela where 
drugs are still traded, but there are no visible 
weapons, ‘no king of the hill.’ 
The state government has increased 
the armed police force in Rio from 36,000 
to 42,000, towards a target of 50,000, with 
another 10,000 ‘civilian police’...  Their salaries 
start at R$1,500 reais (US$680) per month, 
and in six years go up to R$1,900 (US$860). 
A policeman stationed in a pacified area gets 
another R$500 a month to help him fight 
the temptation to take bribes or join one of 
the violent syndicates – the milícias – run by 
corrupt police.
What is happening in the favelas of Rio is 
not so much pacification as legalisation. The 
dictatorship that ruled from 1964 to 1985 was 
brought down after many years and great 
sacrifices. Everyone who was not connected 
to the junta was its victim. People rushed to 
spend their pay as soon as they got it in their 
hands, because by the afternoon it would be 
worth much less. When democracy came, 
everybody – the rich in Leblon and the poor in 
Rocinha – felt they should benefit from it, and 
in Brazil, for a time, most people did. 
But in the favelas there was no democracy. 
The traffickers continued with their own 
dictatorship; the people of the favela still had 
great trouble getting access to the courts 
or casting a vote. Pacification is an attempt 
to interrupt a despotic process. It is, for the 
construction workers and ladies who sell 
feijoada – a black bean stew – in the slum, the 
final fall of the dictatorship.
During the last twenty years, the drug 
dealers took informal control of much of life 
in the favelas, including, most importantly, 
music, the cultural lifeblood of Brazil. ‘Our 
challenge is what will happen after the 
pacification,’ I was told by Ricardo Henriques, 
who was until last year the head of the 
Instituto Pereira Passos, the government’s 
urban think tank that formulates policy for 
the UPP. As Henriques rather optimistically 
sees it, the takeover of the favelas will happen 
in three phases. The first consists of the police 
moving in and denying the drug dealers 
the ability to do what they want, legally and 
culturally. The second: ‘It’s a little bit boring, 
the police are here.’ The third phase consists 
of the state replacing the prohibited culture 
by an officially sanctioned culture, or at least 
culture that doesn’t continue to glorify rape 
and murder. ‘You do it in a creative manner,’ 
explained Henriques. ‘No guns. Less erotic, 
but really creative. The music is not proibidão.’
For decades, the favelas have existed in a 
parallel system to the rest of Brazil. ‘The idea 
of the state is to stay there for the long, long 
term,’ Henriques said. He wants to reduce the 
inequality between the favela and the rest of 
the city.  If this schematic-sounding vision of 
pacification works – and the ongoing protests 
throughout the country are putting it in doubt 
– what would come after it? One night I went 
to a jazz club in the favela of Tavares Bastos, 
which had been pacified for a year, right below 
the headquarters of the Batalhão de Operações 
Policiais Especiais (BOPE). The rooms of the 
club were packed with sweaty bodies and 
heavy with marijuana smoke. If the BOPE 
wanted to find drugs it wouldn’t have to go far. 
But it will never come here, because these are 
people from the rich, white areas of Ipanema 
and Leblon. The only black people I could see 
were the saxophonist and my guide, the street 
photographer, who lived here. ‘The people 
from the favelas can’t imagine themselves 
here,’ said the photographer. The music was 
bebop and bossa nova, an American idea of 
the jazz that Brazilians listen to. No samba 
here, much less funk. 
The club was opened five years ago. A 
beautiful white economist who works for a 
bank, wearing an expensive dress, told me she 
was already bored. ‘Two years ago there used 
to be more interesting people. Now I only see 
all the people I would see near the beaches.’ 
It costs R$50 (US$23) to get in; a beer is R$15 
(US$7). On the way to the club, I passed a 
number of small cafés. In some, neighbours 
were enjoying beers that cost a third as much. 
In one, pleasantly overweight couples were 
dancing close together to samba. All the lights 
in the houses of the favela were out; it was 
after midnight. But the white patrons on their 
way to the jazz club were raucous, laughing, 
energised by the thrill of the expedition to this 
clandestine destination.
In Tavares Bastos, and in favelas like 
Cantagalo, with its easy access to the rich 
southern zone of Rio and increased security 
after the pacification, the residents are being 
forced out, not by violence, which they can 
live with, but by high rents, which will make 
living there impossible. Their right to live there 
was protected as long as it was illegal. After 
pacification, the biggest threat to long-time 
residents of the Rio favelas will come not from 
drug dealers, but from property dealers.
 (c) 2013 The New York Review of Books/Distributed by The 
New York Times Syndicate
Suketu Mehta is author of 
Maximum City, and Associate 
Professor of Journalism at New 
York University.
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RESILIENT COMMUNITIES
Motorcycle taxis skirt the crowds on 
the narrow streets of Rocinha, one of 
Rio’s recently pacified favelas that sits 
cheek-by-jowl with the city’s affluent 
neighbourhoods.
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SELF, COMMUNITY 
AND URBAN 
FRONTIERS IN RIO 
DE JANEIRO  
Sandra Jovchelovitch
Rio de Janeiro is a city of multiple and 
contradictory layers, at once exposed 
and hidden by its beauty and complex 
topography. The distances and overlaps 
between its neighbourhoods and people 
are vast and operate at many levels, all 
immediately noticeable to the senses of 
those who are in the city. Walking in Rio, 
close to the Atlantic Ocean, or beyond, 
through its forests, mountains, people 
and buildings, it is difficult to focus the 
eye on one single aspect, because the key 
characteristic of the city is juxtaposition 
and mixture, a vibrant carnival of 
geography and humanity, a space that is 
both urban and psycho-social, made of 
many lives, emotions, representations and 
behavioural patterns.  
Nowhere is this more evident than 
in the contrast between the favelas and 
affluent paved areas of the city, described 
in the everyday language of Cariocas, as 
the dichotomy morro/asfalto (hill/asphalt), 
a signifier everyone understands and uses 
to navigate the complexity of divisions 
and lines of segregation that characterise 
Rio. The separation morro/asfalto is deeply 
connected to the process of urbanisation 
in Rio de Janeiro, which kept apart and yet 
grew dependent on the favela communities 
it marginalised. 
Officially called urban subnormal 
agglomerates, Rio’s favelas are ecosystems 
of great complexity, in which a rich and 
diverse sociality coexists with chronic lack 
of state services, and heavy social control 
imposed by drug bosses and police violence. 
Since the 1980s drug cartels have gradually 
gained control over favela territories, 
initiating an undeclared and subterranean 
war with the police. Caught in the middle of 
this confrontation, favela dwellers became 
a target for the police and over-exposed to 
the routes of socialisation established by the 
institutional and business-like character of 
narco-traffic. 
As the population of favelas grew, 
the increase in violence and homicides, 
combined with the chronic lack of services 
and socio-economic deprivation configured 
an environment of intense social exclusion. 
Despite being integral to the economy 
and socio-cultural life of the city, favela 
communities were pushed underground, 
their actual sociability and multiple life 
forms hidden away by geographical, social, 
economic, symbolic and behavioural 
barriers. 
This preponderance of marked urban 
frontiers is a central aspect of Rio de Janeiro 
and a major component of life in the favelas. 
Favela dwellers love their communities as 
well as the city, but they are acutely aware 
of borders and separation. Crime, violence 
and marginalisation are equated from the 
outside with the identity of favela residents, 
who regularly experience discrimination 
as they cross borders into the wider city. 
Negative representations and the stigma 
generated in the asphalt hurt both socially 
and psychologically by barring access 
to work and earnings, and by affecting 
identity and self-esteem. The words inside 
and outside are strong signifiers, deployed 
to express both differences between the 
urban worlds and the sharp borders that 
separate them. Border controls in the 
city are subjectively internalised: people 
understand that there is danger when 
crossing into different favelas and feel the 
pain of prejudice and discrimination when 
crossing into other areas of the city.
These issues can be illustrated by 
the psychosocial cartographies of four 
communities of Rio: Cantagalo, Cidade 
de Deus, Madureira and Vigário Geral, 
each located in a different area of the city 
(enter image 1 about here). Cantagalo and 
Vigário Geral fit the accepted definition of 
favelas, whereas Cidade de Deus was built 
as a planned area for relocating favela-
dwellers displaced from the city centre 
during the 1960s. Madureira is a formal 
neighbourhood surrounded by favelas. In 
their similarities and differences, each one 
of these four communities illuminates how 
geographical borders intersect with social 
and psychological frameworks to connect 
territory, community identity and a sense of 
self in the city.  
As with any map, psychosocial 
cartographies are established by 
borders. These can be more or less 
porous, depending on a combination of 
psychological and geographical elements, 
which establish the relations between the 
favelas and the city. These elements include 
the range and quality of social institutions 
present in a community, its location in 
relation to the wider city, the presence or 
absence of urban connectors, the experience 
of leisure of its inhabitants and the social 
representations held by the city as a whole 
about the area. 
Cantagalo 
It is located between Ipanema and 
Copabacana, at the heart of South Rio and 
its beautiful natural landscape. It benefits 
from the state services and commercial 
facilities of these formal neighbourhoods, 
despite the absence of these from the favela 
itself. The community is connected to 
Ipanema by a lift and a paved road, which 
makes it easy to come and go, even more so 
since the expulsion of the drug trade and the 
introduction of the Pacification Police Unit 
(UPP). Social representations of the area 
are mixed, including positive and negative 
dimensions. There is flow both ways in terms 
of leisure, services and intergroup contact, 
making Cantagalo’s borders highly porous.  
Madureira
It is in the centre of North Rio and open 
to the city, although distance gives some 
density to its borders. There are multiple 
institutions in Madureira and the 
neighbourhood enjoys its own facilities and 
vibrant popular culture. It is placed at the 
crossroads between the different cultures 
of Rio and offers multiple references for 
the sociability of its residents. Madureira 
is associated with poverty, but also with 
conviviality and important cultural 
traditions of the city. Its large market is a 
strong urban reference, and samba schools 
such as Portela are exemplary of its rich 
influence in the life of Rio. Its borders show 
medium to high porosity; they are very wide 
and not controlled by the drug trade.
Cidade de Deus
It is located remotely in the western part 
of Rio, close to forests and to the Barra 
neighbourhood, its beach and overall 
facilities. References for sociability 
are focused on the drug trade and the 
evangelical churches, although the 
UPPs are introducing a new, if uneasy, 
relationship with the state. There is freedom 
to come and go but leisure is concentrated 
inside the community, mainly for fear 
of discrimination. Dominant social 
representations of Cidade de Deus continue 
to link the community to the drug trade, 
poverty and violence. Its borders show low 
porosity: they are no longer controlled by 
narco-traffic, but internalised segregation 
keeps the horizons of the community 
primarily inside its own territory.
Vigário Geral
In Vigário Geral, scarcity of social 
institutions and distance from the city 
reduce the references for the sociability of 
its residents, which is polarised between 
AfroReggae, an important NGO originated 
in the community, and the drug trade. 
The drug trade is the central organiser 
of community life, and, along with the 
evangelical churches, AfroReggae, and the 
sporadic presence of the police, comprise 
the social institutions of the favela. 
Crossfire and stray bullets are part of 
everyday life; the area is closed and tightly 
controlled, and circulation is difficult. 
Vigário Geral is strongly associated with 
wars between factions of the drug trade and 
the violence of the police. The territory of 
the community circumscribes the leisure 
and the horizons available for its residents. 
Levels of porosity in community borders 
shape the context that is offered to pathways 
of socialisation inside favelas as well as 
the nature of the relationship between the 
communities and the wider city. Levels 
of porosity of borders correlate with the 
breadth of social networks and potential 
crossings that are available in the everyday 
life of favela dwellers. The broader the 
networks and looser the borders, the more 
the experience of the self is broadened. The 
denser the borders, the lesser the chances of 
expanding networks and crossing into the 
wider city, while the need and importance 
attributed to the few institutions, good or 
bad, that operate in the community rise.
Porosity of borders between peripheral 
communities and the wider public sphere 
of the city is a major factor defining the 
routes of socialisation and the individual 
and collective experience of the city. 
Actions on the flexibility of urban frontiers 
are central for the enlargement of the self, 
the regeneration of territories of exclusion 
and for giving back to favela dwellers 
the right to the city. Keeping borders 
open contributes to the transformation 
of identities and the development of 
citizenship. It connects a divided society 
and avoids the formation of ghettos that 
isolate and prevent the vibrancy embedded 
in the social and cultural encounters of 
the contemporary city. The Viaduto in 
Madureira and the Centro Cultural Waly 
Salomão in Vigário Geral are exemplary 
of these processes: they operate as places 
of encounter, learning, development, 
psychosocial containment and conviviality, 
bringing the city to the favela and the favela 
to the city. In regenerating the public sphere 
and the built environment of popular 
communities, they also regenerate Rio de 
Janeiro, establish a bridge between hitherto 
separated social worlds, and take a further 
step towards the communicative city.
The experience of Rio corroborates the 
need to decentralise urban planning and 
consolidate the vistas offered by the mixed 
city of the twenty-first century. Cleaning 
the city of its poor by removing favelas and 
unwanted populations from sight is not a 
sustainable urban solution, and not only 
because it violates the fundamental right to 
the city. The study of favela life shows that 
despite social exclusion there is resilience, 
a powerful culture and a proud collective 
intelligence living on the edges of the city. 
To recognise the favela and the potentials 
of its people, culture and economy 
requires urban policy committed to social 
integration, without which Rio de Janeiro’s 
development will always be partial.
 
Sandra Jovchelovitch is 
Professor of Social Psychology 
at the London School of 
Economics and Political Science 
and co-author of Underground 
Sociabilities, a study of Rio’s 
favelas.
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CITY DYNAMICS
Over the past 60 years Brazil’s population nearly quadrupled, 
reaching 190 million inhabitants in 2010. The vast majority 
of this growth has been accommodated in cities: while only 
36 per cent of the population lived in cities in 1950, this 
figure increased to 84 per cent by 2010, making Brazil one  
of the most urbanised countries in the world today. The rapid 
rural to urban migration has accelerated the growth of Rio 
de Janeiro into a city of more than six million people, with  
a metropolitan region nearly double that population.  
Rio’s population has been growing steadily since the late-
nineteenth century, with accelerated growth in the post-
World War II years and gradual slow-down in recent years. 
However it is only in the last ten years that Rio’s economic 
growth has outpaced its population growth.  
                
Economic Transformations
Rio’s socio-economic renaissance is underpinned by a 
national economy that has been growing rapidly over the 
past decade, and has weathered the global recession nearly 
unscathed. For the Municipality of Rio, per capita GDP more 
than doubled since 1999, increasing to more than R$30,000 
(US$13,000) in 2010, with the total GDP for the city now 
at more than R$190bn (US$85bn). The presence of large 
reserves of oil and natural gas off the coast of the State of Rio 
de Janeiro has further boosted Rio’s economy in recent years. 
The State is currently responsible for 74 per cent of Brazil’s 
total oil production, holding more than 77 per cent of the 
nation’s oil reserves and more than 60 per cent of the natural 
gas reserves. In terms of  GVA, Rio is one of a small number 
of cities in the world that are re-industrialising, largely due 
to the record investments in the oil and natural gas industry, 
which are expected to generate 250,000 new jobs across the 
country by 2016. Between 1995 and 2010 the contribution 
of the extractive sector to state GVA increased from one per 
cent to ten per cent. This same sector is behind more than 
R$2.4bn (US$1.1bn) in oil and natural gas royalties flowing 
into State of Rio de Janeiro’s coffers in 2011, with a further 
R$2.6bn (US$1.2bn) going directly to the municipality. 
This is nearly twice as much as the funds received by all 
other states in Brazil combined, although the current 
restructuring of royalties payments has put this reliable 
influx of cash into jeopardy.
Social Transformations
Over the past twenty years, the country’s strong economic 
growth coupled with a continued political commitment to 
social equity has led to a remarkable transformation in socio-
economic realities of the country’s poor. The percentage of 
the population living in poverty (income of less than R$140/
US$62 a month) has decreased substantially since 1993, 
with a marked drop following the 2003 introduction of the 
Bolsa Família, a social welfare programme introduced by 
former president Lula that has lifted millions of families 
out of poverty across the country. In 2011, only 16 per 
cent of the population of the Rio de Janeiro Metropolitan 
Region was categorised as living in poverty, a reduction of 
more than 50 per cent compared to 1993 levels. Inequality 
also improved for Rio over this time period, although the 
change is nowhere as drastic as for Brazil as a whole, which 
experienced a reduction in its Gini coefficient (a measure of 
inequality) from 0.60 to 0.53. This is due to the positive effect 
the Bolsa Família programme and other social policies have 
had in combating rural poverty and moving large numbers 
of people into the middle class. Despite these encouraging 
developments, Rio remains a highly unequal city, where 
extremes of wealth and poverty continue to exist side by side. 
From 1991 to 2010, life expectancy in the Municipality of 
Rio increased from 67.9 to 75.7 years while infant mortality 
dropped from 30 per 1,000 to 13 per 1,000. The metropolitan 
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Sectoral composition of the economy
Share of economic activities in gross value added of State of Rio de Janeiro (1995 and 2010)  
Source: IBGE
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level illiteracy rate dropped from 6 per cent in 1993 to 2.9 
per cent in 2011, a significant achievement compared to the 
rate of 8.4 per cent reported for the rest of Brazil in 2011. 
Secondary school graduation rates have doubled over the 
same period. However, 31.9 per cent of the metropolitan 
population above 15 years of age did not finish primary 
school and less than 20 per cent go on to study beyond 
secondary school. 
In the first decade of this century, new policies 
were implemented in Brazil to reduce crime levels and 
homicides in particular. In 2003, legislation was passed 
introducing tighter controls on firearms, in conjunction 
with disarmament campaigns. Following the 2006 
introduction of the UPP programme in Rio de Janeiro, the 
city experienced a marked drop in homicides, especially 
among its young population, although the current rate of 23 
homicides per 100,000 inhabitants remains higher than for 
most other global cities.     
 
Physical Transformations
While an impressive 99 per cent of municipal households 
now have running water and electricity, and almost all 
formal neighbourhoods receive regular waste collections 
services, waste collection in the favelas remains patchy and 
comprehensive recycling services are only slowly picking 
up across the city. Rio already generates 525 kg of waste 
per person every year, comparable to the rates of cities 
like New York and London, and the waste sector accounts 
for a staggering 21 per cent of Rio’s total greenhouse gas 
emissions. Road transport is responsible for a further 
39 per cent of emissions, highlighting the importance of 
rethinking the city’s transport infrastructure. This will 
help address some of the sustainability concerns while also 
improving accessibility, another central issue for the city.  
Rio is growing towards the West, which has seen average 
population increases of over 20 per cent between 2000 and 
2010. This population shift is driving development in the 
area. In 2011, whereas 611 residential and commercial units 
were added to the Centro and Port Area, over 15,806 units 
were added in Barra da Tijuca and its surrounding areas. Due 
to the distance and limited public transport connectivity 
to the city centre, modal splits in these neighbourhoods 
are heavily oriented towards car use, putting further strain 
on the city’s already congested road network. The city is 
adding more than 200 new cars to its streets every day and 
has now reached a motorisation rate of 310 cars per 1,000 
people. Current investments in the BRT system are aiming to 
improve accessibility along the main growth corridors and 
provide an alternative means of transport for millions of the 
city’s residents. Additionally, Rio has doubled the number of 
cycle lanes in the city since 2009, creating the largest cycling 
network in Brazil and quickly catching up with Bogotá as 
the most bicycle friendly city in Latin America. Currently 
measuring 320 km, the extension of the city’s bike lanes is 
part of a bigger initiative to reach 450 km in time for the 
Olympic Games in 2016. 
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Sanitation and electricity
Waste collection data excludes informal areas of the city 
Source:  www.atlasbrasil.org.br
 
Greenhouse gas emissions by sector
Source: Rio de Janeiro Municipal Environment Department (SMAC)
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URBAN TYPOLOGIES
Density: 21,560 pp/km2 Density: 20,890 pp/km2
A   COMPLEXO DO ALEMÃO B   CIDADE DE DEUS C   LEBLON
Density: 37,000 pp/km2
Built-up land: 54.7%
Average annual income: R$7,540 (US$3,374) Average annual income: R$10,710 (US$4,792) Average annual income: R$92,160 (US$41,239)
Built-up land: 39.8% Built-up land: 45.5%
Nestled between steep mountains, mangrove swamps and 
the Atlantic Ocean, Rio de Janeiro’s complex urban form 
has always been shaped and constrained by its dramatic 
topography. Together with the unequal distribution of 
wealth and contrasting formal and informal development, 
Rio has produced very distinct characteristics of urban 
form and order. Six neighbourhoods have been selected 
to display typologically diverse but nonetheless typical 
Carioca qualities. Arranged from highest to lowest density, 
the aerial photographs, figure-ground maps (showing built 
form in black and all open space in white over 1 square 
kilometre) and street-level images provide a snapshot of 
spatial variety in a dynamic city that includes informal 
hillside settlements, high-rise gated communities, everyday 
suburbia and traditional urban fabric overlooking the 
Copacabana waterfront.
57
Density: 14,990 pp/km2 Density: 14,570 pp/km2 Density: 6,940 pp/km2
D   BARRA DA TIJUCA E   BONSUCESSO F   SANTA CRUZ
Average annual income: R$97,250 (US$43,516) Average annual income: R$19,680 (US$8,806) Average annual income: R$14,280 (US$6,390)
Built-up land: 17.5% Built-up land: 56.4% Built-up land: 24.7%
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URBAN AGE
The Urban Age programme, jointly 
organised by LSE Cities and supported 
by the Alfred Herrhausen Society, the 
international forum of Deutsche Bank, 
is an international investigation of the 
spatial and social dynamics of cities. 
The programme centres on an annual 
conference, research initiatives and 
publications. Since 2005, twelve conferences 
have been held in rapidly urbanising 
regions in Africa and Asia, as well as in 
mature urban regions in the Americas and 
Europe.
ORGANISED BY 
LSE Cities
LSE Cities is an international centre 
supported by Deutsche Bank whose mission 
is to study how people and cities interact 
in a rapidly urbanising world, focusing on 
how the design of cities impacts on society, 
culture and the environment. Through 
research, conferences, teaching and public 
lectures, the centre aims to shape new 
thinking and practice on how to make cities 
fairer and more sustainable for the next 
generation of urban dwellers.
Extending LSE’s century-old commitment 
to the understanding of urban society, LSE 
Cities investigates how complex urban 
systems are responding to the pressures of 
growth, change and globalisation with new 
infrastructures of design and governance 
that both complement and threaten social 
and environmental equity.
Alfred Herrhausen Society, The 
International Forum of Deutsche Bank 
The non-profit Alfred Herrhausen Society 
is the international forum of Deutsche 
Bank. Its work focuses on new forms of 
governance as a response to the challenges 
of the twenty-first century. The Alfred 
Herrhausen Society seeks traces of the 
future in the present, and conceptualises 
relevant themes for analysis and debate. 
It works with international partners 
across a range of fields, including policy, 
academia and business, to organise 
forums for discussion worldwide. It 
forges international networks and builds 
temporary institutions to help to find better 
solutions to global challenges. It targets 
future decision-makers, but also attempts 
to make its work accessible to a wide 
public audience. The society is dedicated 
to the work of Alfred Herrhausen, former 
spokesman of the Deutsche Bank board 
of directors, who advocated the idea 
of corporate social responsibility in an 
exemplary manner until his assassination 
by terrorists in 1989. The Alfred Herrhausen 
Society is an expression of Deutsche Bank’s 
worldwide commitment to civil society.
London School Of Economics and 
Political Science
LSE is a specialist university with an 
international intake and a global reach. 
Its research and teaching span the full 
breadth of the social sciences. Founded in 
1895 by Beatrice and Sidney Webb, and set 
up to improve society and to “understand 
the causes of things”, LSE has always put 
engagement with the wider world at the 
heart of its mission.
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